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ABSTRACT 
This study aimed at providing a comprehensive Object-Relations 
understanding of the borderline personality. Towards that end 
theoretical issues related to the borderline concept were intro-
duced and certain controversial aspects were briefly discussed. 
A review of the pertinent descriptive literature attempting to 
detail borderline symptomatology was presented. The enormous 
discrepancies, inconsistencies and contradictions evident in this 
area emerged from the strongly contrasting descriptions of the 
various workers in this field • A borderline symptom profile 
.was introduced, based on both the descriptive literature review 
and the author's own experience, which served as a reference 
point for the dynamic formulations which followed. 
The theoretical formulations aimed at understanding a borderline 
personality structure were traced from their origins in Freud and 
Abraham. Melanie Klein was seen to play a central role in pro-
viding key:: . conceptual tools for understanding borderline 
phenomena, and pertinent aspects of her theory were presented in 
some detail. Modern American and European contributions were 
then introduced and a division along environmental - intropsychic 
axes emerged with respect to borderline aetiology. 
The study concluded with a selective synthesis of this division, 
which was then applied to two of the author's own case studies. 
The role of fantasy, and the structuring of mental processes were 
specifically emphasised for arriving at an adequate understanding 
of the ~orderline.perso~ality~. •· · · 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE BORDERLINE CONCEPT 
1.1 Aim 
1.2 
This initial section is intended to provide the reader with an 
overall perspective of the borderline concept, and of the border-
line patient within psychiatry generally. Special emphasis will 
be focussed on broad areas of discrepancy between two fundamental 
definitions of the borderline state or personality and the con-
sequences of such definitions, as well as introducing the reader 
to the importance of a conceptual framework for understanding the 
borderline state in particular, but, by implication psychiatric 
patients in general. The special position of the borderline concept 
in psychiatric nosology will be appreciated as regards difficulties 
in classification, inadequacies in the accepted signs and symptoms 
approach to diagnosis, and issues involved in diagnosis itself, 
issues so often taken for granted in the clinical setting. 
The Borderline The Concept and its Controversy 
It is commonly accepted (Kernberg 1972, Masterson 1973, 1974, 
Rinsberg 1977) that the "borderline" referred to in borderline 
conditions is that diffuse area of psychological functioning lying 
somewhere between the psychoses and neuroses. In other words, the 
borderline states are an apparent admixture of signs, symptoms, 
behavioural and relational spectra. However, the borderline state 
for the purposes of this study, is not to be confused with a transi-
tional state in the sense of finally leading to psychgsis or neurosis. 
Instead it is conceptualised as a stable hybrid of polysymptomatic 
clusters spanning a very wide spectrum. This is by no means a 
universally accepted con~ept, but one that will be argued for in 
this study, and one based on the pioneering work of Klein 1921-1967, 
Stern 1938, Deutsch 1942, Knight 1953, Kernberg 1967, and others. 
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It was originally considered to be a ragbag or wastebin 
category for those patients not neatly fitting either a 
neurotic or psychotic picture, but with time and observation 
a purely borderline mode of existence emerged, and (admidst 
hot contention and argument)(Gunderson & Singer 1975, 
Mack 1975, Green 1977) currently enjoys an automatic clinical 
status in the American Psychological Association's (APA) 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM III). It is defined 
in this source as follows: 
301.83. Borderline Personality Disorder. 
The essential feature is a Personality Disorder 
in which there is instability in a variety of 
areas, including interpersonal behaviour, mood, 
and self-image. No single feature is invariably 
present. Interpersonal relations are often 
intense and unstable, with marked shifts of 
attitude over time. Frequently there is impulsive 
and unpredictable behaviour that is potentially 
self damaging. Mood is often unstable, with 
marked shifts from a normal mood to a dysphoric 
mood or with inappropriate intense anger or loss 
of control of anger. A profound identity disturb-
ance may be manifested by uncertainty about several . 
issues relating to identity, such as self-image, 
gender-identity, or long term goals or values. 
There may be problems tolerating being alone, and 
chronic feelings of emptiness and boredom. 
(DSM.III, pp. 321-322). 
This definition, in one sense, sums up the peculiarities and 
difficulties in arriving at a conceptual understanding of the 
borderline state. On the one hand it is meaningful in so far 
as it introduces one to the range of problems experienced in 
all areas of borderline functioning. On the other hand, this 
definition is so broad as to convey little of value for the 
clinician wanting to make an accurate diagnosis of borderline 
pathology. As this study continues the reader, it is felt, 
will return to this defintion, despite its shortcomings, and 
respectuflly acknowledge its concise inclusiveness. This 
is so because of the enigmatic, chimera-like qualities·of the 
borderline concept. What is important is that in America at 
I 
least, the need to establish the borderline as a specific 
nosological entity has been felt'·· and~: perhaps more interestingly, 
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this slot has been located within the broad "Personality 
Disorders" bracket. It is, however, significant that no 
borderline category as yet, is referred to in the ICD-9 (1978). 
However this te~m is included as a descriptive item under the 
category "Latent Schizophrenia" (295.5) and is defined as 
follows:-
It has not been possible to produce a generally 
acceptable description of this condition. It 
is not recommended for general use, but a 
description is provided for those who believe 
it to be useful: a condition of eccentric or 
inconsequent behaviour and anomalies of affect 
which give the impression of schizophrenia 
though no definite and characteristic schizo-
phrenic anomalies, present or past, have been 
manifested. (ICD9, 1978, p.29) 
It is quite clear from this well qualified definition that the 
authors are fully aware of the scepticism and uncertainty rife 
in the use of this term. But what is significant is again the 
need to include it somewhere in the overall psychiatric nosology, 
·and, perhaps more importantly, is the slant toward the psychotic 
spectrum in its location. the term latent schizophrenia itself 
suggests that the latent may sooner or later become manifest, or 
that the non-psychotic appearance masks psychotic foundations. 
What is also of significance, as we shall see in greater detail 
later on, is the mutual exclusiveness of the above diagnosis from 
"schizoid personality" (ICD.9, 301.2) which is defined as follows: 
Personality disorder in which there is withdrawal 
from affectional, social and other contacts with 
autistic preference for fantasy and introspective 
reserve. Behaviour may be slightly eccentric or 
indicate avoidance of competitive situations. 
Apparent coolness and detachment may mask an 
incapacity to express feeling. (ICD.9, p.38). 
We shall see in what follows, that the presentation of the border-
line patient both in mental state and personal history, shows so 
many ambiguities, confusions and frank contradictions from day to 
day or from moment to moment, that the potential for seeing the 
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person as psychotic one minute or under one situation, and 
normal/neurotic under different conditions, is very great. 
The important point here of course is the resultant change 
in attitude and treatment and hence prognosis of the border-
line being seen as, at root, psychotic on the one hand, or 
as a somewhat cold, rather eccentric loner on the other. 
It is with this sort of classificatory rider as a backdrop, 
that we embark on an attempt at some clarity in this 
"psychiatric penumbra". 
The term 'borderline' itself has had a very chequered history 
and only relatively recently has it become regularly used. 
Gunderson and Singer (1975) note that:-
Stern (1938) was the first to use the term 
borderline, but the real parentage for this 
unwanted category is traceable to the "as-if" 
personality described by Deutsch (1942), the 
ambulatory schizophrenia of Zilboorg (1941) 
and the latent schizophrenia as introduced by 
Rorschach (1921), Bleuler (1950) and Federn (1952) ••••• 
Ambulatory schizophrenia was subsequently offered 
by Zilboorg in 1941 to combat the therapeutic 
nihilism that clinicians felt the latent schizo-
phrenia implied. 
Various other labels were used prior and subsequent to Knight's 
major 1953 paper, but few had the impact and following gained 
by Hoch and Polatin's pseudoneurotic schizophrenia (1949). 
Before we expand on these descriptive accounts, it is as well 
to note that in spite of a more amenable general attitude to 
the term borderline, disagreement as to its broad nosological 
definition is rife, despite the guidelines laid down in the 
ICD.9 and DSM.III. As Gunderson and Singer (op. cit.) observe, 
many who accept the term borderline, now disagree 
about whether it refers to borderline patient, 
state, personality organization, character, 
pattern, schizophrenia, condition or syndrome. 
(Gunderson and Singer 1975, p.1) 
···:: .: · .. : _·_:~ 
v 
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On the other hand, however, with the proliferation of 
)titerature in the borderline area a sort of moratorium has 
been called with regard to argument over precise definitions 
and instead clinicians have tended to agree with Green (1977) 
when he said that:-
the borderline case is less of a frontier than 
a no-man's land, an entire field whose boundaries 
are vague. Its population has to be sorted 
out ••.••• we are in need not only of categories 
of symptoms or classificatory tables, but also 
of ordinal concepts. (Green 1977, p.31). 
He goes on to emphasise the qualitative interactional aspects 
of the patient-therapist encounter, as being more valuable 
diagnostically for borderline states than the signs and symptoms 
of other clinical categories: 
Illustrative case material may give the reader 
the impression that the patient is neurotic, 
but the analyst knows that he is dealing with 
a borderline case. This knowledge is based 
on the affective quality of the patient's 
·communication and the analyst's own inner 
response to it, which are difficult to convey 
in writing ••• (Green 1977, p.31). 
Kernberg (1967 -) too, in his structural approach, emphasises 
the qualitative interactional aspects in arriving at a diagnosis. 
In his emphasis on understanding the intrapsychic structural 
characteristics of patients, he claims that the differential 
diagnosis of borderline disorders from the neuroses and from 
the psychoses, can be made. Toward this end he has developed 
a ''Structural Diagnosis of Borderline Personality Organization" 
(Kernberg, 1977) which necessarily extends the conyentional history 
and mental state examination which in itself appears too rigid 
a means of meaningfully approaching a diagnosis of borderline 
disorder. 
r----------------------------
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Summary 
From the aforegoing the general rather enigmatic qualities 
of the borderline concept already begin to appear. At one 
level we are faced with far more than merely establishing the 
means of making a correct and accurate diagnosis of the border-
line condition. We are faced, it seems, with far broader 
conceptual issues. If it is true that the borderline is a 
great masquerader behind neurotic and psychotic symptoms, and 
that the actual nature of the masquerader is seemingly impossible 
to finally fix and define, then at least at the edges of where 
neurosis ends and psychosis begins blurring also occurs, and we 
as clinicians are labelling and subsequently treating a fair 
proportion of patients on faulty premises. Are we, as Mccully 
(1962) feared "stumbling over our own egos" in an attempt at 
making that which may inherently be ambiguous, unambiguous? But 
what is perhaps of especial concern in this study, is to attempt 
to instil the need in every clinician to rigorously establish a 
conceptual model for approaching his patients. The dangers 
inherent in discarding statements or experiences as nonsensical 
or worse, as "merely psychotic", when an absence of a model for 
translating these experiences into meaningful communications is 
.r actually at fault, is a fact almost every therapist who has spent 
any time in the mental health services, must have come across. 
It is to be noted thc.t this is not an appeal to take on any 
particular model, but merely a statement that without a conceptual 
model for understanding the patients with whom we come into 
contact, meaningful rapport and true therapeutic change, while 
possible, always remains a riddle and subject to unnecessary 
chance variables. 
To elaborate on this point briefly, take depression for instance. 
Depression clearly resul tin!j fro1n the loss of s01neone close 
and resolving itself with support, time and mourning, is generally 
understandable from most frames of reference, if not simply from 
our human experience. We run into difficulties however, if the 
depression does not lift over a reasonabl~ period of time, because 
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we are forced to acknowledge the unexpectedness and, at face 
value, the inexplicableness of the continuing symptoms. We 
have to formulate this atypical pattern in a manner which lends 
understanding as to why, in this particular person these 
symptoms persist. Based on our understanding, and only on our 
conceptual understanding of this problem, can we purposefully 
intervene. 
At the level of psychotic or semi-psychotic phenomena, the 
sophistication required to make sense of what is manifested is 
necessarily greater (unless we regard it as "mere madness" and 
ascribe non-understandable processes to its manifestation). It 
is at this frontier that the borderline poses particular problems -
that is, the frontier between would be understandable neurotic 
symptoms and psychotic phenomena. In a very real way it appears 
as though an understanding of the borderline personality structure 
affords us the clearest possible vantage point to see into and 
understand the basic mechanisms underlying something as removed 
from us as psychosis. But the most important point is that this 
understanding can only emerge with a structuring of the data, and 
the process of structuring implies a framework from which the data 
makes a particular kind of sense. Without a structure ignorance 
must exist with respect to understanding any manifest phenomena. 
From the discrepant definitions applied to the borderline from the 
APA's DSM.III to the guarded small print of the !CD 9, possible 
reasons for this wide disagreement rear up as fair bait for any 
interested clinician or theoretician. It is held by this author 
that part of this diagnostic division can be attributed to varying 
conceptual models of understanding the borderline condition, and 
that this discrepancy may be located in traditional approaches 
of the varying schools of thought. 
Much of this study will be focussed on a presentation and discussion 
of the various contributions, European, British and American to 
the understanding of the borderline concept, and the influences of 
the "traditional approaches" referred to above, in understanding 
the phenomenon will be clearly revealed. 
·CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE DESCRIPTIVE LITERATURE 
2.1 Aim 
This chapter is intended to provide a selected yet comprehensive 
overview of the available literature both clinical and that 
emerging from psychological testing, describing and defining 
the borderline concept. What is aimed at is not so much a 
critical analysis of this literature, but rather the review of 
major contributions to this area so as to reveal the vast 
discrepancies as well as those areas of overlap from the various 
contributors. While critical analysis will not be the focus of 
this chapter, critical comments and observations will be made 
where appropriate. 
The reader should be left with a broad historical overview and 
an understanding of the borderline concept in its descriptive 
features as well as its present state as a diagnostic entity ih 
psychiatry. 
The final section defines "borderline" as it relates to this study 
and the foregoin~ literature review will place this into some 
descriptive and theoretical context. 
2.2 Historical Introduction to the Borderline Concept and a 
Review of the Descriptive Literature 
There is some dispute as to who originally used the term border-
line in a clinically diagnostic sense. What is perhaps a more 
meaningful and relevant endeavour however, is to nof so much focus 
on the term borderline, but to gain some understanding in a 
clinically descriptive sense, as to what it was about a certain 
group of patients who, as we have seen, were (and are) variously 
labelled but who are now more commonly referred to as borderline 
state patients, or borderline personality disorders or who display 
the borderline syndrome. 
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While many authors mention Stern's (1938) name as the first 
to be associated with borderline disorders, most agree that 
his interests were not so much directed at defining and under-
standing a syndrome as such, but rather to look at the under-
lying conflictual dynamics of "Large groups of patients who 
were on the one hand not overtly psychotic but who at the 
same time manifested an infantile defensive organization, low 
self-esteem, and atendency to act our psychotic conflict". 
(Mack 1975, p.8). Wong (1980) lists ten symptoms, however, 
which he attributes to Stern's paper, which Stern maintained 
could be present in these patients. These are: narcissism; 
psychic bleeding or a state of collapse in response to stress; 
an inordinate psychic hypersensitivity; psychic rigidity; 
negative therapeutic reactions; feelings of inferiority despite 
external accomplishments; masochism; somatic insecurity or 
anxiety; the use of projective mechanisms and difficulties in 
reality testing. The unfortunate thing about this psycho-
logical check list, is i'ts all-embracing nature. In other 
words, a syndrome or specific symptom-cluster is not attempted 
and no related personality structure is offered. On the other 
hand, many authors agree that Helene Deutsch's 1942 paper dealing 
with certain forms of emotional disturbances and their relation-
ship to schizophrenia, really laid the foundation for the later 
developments in the borderline area. In the light of this fact 
therefore, it would be beneficial to look closely at her observa-
tions and conclusions in this paper. 
Her first point describes a mode of relationship of a particular 
kind of patient "in which the individual's emotional relationship 
to the outside world and to his own ego, appears impoverished or 
absent" (Deutsch, 1942, p.301). She goes on to indicate that 
while these conditions bear a similarity to experiences of de-
personalization, they differ from it in that they are not perceived 
as disturbances by the patient himself, and she gives the name of 
"as-if" to this special type of personality: 
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My only reason for using so unoriginal a label 
for the type of person I wish to present, is 
that every attempt to understand the way of 
feeling and manner of life of this type, forces 
on the observer the inescapable impression that 
the individual's whole relationship to life has 
something about it which is lacking in genuine-
ness and yet outwardly runs along "as-if" it 
were complete (Deutsch, op. cit. p.302). 
She notes the lack of warmth and spontaneity in these persons' 
every action - interpersonal, creative, professional, and likens 
their behaviour and emotional life to a well-trained actor who 
lacks the necessary spark to make his impersonations live. She 
goes on to state that the as-if individual is different from 
the controlled neurotic, with his or her repressed conflicts, in 
so far as the as-if person's relationships are no more than 
mimicry, i.e. a state of absent ''object cathexes". This state 
at once leads to a passive plasticity of interaction, emotionally, 
socially, or in ethical or religious groups, each being sought 
"to give content and reality to their inner emptiness and establish 
the validity of their existence by identification" (Deutsch, op cit. 
p.305). 
Descriptively, what she regards as important too, is the prevalent 
complaints of no feelings, of emptiness and this is especially 
true, Deutsch notes, in the absence of figures real or fantasised, 
with whom to identify. At these times of "realization" the as-if 
patient was noted to display extreme and inappropriately violent 
fits of weeping or outbursts of rage. 
Acts of polymorphous sexual perversity, wide ranging antisocial 
activities, extreme suggestibility and passive compliance, were 
added aspects to the overall picture. She concludes by 
distinguishing the as-if personality from the psychotic, in so 
far as reality testing remains unimpaired in the former. 
Zilboorg in 1941 introduced the term ambulatory schizophrenia 
which attracted much psychiatric attention. He put forward ideas 
suggesting that a range of schizophrenias existed, of which the 
11 
ambulatory variation was the mildest. He defined these 
. patients as suffering from intense hatred and diffuse anger, 
engaged in few friendships, yet managed to function superficially 
with some success in everyday activity. He highlighted sado~ 
masochistic aspects of their phantasy life, referred to their 
organ pleasure needs and the separation of these from their 
higher order derivatives, e.g. the split between sexual feelings 
and love. 
Despite his view that the borderline conditions were subtypes of 
schizophrenia, he felt that the treatment of choice was analysis, 
albeit an arduous and protracted affair with little chance of 
success. After the publication of Knight's papers (1953), the 
American Psychoanalytic Association gave official recognition to 
the borderline problem by holding a two-day conference on the 
"Borderline Case". Zilboorg remained severely critical of the 
borderline concept, stating shortly after this conference that: 
There is a psychiatric area of theoretical 
penumbra, called by some 'borderline'; in 
which there reigns considerable chaos or 
confusion with regard to clinical criteria 
and diagnostic differentiation. (Zilboorg 1956). 
Zilboorg's purist criticism unfortunately holds, in so far as no 
general agreement has been reached at defining finally what 
criteria the borderline conditions have to display to be 
definitively and unambiguously known as such. This issue 
naturally raises important questions regarding the definitiveness 
of psychiatric nosology generally, which, however, cannot be 
entered into here. Zilboorg clung to his ambulatory schizo-
phrenia, a concept that Mack (1975) notes with some cynicism, 
"that.did little to reduce the chaos or illuminate the penumbra". 
(p.11) 
Hock and Polatin (1949) introduced the concept of pseudo-neurotic 
schizophrenia, which enjoyed widespread recognition (Mack 1975, 
Hoch et al, 1962). These were a group of patients characterized 
by an autistic and dereistic 1i fe apJ?rpac;h, .. exce.ss.iy~ hC1tred, 
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anxiety, and generally a pan-neurotic appearance. These 
authors felt however, that this neurotic front masked a 
schizophrenic-like make-up due to observations that 
disturbances of thought and affect occurred revealing the 
"core" personality make-up. 
By 1950 most clinicians were convinced that they were seeing a 
large group of patients not strictly speaking schizophrenic but 
more disturbed than those usually defined as neurotic. It was 
in this context and in the midst of great confusion, that 
Knight's paper "Borderline States" appeared in 1953, and brought 
some clarity and understanding into the picture. 
Knight stated quite clearly that he did not want to defend the 
term "borderline state'' as a diagnosis, but wished to discuss the 
clinical conditions usually connotated by the term, "and especially 
to call attention to the diagnostic, psychopathological and 
therapeutic problems involved in these conditions" (Knight, 1953, 
p.2). He was writing at a time when the term ''borderline state" 
had no official status in the psychiatric nomenclature and implied 
strongly that the term was more commonly used when the degree of 
clinical uncertainty was high and "conveys more infor~ation about 
the uncertainty and indecision of the psychiatrist than it does 
about the condition of the patient". (Knight, op. cit. p.1.) 
He felt that there are three commonly used criteria, or frames of 
reference which when used loosely or exclusively would lead to 
diagnostic and prognostic errors. These are, firstly, the 
concept of a "break with reality"; second, that psychosis and 
neurosis are mutually exclusive; and third, the psychoanalytically 
derived notion that developmental stages of libidinal organizatioh 
are reflected in typical fixated or regressed defence mechanisms, 
which are recognizable. 
His criticism of the break with reality concept directs itself 
mainly at those who believe the break to be a sudden or unexpected 
event and hence when it appears to look markedly bizarre and 
psychotic. He calls attention to the need to understand the 
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"gradual bending.~····· which preceded the stopping", which 
can only be understood if the relative strengths and weak-
nesses of constitutional and external stress factors are taken. 
fully into consideration. 
His second criticism against the mutual exclusiveness of 
psychosis and neurosis, is of course a more contentious one, 
but a view which needs full appraisal before being judged, but 
unfortunately not relevant for full discussion here. He states: 
it is, to be sure, one of the contributions 
of psychoanalysis that neurotic mechanisms 
are different from psychotic mechanisms and 
that psychosis is not simply a more severe 
degree of neurosis. However, it is quite 
possible for both psychotic and neurotic 
mechanisms to have developed in the same 
individual, and this is the crux of the 
problem in many borderline cases. 
(Knight, op. cit. p.14). 
He then introduces a very linear and hence rather limited analogy 
of an embattled army in various stages of disarray hypothetically 
representing the borderline psyche; those "segments or detach-
ments" (neurotic mechanisms) making a stand, and conduct holding 
or delaying operations, while "the main retreating forces may 
have retired much farther to the rear" (i.e. to psychotic levels). 
He thus introduces the important notion of the co-existence of 
these two personality states, but it is felt misses the extremely 
important qualitative point i.e. that the presentation of these 
conditions in the typical borderline patient is never an admixture 
of two different states of defensive organization (i.e. neurotic 
. 
and psychotic) but rather more closely resembles a third hybrid 
form, giving the borderline condition its characteristic elusive-
ness. 
His final criticism is levelled against: 
Reliance on the ladder of psychosexual development 
(which) •••••• has resulted in many blunders in 
diagnosis, especially in the failure to perceive 
the psychosis underlying an hysterical, phobic, or 
obsessive-compulsive clinical picture. (Knight, op.cit. p.5) 
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He feels that the psychoanalytic contribution has been of 
major value in understanding ,borderline states, but needs 
to be supplemented extensively with the findings of ego 
psychology. Broadly speaking he feels that in emphasizing 
the classical oral, anal, oedipal or phallic characteristics 
as elucidated by psychoanalysis, we may fail to see that the 
"ego has regressed far behind this (i.e. any psychosexual 
point) in varying degrees of disorder" (My brackets .i:ftelus±or:r 
op. cit. p.5). And he feels too, perhaps more pertinently 
that these ego defences e.g. the obsessive-compulsive defences, 
should in the case of borderline states, perhaps not be touched 
in therapy, and possibly even strengthened, in so far as it 
represents a relatively more progressed aspect of overall 
psychological functioning. 
Knight's own introduction to the borderline group of patients was 
due to his observations that near-normal or neurotic patients 
surprisingly developed psychotic symptoms during non-directive or 
free associational methods of diagnostic interviewing or psycho-
therapy. Knight described these patients who "were falling apart 
on the couch" (1953) in terms of three broad personality function-
ing characteristics. These were:- (i) presence of n~urotic 
symptoms; (ii) macroscopic evidence of ego weaknesses; and 
·(iii) microscopic evidence of ego weaknesses. We will enlarge 
on these categoriei shortly. Perry and Klerman (1978) note 
that: 
Knight's description is noteworthy for its 
clinical clarity and its care in distinguishing 
clinical observations from psychodynamic 
inference. (Perry and Klerman, 1978, p.142): 
These authors neatly summarized Knight's diagnostic criteria in 
the same paper which is reproduced here: 
1. Neurotic symptoms present. 
2. Macroscopic evidence of ego weaknesses. 
(A) Lack of concern over predicament. 
(B) Absence of observable precipitating stress. 
'. ··~ . :· .. 
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(C) Symptoms viewed as ego-syntonic or 
externally precipitated. 
(D) Lack of achievement over time. 
(E) Unrealistic planning. 
(F) Relating of bizarre dreams. 
(G) Insufficient contrast between dreams 
and waking life. 
3. Microscopic evidence of ego weaknesses. 
(A) Impaired integration of ideas. 
(B) Impaired concept formation. 
(C) Impaired; judgement. 
(D) Occasional blocking. 
(E) Peculiarities of word usage. 
(F) Obliviousness of obvious implications. 
(G) Contaminations of idioms. 
(H) Imappropriate affect at times. 
(I) Suspicious-laden questions and behaviour. 
(J) Lack of recognition of embarrassment over 
peculiarities of speech. 
(Perry and Klerman 1978) 
Most of these criteria are self-explanatory but a few need 
some elaboration. Knight noted that ostensibly the ~ntire 
clinical picture could be dominated by neurotic symptoms and 
that the patient may attribute all his problems to these symptoms. 
He recognized "microscopic" evidence of ego weaknesses on mental 
state examinations, as listed, and that these influence the 
person's macroscopic functioning generally. This formulation 
makes possible some degree of understanding the pec~liar 
ambivalences, contradictions and inappropriateness of the border-
linesfunctioning. This summary in no way does full justice to 
Knight's formulation of the borderline, but will serve as a founda-
tion to his understanding and we will be returning to look more 
closely at his dynamic understanding of borderline functioning, 
in a later section. 
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Otto Kernberg (1967- ) arguably the most influential 
borderline theorist at present must certainly be the most well 
known and widely written about worker in this field. He, as 
did many others, used Knight's formulations and observations 
as the foundation for his own ego-oriented object-relations 
theory of personality organization in general and borderline 
states in particular. 
With specific reference to borderline conditions, he believes 
and is being increasingly supported by some~of the most influential 
writers in the field, that the borderline condition or state is 
in fact a reflection of a specific borderline personality organiza-
tion, arranged in a structurally consistent manner and based on 
the internalization of pathological primitive part-object relation-
ships. As a consequence, the psychology of the borderline 
personality is a unique one and is indeed, as Schmiddeberg (1947) 
had said years earlier, "stably unstable". 
We will spend a great deal of time in presenting and discussing 
Kernberg's model in the next chapter dealing with dynamic 
formulations of the borderline personality, but it is necessary 
at this point to introduce that aspect of his understanding of 
the borderline functioning which could be defined as descriptive. 
In so far as Kernberq's is a phenomenological interactional model, 
this split between psychical structure and outward manifestations 
of that structure is somewhat false, nonetheless some idea is 
gained of Kernberg's view without doing him too much injustice. 
Kernberg's concern has never been a diagnostically pragmatic 
"signs and symptoms" inventory for recognition of borderline 
pathology. At the same time he certainly has not disregarded 
the importance of accurate "structural diagnosis" of the borderline 
personality make-up. Towards this end he developed his "Structural 
Diagnostic Interview" as mentioned earlier (pp. 3 and 4). Kernberg 
has substantially developed an ego-psychology based on psycho-
analytic theory, particularly object-relations theory, within what 
can only be called a structural-genetic model. In his book 
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Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psycho-analysis (1976), 
he specifically criticises Melanie Klein (1921-1960)(see below), 
and at the same time asserts his own insistence on the 'synthetic 
functions' of ego development as being principally a structuring 
one. Structuring first, internalised objects, second, a consistent 
self-representation in relation to internalised objects, third, 
structuring a mode of inter-personal relations derived from the 
previous two internalisations, and the respective affects associated 
with these procedures. He states: 
It should be stressed that the 'world of inner 
objects' which, as used by Klein, gives the 
impression of remaining free-floating object 
images in the psychic apparatus rather than 
being related to any.specific structures, does 
not do justice to the complexity of integra-
tion of object-relations. (Kernberg, 1976, p.33). 
Whatever standing or value Kernberg's criticism of Klein has, will 
be deferred for discussion to the next chapter where these two 
approaches will be presented in greater detail. Kernberg is at 
once concerned with the clinical manifestations of pathologically 
internalised object-relations as well as the underlying structure 
itself, hence what follows must constantly be seen as an external 
' 
representational view of the inner psychical structures of the 
borderline personality organization. 
The summarized diagnostic criteria referred to earlier is as 
follows:-
1. Non-specific manifestations of ego weaknesses 
(A) Lack of anxiety tolerance 
(B) Lack of impulse control 
(C) Lack of developed sublimatory channels 
2. Shift towards primary process thinking 
3. Specific defensive operations characteristic of the 
borderline personality organization 
(A) Splitting 
(B) Primitive idealization 
(C) Early forms of projection, especially 
projective identification 
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(D) Denial 
(E) Omnipotence and devaluation 
4. Pathologic internalized object relations (Perry and 
Klerman, 1978) 
While Perry and Klerman make valuable points regarding the various 
criteria listed, their criticism of Kernberg's acceptability can 
largely be disregarded due to their lack of viewing Kernberg's 
theory as a holistic one. What is meant here is that judge-
ments regarding his diagnostic criteria's usefulness or accuracy 
must be seen in relation to his theory and meta-theory as a whole, 
not merely judged at face value as they tend to do. On the 
other hand, their interests in the paper were quite simply compari-
sons of diagnostic criteria and they have presented broad criteria 
such as "lack of anxiety tolerance", "lack of impulse control", or 
"defence mechanisms such as projection", as characterising Kern-
berg's diagnostic approach to borderline pathology. 
Kernberg's criterion of lack of anxiety tolerance, refers to his 
observation that while the borderline patient is fairly commonly 
anxious, he is unable to tolerate any addition to this baseline 
level without further symptom formation. This recognition leads 
on to the second and third points and to the absence of adequate 
sublimatory channels. The overly stressed patient with an already 
weakened ego function in relation to adequate sublimatory channels 
of impulse build-up, is likely to "break" even further and allow 
pure-form impulses to emerge into manifest life. One can 
appreciate too Kernberg's line of thought with regard to a shift 
-toward primary process thinking, especially at times of excess 
stress. A point of criticism that it is felt vital to make at 
this time is Kernberg's excessive focus on the "bad" stressful 
environment, i.e. the external reality which is the main trigger 
resulting in occasional psychiatric breaks. It is in this respect 
that ego psychology has moved significantly far away from the more 
classified object-relations theorists such as Melanie Klein, who 
stress equally the threat from within, in the form of a vibrant 
_phantasy life whose relationship with external triggers may be 
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extremely obscure. Again a fuller debate on the relationship 
between inner and outer and the role of the ego will be deferred 
for fuller discussion in the next chapter. 
Kernberg's stressing of primitive defence mechanisms needs no 
great elaboration, except for the point to be emphasized, that 
for him these are diagnostic, and not only useful for the 
analytic or therapeutic setting. Naturally the separating of 
internalization of object-relation patterns and their associated 
affects from defence mechanism, is again pragmatic, for the 
purpose of clarity, and this is acknowledged by Perry and Klerman. 
But again, the emphasis on this false split cannot be exaggerated. 
For Kernberg, the primitive defence mechanisms arising from a 
pathological relationship with the outside world, lead to a 
particular mode of internalization and in this way they are 
inseparably linked. 
Particular manifestations of this pathological internalization 
of object-relations, Perry and Klerman draw attention to, include 
the following:- as a result of splitting there is an incapacity 
to synthesize or reconcile good and bad (based possibly on part-
object confabulation), and sometimes this basic splitting results 
in a chameleon-like adaptation on the part of the patient to 
adapt to these vastly different situations (in his mind), resulting 
in a most superficial "as-if" identity and no sense of an ongoing 
self. 
Perry and Klerman conclude with the following criticisms and 
suggestions. 
Pathological defence mechanisms and object relations 
are diagnostic criteria for Kernberg. Kernberg's 
criteria are a mixture of inferential judgements and 
direct clinical observation. Whether Kernberg's 
structural approach to delineating diagnostic criteria 
is useful or not, will depend on several considerations. 
First, it will be necessary to enumerate those patient 
signs, symptoms, or behavioural patterns reflecting the 
presence of a particular structural criterion. Secondly, 
the less inferential descriptors must be rated in a 
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reliable way. For example, noting whether a 
patient is devaluing others in an interview 
requires far less inference than does 
determining that he is unable to synthesize 
good and bad introjections and identifica-
tions. (p. 144) 
Valid as these criticisms are, it is felt that to fulfil them 
and so develop an objectively valid and rigorous diagnosis, will 
require more emphasis on developing clinical skills and analytic-
ally oriented understanding, than on an implied format of 
questioning, methods of elicitation, etc. How far these authors 
will go in accepting this point, remains to be seen. 
Grinker, Werble and Drye produced a most influential piece of work 
in 1968. Theirs was the first systematic and empirical study 
and to this day remains the only major piece of empirical research 
in the area. It is of some interest to outline their study 
briefly. From a large group of hospitalized patients, 51 were 
selected and measurements of "ego functions" were carried out 
and later factor-analyzed from which the common features of the 
borderline patients were derived. Subsequently a cluster analysis_ 
was carried out and four subtypes were identified of the 51 
patients selected, as falling within the limits of classification 
for the borderline syndrome. This was the first major sub-
division of borderline states into specific subtypes. 
In their book published in 1968, "The Border line Syndrome", 
Grinker et al state that their theoretical orientation would be 
an ego-psychological one and they go on to define ego in Hartmann's 
. (1958, 1964) terms as follows: "Ego is the centralized functional 
control which integrates different parts of the personality with 
each other and with outer reality", and "the ego is a •••• sub-
structure of the personality which is defined by its function". 
(Grinker et al, 1968, p.29). This "function" is defined in terms 
of a filtering of processes on the border between psychical and 
outer reality. They distinguish between a weak ego with poor 
functioning easily succumbing to stress which then freely exposes 
psychotic internal processes of thinking, e.g. delusions, 
hallucinations or bizarre associations. 
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They then attribute, rather arbitrarily, (acknowledged as such 
by the authors), various functions to the ego, thereby setting 
up criteria for measurement and hence labelling of neurotic 
borderline or psychotic, according to these criteria. 
broad ego functions are outlined; these are:-
(i) Relation to reality - a) 
b) 
c) 
adaptation 
reality testing 
sense of reality 
Regulation and Control of Drives 
Seven 
(ii) 
(iii) Object-relations (i.e. the ability to form and maintain 
consistency in object-relations 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
Cognitive functions 
Defensive operations 
Autonomous functions: "Th~se cognitive functions are 
considered to be "givers" of the conflict-free ego 
and include perception, intention, intelligence and 
language capacity." (p.30) 
Synthetic functions (i.e. generally an ability to 
relate parts to wholes and to form gestalts). 
Analyses which are consistent throughout the entire group were:-
A) Anger as main or only affect 
B) Defect in affectional relationships 
C) Absence of consistent self-identity 
D) Depression characteristic of life. 
The four subtypes cluster-analyzed out were:-
(A) Type 1: The psychotic border 
1. Behaviour inappropriate, non-adaptive 
2. Self-identity and reality sense deficient 
3. Negative behaviour and anger expressed 
4. Depression 
(8) Type 2: The core borderline symptom 
1. Vacillating involvement with others 
2. Anger acted out 
3. Depression 
4. Self-identity not consiste~t 
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(C) Type 3: The adaptive, affectless, defended "as-if" person 
1. Behaviour adaptive, appropriate 
2. Complementary relationships 
3. Little affect, spontaneity lacking 
4. Defences of withdrawal and intellectualization 
(D) Type 4: The border with the neuroses 
1. Anaclitic depression 
2. Anxiety 
3. Resemblance to neurotic, narcissistic character 
(From Perry and Klerman, ibid.) 
To expand on this symptom table, Grinker's (1977) summary is 
reproduced here in summarized form:-
Group 1 patients faii in their relationships, and, 
at the same time, overtly in behaviour and affect; 
they react negatively and angrily, toward other 
people and to their environments. Subjects in 
Group II are inconsistent, moving toward others 
for relations, which is then followed by "acting-
out" repulsion - moving away into isolation, where 
they feel lonely and depressed. Patients in 
Group III seem to have given up their search for 
identity and try to defend themselves against their 
perception of the world as empty. • •• They passively 
await cues from others to behave in complementarity ••• 
Subjects in Group IV search for lost symbiotic 
relations with a mother figure, relations they rarely 
achieve. In consequence, they reveal what may be 
called an anaclitic depression. (Grinker, 1977, p.161). 
Grinker defines the borderline syndrome in the following terms: 
A prevalence of anger, a defect in affectionqj::e 
relations, an absence of indications of self-
identity, and the presence of depressive loneliness 
(op. cit. p.161). 
In his summary (op. cit.) of their findings, Grinker suggests 
that the borderline is a specific syndrome with a considerable 
degree of internal consistency, and not a regressive state, in 
response to some internal or external conditions of stress. They 
feel rather that it reflects an arrested ego development in early 
···.·· .... 
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childhood. They note too the unreality of family information 
as most of their samples revealed a high degree of disturbance 
in the family members, which they found impossible to classify 
in any specific way. 
They conclude by suggesting that the best form of treatment (they 
do not specify for which subtype) is in hospital with milieu or 
behavioural therapy, using advice, direction, and control. Grinker 
and associates suggest this treatment approach for a number of 
reasons but feel specifically that due to the common finding that 
borderlines tend to have average to above average I.Q's, they often 
find themselves in jobs or situations requiring social interactions, 
in which their social inadequacies are revealed and failure usually 
ensues, resulting in admission to a hospital; and secondly that 
a clear, firm and consistent structure is vital for continued 
functioning. 
Grinker et al are highly critical of psycho-analytically oriented 
formulations or treatments of .the borderline. 
To gain any credence for psychodynamic formulations, 
the psychoanalyst needs to know the phenomenology of 
the conditions under study as derived from empirical 
data, from large numbers of cases statistically 
isolated from other conditions. (ibid. p .170). 
They go on to criticise psycho-analytical interpretations and 
conclusions as "skimpy" with direct application of "metapsycho-
logical theory". 
In conclusion they state that:-
It is indeed time that in the development of our 
primitive nosology, we recognize the need for 
accurate descriptions of clinical typologies and 
address ourselves to the question of "what", so 
that we may attain a handle on aetiology. 
(ibid. p .171) . 
However, the age-old question relating quantity and quality to 
human behaviour again raises its enigmatic head. For Grinker's 
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"accurate descriptions" to be obtained behaviour has first 
to be seen, and proved to be representative of and a parallel 
mediator for, an internal psychological state. Only in this 
way can one achieve the objectivity that quantifiability requires. 
Grinker himself states: 
Yet logically, objectively, and according to 
behavioural scientists, what goes on internally, 
within the mental "black box", can only be 
determined by behaviour in action. (ibid. p .170) 
This has to be contrasted with the recognition of real qualitative, 
experiential and interactional aspects of human functioning less 
observable and quantifiable, but ,no less real and no less reveal-
ing of our overall human condition. It appears that the border-
line position represents just such a melting pot where the fusion 
between behaviour and ~ffect, action and psychological origin, 
of what makes us human is both very vague and ephemeral, but at 
once present and real. The issue at stake is not just how much 
do we sacrifice in our efforts to objectify and quantify, but 
what are we altering in our efforts to do so? It is not being 
asserted that we should place restraints on our efforts to 
accurately diagnose and label, but so often it appears firstly, 
that we distort empirical data "to fit" established categories, 
and secondly, that the diagnosis. becomes an end in itself. 
It appears that a far more rewarding and meaningful task may be 
to continue as we are at present: A fair body of sophisticated 
elaborations and modifications of psychoanalytical theory is 
being evolved in the attempt to understand the dynamics of the 
borderline, however ill-defined, and at the same time researchers 
such as Grinker and associates are developing more and more 
sophisticated screening devices to more accurately describe the 
"what" aspect of that which is being dynamically formulated. IS 
it not perhaps the ideal to aim for, to have the clinical descrip-
tion of what is or is not the borderline syndrome realistically 
explained in terms of an adequate dynamic formulation? 
Gunderson and Singer (1975) attempted a synthesis of previous 
reviews and empirical observations and studies (such as Knight's 
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and Grinker~s). 
as follows:-
In their introduction they state their aim 
In this review, the most common and distinguishing 
characteristics (of borderlines) will be identified 
and a rational guide for standardizing clinical 
criteria for diagnosing borderline patients will 
be offered. (p.2) 
The literature, they report, contains three types of descriptive 
reports: behavioural observations, psychodyhamic formulations, 
and psychological tests. As the authors correctly point out, 
such results are determined by four variables. Who does the 
describing, what methods are used in describing, in what context 
these methods are used, and how the sample is selected. From 
previous papers and reviews they abstract the following six 
descriptive features as being most definitive of borderline 
patients: 
1) intense affect mainly anger; 
2) impulsive behaviour; 
3) poor social adaptation; 
4) brief psychotic episodes; 
5) psychological tests revealing primitive 
personality organization; 
6) interpersonal relations that are transient 
and marked by a high degree of dependency. 
To list their findings for purposes of clarity, we again refer to 
Perry and Klerman's (1978) paper. 
Gunderson and Singer's Criteria for Borderline Patients: 
1. Affects 
(A) Anger 
(B) Depression 
(C) Anxiety 
(D) Anhedonia 
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2. Behaviour 
(A) Social behaviour superficially good 
(B) Impulse control poor 
(C) Sexual problems 
3. Psychosis 
(A) Brief psychotic episodes or regressions 
(B) Paranoid in nature 
(C) Disturbances of consciousness 
4. Psychological test performance 
(A) Ordinary reasoning on structured tests 
(B) Deviant thought processes on unstructued tests 
(C) Reality testing preserved except temporarily 
5. Interpersonal relationships: 
(A) Usually superficial 
(B) Problems with closeness. (p. 146) 
To single out one pathological feature which stands out as 
particularly indicative of borderline patients may seem a trifle 
trivial, yet the authors state categorically that: 
This propensity to regress when structured is low, 
becomes an important and perhaps pathognomonic 
criterion for defining any sample of borderline 
persons. (Gunderson and Singer, 1975, p.2). 
This point is naturally of vital importance in the sense that it 
draws attention to the context in which the prospecti~e border-
line patient is being observed, as well as the nature of the 
diagnostic tools being used in the assessment. This immediately 
calls attention to the validity of Grinker et al's study, which 
empirical and systematic though it was, was tapping an impatient, 
hospitalized group of patients and thereby providing a very 
definite structure, which, according to Gunderson and Singer, is 
a vital independent variable in itself. What is more, their 
study lacked a necessary control group for adequate contrast. 
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Indeed given this seeming "fact" of borderline functioning, an 
empirical study taking this factor into consideration, while 
aiding in possibly validating Gunderson and Singer's assertion, 
only effectively adds to our frustration at finally and conclusively 
being unable to define the borderline personality symptomatically. 
To return to Gunderson and Singer's paper however, we will briefly 
enlarge on some of their criteria for a borderline diagnosis. 
With respect to the affect of depression, they note that a fair 
deal of controversy revolves around the qualitative aspects of 
depression in borderline patients. Carey (1972) noted that the 
borderline patient is characterised by a "sense of futility and 
pervasive feelings of loneliness and isolation", which he feels 
does not constitute a true depression. In similar vein, 
Chessick (1972) speaks of ongoing "existential despair". As noted 
earlier, Grinker and associates felt the depression to be related 
to a sense of inevitable social isolation. Kernberg (1967) stressed 
depressive masochistic character traits and differentiated these 
from true depression. In fact he felt that an "ego depersonaliza-
tion" as a result of a severe psychotic-like depression, should be 
a presumptive indicator for a diagnosis of borderline personality". 
(p.3) 
This is just the sort of issue referred to earlier, in terms of 
theoretical formulations providing explanations for clinical 
observations. What makes depression a particularly important 
issue will be more fully understood in a subsequent section dealing 
with the theoretical description of the importance of the 
"depressive position" in the theory of Melanie Klein, and its 
relevance to the borderline syndrome, but that there has been such 
widespreRd and independent observations of the specific qualitative 
nature of depression noted in borderlines, and that a theoretical 
explanation attempts to answer the "how" of an established "what" 
must surely be what a psychological science is all about. 
Anger is an affect very commonly agreed upon, as being by far the 
most prevalent in borderlines. In an interesting article dealing 
: ·-··· ... . . ··.·. 
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with just this issue in terms of the therapist dealing with 
anger in borderlines therapeutically, Nadelson (1977) feels 
that this pervading aggression forms more of a primitive defence 
operation than reflecting extreme aggressiveness, poor impulse 
control or weak ego development. Again this type of information 
proves of limited value, but becomes meaningfully enriched if 
independent theory provides possible explanatory formulations. 
Anxiety has received widely differing opinion as to being a major 
affect present in borderlines. (Hoch and Polatin 1949, Gunderson 
and Singer 1975, Klein 1977). An interesting and important 
affect state noted by the authors, anhedonia, i.e. an incapacity 
for pleasure or rare feelings of true satisfaction, again presents 
a theoretically import puzzle. These affect-laden issues will 
receive full attention and discussion in the following chapter. 
Behaviourally, a relevant and widely agreed-upon behaviour pattern 
involves the self-destructive acts borderlines are involved in. 
But as Gunderson and Singer (1975) point out 
Self-destructive is used here to indicate a 
broad range of behaviours whose result is 
self-destructive although their intent or 
purpose is not. Examples include sexual 
promiscuity and perversions in. search of 
affection, self-mutilation with the goal 
of object manipulation or establishing self-
identity, and addiction in search of escape. 
(ibid. p.4). 
Melitta Schmideberg (1959) noticed the same behavioural style and 
formulated her understanding of it as follows: 
Psychiatrically, if the patient is aware of and 
perturbed by his inability to feel, it is 
classified as a depersonalization phenomenon -
a very frequent characteristic of borderlines. 
Patients who suffer from their inability to feel, 
sometimes work themselves into hysterical-like 
scenes and over-emotional reactions, or take 
drugs or alcohol, or commit offences or have 
pathological sexual reactions to escape both 
their painful feelings and their lack of feel-
ings. (p.400) 
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With respect to psychosis, much discrepancy of opinion exists. 
Gunderson and Singer note that the adherents to a belief that 
psychotic episodes do occur, hastily add that these episodes are 
the exception rather than the rule. They are almost invariably 
induced by life stresses, are transient and reversible, are of 
very short duration - (micropsychotic episodes), they are ego-
alien and are unsystematized. There appears, with few exceptions, 
general concensus that there is an absence of stable or clear 
delusions or hallucinations and that the nature of the psychosis 
is predominantly of a paranoid nature. 
Finally, the authors note that interpersonal relationships are 
characterised by vacillation between transient, superficial 
relationships and intense, dependent ones, "that are marked by 
devaluation, manipulation and demandingness." (Gunderson and 
Singer, 197 5, p. 8) • 
Perry and Klerman (ibid) compared the four sets of diagnostic 
criteria as suggested by Knight, Kernberg, Grinker et al, and 
Gunderson and Singer. They remark in their conclusions: 
Reviewing our findings, we are struck by the 
number of different criteria proposed for 
borderline patients. In one way or another, 
it seems as if the whole range of psycho-
pathology of personality is presented. 
(Perry and Klerman, 1978, p.150). 
Their findings will be briefly presented. With reference to 
Mental Stat~ items, forty-two are listed and only one, that is 
the patient's behaviour in the interview is usually-adaptive 
and appropriate, is agreed on by all four sets of criteria. If 
only three of these sets were compared, the authors feel that 
they could describe the borderline patient's mental state in 
the following terms: 
The patient behaves appropriately and adaptively, 
but acts in an angry and negativistic way. He is 
emotionally shallow but not blunted and his associa-
tions are not loose. His sense of reality is 
deficient, however. (ibid. p.146) 
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Only one item of sixteen is agreed upon by three monographs 
in terms of the patient's personal history. The authors 
summarise as follows: 
The patient has a history of regression or brief 
psychotic episodes, usually precipitated by life 
stress or by transference in psychotherapy. The 
patient's behaviour outside the interview is 
usually erratic and unpredictably characterized 
by self-mutilation. Such as wrist slashing, and 
by alcohol and drug abuse. The patient may also 
have sexual deviations and there is general lack 
of creative achievement on the patient's part over 
time. ( ibid • pp . 146-14 7) • 
Interpersonally, three items are agreed upon by three monographs 
(16 items listed). In summary the authors state: 
· The patient has generally little emotional involvement 
with others. On the other hand, close emotional 
relationships, when existent, are marked by demanding, 
clinging, and dependent behaviour. The patient also 
becomes angry. (ibid. p.147) 
With regard to defence mechanisms and clinical judgement regarding 
personality functioning, the authors conclude with the following: 
Among the defence mechanisms, externalization and 
acting-out are prominent. Additional defences' 
are projection and withdrawing from others. The 
patient is seen as emotionally shallow. While 
the patient is not overtly psychotic, there is a 
lack of evidence of a consistent identity on the 
patient's part, and manifestation of identity 
di ff us ion. ( ibid . p. 148) 
In the light of this paucity of consistency of diagnostic criteria 
of four reputable works, the authors call for a mcn:-atorium on 
further general clinical descriptive and psychodynamic papers 
on the borderline patient. They suggest that realibility and 
validity studies be conducted on extant hypotheses. They 
conclude, however, by suggesting three possible reasons for this 
dramatic lack of agreement. Firstly, the concept of borderline 
could be an illusion and perhaps a rethink_ in terms of existant 
personality disorders may be required. Guze (1975) has in fact 
proposed this. Secondly, the authors suggest that the borderline 
concept may well be defined according to those criteria which are 
common to several monographs. 
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Finally, they agree that the borderline syndrome may consist 
of four sub-types (or more) each with internally consistent 
symptom patterns, as suggested by Grinker's study. What is 
more, the "outer'' two subgroups, i.e. those lying close to 
enurosis and psychosis respectively, could be expected to 
overlap with these established two diagnostic categories. The 
remaining two groups would therefore be expected to show purer 
borderline characteristics. 
The overall result of this paper appears to be some sort of an 
appeal for diagnosticians not to lose their heads, describing 
ever increasing numbers of symptoms and signs to label border-
lines by. Instead carefully look at what has already been 
written, and to test this critically. Guze (referred to earlier) 
states at the end of his paper on the differential diagnosis of 
the Borderline Syndrome: 
In conclusion, it must be stressed again that the 
differential diagnosis of the borderline syndrome 
includes a wide range of psychiatric disorders .•••• 
Systematic clinical studies - based at least in 
part on structured interviews, follow-ups, and 
examination of close relatives are needed before 
the validity of the syndrome can be established. 
(Guze 1975, p.74). 
Taking up this challenge, Gunderson and Kolb (1978) have attempted 
some discriminatory clarity in their paper "Discriminating 
Features of Borderline Patients". They compared Borderline 
patients, with schizophrenic patients, neurotic depressed patients 
and a group of patients with mixed diagnoses. The purpose of 
this comparison was to find out whether: (i) borderline patients 
could be discriminated from other psychopathological groups and, 
(ii) whether a discrete list of recognizable characteristics 
discriminating borderline patients could be isolated. 
Methodologically, patients from the respective groups were matched 
for sex, race and marital status. They were generally young, 
white, middle-class people. Sixty-four patients were interviewed 
using the Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines (DIBS) which has 
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already been published and reliability and scoring details 
presented elsewhere (Gunderson & Kolb,1976). Statistical 
operations were performed on the data and the following 
results were reported: 
Borderlines were able to be discriminated from 
schizophrenic patients with 100% accuracy. 
Certain specific variables proved more valuable 
than others. For instance, flat affect was the 
most useful discriminator; borderline patients 
were presenting an interview with flat affect. 
(Gunderson and Kolb, 1978). 
Devaluation/manipulation as a variable reflected aspects of the 
quality of the close interpersknal relationships of the border-
line patients, and in fact this proved by contrast to the "loner" 
variable, very discriminatory for borderlines from schizophrenics. 
Other variables mentioned included, derealization phenomena, 
drug abuse, psychotic experiences on drugs, aggressiveness, and 
levels of social activity. Statistically validated contrast 
discriminatory figures are presented for each variable and for 
the groups. 
Interestingly, the authors state that the most valuable discrimina-
tors were found in areas of functioning (as opposed to signs and 
symptoms) such as interpersonal relationships, patterns of dealing 
with impulse life, social adaptation and affectual life, and 
state that: 
The most useful section - totals were for interpersonal 
relations and impulse/action patterns, both of which 
reflect more enduring behavioural patterns.· This 
analysis suggests that the least useful information in 
discriminating borderline from schizophrenic patients, 
can be expected to come from the sign and symptom 
information (p. 793). 
In the comparison between borderlines and neurotic depressed 
patients, the authors report a 95.4% discriminatory accuracy. In 
this comparison with the schizophrenic group, drug abuse and 
occurrence of psychotic experiences while using drugs were helpful 
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discriminators. The only discriminator of any value on the 
affect spectrum was the prese.nce of dysphoria and anhedonia 
in the borderline group. Borderline patients were more 
frequently sexual deviant, with poorer school/work records 
and displayed a more generalized antisocial pattern. A final 
major area of difference was the more frequent paranoid 
experiences reported by the borderline group. 
Again, the authors note, that more enduring patterns (impulse/ 
action patterns and interpersonal relations) proved more valuable 
than signs and symptoms as discriminators. 
Fourteen DIBS statements (discriminators) were able to discriminate 
the borderline patients from all other groups with 86,84% accuracy. 
The authors feel that these fourteen variables could be condensed 
to seven broad criteria which they assert provides a clinically 
sensible and practical means of approaching the diagnosis of 
borderline disorder, and .these are reproduced below:-
1. Low achievement - achievement at school and work two years 
prior to hospitalization quite low in borderline group, 
despite talent or ability in the area. 
2. Impulsivity - mainly related to alcohol and drug abuse 
and as a result of this impulsivity, sexual deviance was 
prevalent. 
3. Manipulative suicide - refers to those suicide efforts 
designed to elicit "saving" responses from others, e.g. 
wrist slashing, overdoses. 
4. Heightened affectivity - display of multiple intense 
affects by borderlines, and absence of flat affect and 
absence of "satisfied feelings". 
5. Mild psychotic experiences - mainly drug-free paranoid 
ideation, derealization experiences and a history of 
regressions from previous treatments. 
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6. High socialization - intolerance of being alone or 
displaying "compulsive sociability". 
7. Disturbed close relationships - devaluation, manipulation, 
dependency, and masochism, characterized and caused 
instability in the intense attachments of borderline 
patients. (Gunderson and Kolb, 1978, pp. 794-795). 
The authors conclude by stating that their study showed that 
borderlines can, with high accuracy, be discriminated from other 
patient groups described as easily confused with borderline 
leading to frequent mis-diagnoses. 
They draw attention, however, to two unresolved questions about 
their study. These are discriminating borderlines from a 
more difficult control group such as a personality disordered 
group not considered borderline. Secondly, to examine a sample 
from consecutive admissions or a cross-section of the general 
population, and (presumably) to perform repeat, or repeated 
double blind studies to test the reliability of their discrimina-
tors. 
Summary 
A chronological review of the available literature describing 
the symptomatology of the borderline patient was presented. A 
number of issues were specifically highlighted for example: 
the lack of agreement amongst workers as to what clinically 
constitutes the borderline; the confusion as to whether bo,rder-
line refers to a state, a syndrome, a patient, a personality 
disorder etc., or whether it is a form a psychosis or not. 
The importance of theoretical formulations as attempts to under-
stand this diversity of symptomatology was suggested and some . 
discussion was introduced. Despite the extreme lack of concen-
sus amongst workers in this field, the reader is left with a 
knowledge of some definite signs most likely to be associated with 
the bo.rderline.:cor.idit-ion, and that these .a.i,-.e· more likely to be 
elicited from overall behavio4~a1·and affectual patterns of living 
................. ·. 
than from a signs and symptoms inventory. 
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2. 3 PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS AND THE BORDERLINE: 
Unlike the clinical literature, a great deal of agreement exists 
in the psychological test literature as to those patients who 
should be diagnosed as borderlines based on certain test profiles 
and relative test performances. Specifically, those who show 
ordinary reasoning and communication, skills, perceptual and con-
ceptual responses, on structured tests such as the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS) but who on projective tests such as the 
Rorschach, where structure is low, reveal extremely deviant often 
bizarre thought processes, are diagnosed as borderline. It has 
I 
also been noted that the borderline response to the Rorschach 
cards, is often far more flamboyant psychotic than the overtly 
schizphrenic patient (Stone and Dellis 1960, McCully 1962, 
Singer 1977) an observation that has not been effectively explained, 
and to which we will turn a little later. 
It appears that this wide discrepancy in the borderlines function-
ing under varying external conditions of structure indicates his 
dependence on external cues for appropriate functioning, his 
internal personality make-up presumably being dysjoint and incon-
sistent. Hence when structure is high, as for instance on the 
WAIS, and guidelines are continually present for directing the 
discourse the borderline restricts his responses and remarks to the 
tasks set by the other person. The Rorschach on the other hand 
requires the borderline to structure his own performance, and it 
is under these conditions that a psychiatric-like cognitive, 
emotional and communicational structure appears to emerge. This 
high structure/low structure discrepancy is so marked and so incon-
sistent that Singer (1977) has remarked:-
If a rule evolves from the test literature on borderline 
persons, it is that when a person performs adequately 
and displays almost no deviant reasoning on the structured 
WAIS, but on the less structured Rorschach shows highly. 
elaborated, idiosyncratic associative content and peculiar 
reasoning, then it is almost exiomatic that a borderline 
diagnosis should follow.(p.194). 
The earliest seminar papers in this area were those of Rorschach 1942, 
'Rapaport Gill and Schafer, 1945-1946; and Schaf.ier 1948, 1954. But 
it was the Rapaport group who first categorically related the high 
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versus low structure performance to the diagnosis of borderline. 
These early papers presented useful descriptions of borderline 
persons but remained impressionistic and attempted to relate 
various personality theories to overall impressions of tests. 
Singer ( ibid. ) traced certain characteristic features of border-
line responses on the Rorschach test to the early papers by 
Rorschach (1942) Rapaport et al (1945-46) and these remain as 
pathonomonic of borderline pathology. Terms such as "fabulizing", 
"combinatory" and "confabulated thinking" were used to label these 
persons' deviant thought processes as judged by their associations 
and elaborations on the Rorschach. Singer notes: 
The borderlines' affective elaboration of ideas 
cannot be consensually validated by others, and 
their separate perceptions tend to become inter-
mingled and related simply because the responses 
are close together in time or space •.• In 
addition, the listener is unlikely to accept the 
frequent circumstantiality present in the border-
line's reasoning which renders his logic un-
acceptable to a listener. (p. 195) 
Later workers have noted that these thought qualities are ego 
syntonic (Weiner 1962) and do not apparently bother the borderline. 
This has becom~ an important differential between the person in 
an acute schizophrenic state, who would tend to be affected by 
his bizarreness and the borderline. 
In a study cited by Singer ( ioid.), Rapaport et al (1945-46), 
who used the term preschizophrenic which was popular then, 
separated two major subgroups out of 33 patients dia9nosed pre-
. i;r:h i :1nphr1~nic. Thl)!H) were respectively labelled as an overidea-
tional subgroup and a coarctated subgroup of pre-schizophrenics, 
as diagnosed from their varying approach and responses to the 
Rorschnch cnrds. Rrondly speakinq the overideational groups can 
be termed expunsive, with many and elaborate responses, while the 
coarctated group may be seen to be more constrictive and inhibited, 
many of their responses being strongly tainted. 0ith anxiety. 
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It appears appropriate to pause at this point and to give a few 
examples of the nature of borderline responses. This will serve 
to illustrate points made referring to bizarreness of the responses, 
expansive and coarctated responses and the overall psychotic 
flavour of what has hitherto been written about. 
Singer (1977) provides two examples to illustrate the strangeness 
of the borderline's responses to the Rorschach: 
Two unborn mice attached to a human uterus and 
being helped to birth by gentle hands; 
Two statues with a growth on their head and 
electricity passing between them. (p.200) 
What is illustrated in these two examples is the overall bizarre-
ness of the content of the responses, but without evidence of 
formal psychotic-like disturbance. 
Zucker (1952) who presented five extensive borderline Rorschach 
protocols and whose paper will be looked at closely later, also 
highlights in her selection, typical borderline responses. A 
few follow again to illustrate theoretical points made. 
Projection as a primary defence for the borderline against un-
controllable anxiety associated with excessive and unacceptable 
impulses is well illustrated by a woman with severe conflict in 
the sexual realm. The following two responses would be good 
examples of the coarctated subgroup of Rapaport et al •. She sees 
for instance, "A man, he looks as though he could attack me, wise 
and sly, yet brutal and cruel", or " ••• This one looks.sharp and 
wicked, he knows how to get around you, he scares me". (Zucker 
1952, p.49 ). Depersonalization, another well documented border-
line and schizophrenic phenomenon is illustrated by the following 
examples:-
"a strange figure enclosed in a transparent shaft", 
"ghosts looking at bears that are unperturbed;" 
"another elongated ghost, holding a stone but getting 
crushed". (p.50) 
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Zucker notes:-
These attempts at a derealization of her humans 
must be interpreted on two different levels: 
They uncover the patient's hostile attitude 
toward people - and, they convey in a vague but 
nevertheless distinct manner, an estrangement 
from reality. (p.50) 
Finally, this following quotation also from Zucker's paper 
represents regressive elements as noted by the author, but also 
a blurring of what is objective from subjective and the animating 
of the stimuli which in turn stimulates unconscious conflictual 
material: 
Regressive trends are disclosed by his wavering back 
and forth from human to animal life. "I see a man, 
but it is not a real one, a bat-man with wings" ••• 
"This looks like the head of the rooster", he says 
"but the body is human •.• I have dreams, horrible 
dreams with bird-like creatures half-man, half-
animal". " •••• Two humble coachmen, so to speak, 
they are holding a silver basket, in it resides a 
young crown prince •.•• I always felt I was an orphan 
this was well confirmed the other day when my mother 
told me i was an unwanted child" (p.54) 
These responses are also good examples of clearcut loosening of 
association in the patient's thought processes. It is felt too 
that there is a certain grandiosity expressed here, especially in 
the way the last response runs on from, "··· a crown prince ••• (to) 
.... ! ... always felt, etc.'', and could be seen to be an example of 
Rapaport's expansive preschizophrenic patient. 
To return to the issue related to the borderlines abjlity to be 
apparently functioning ordinarily in day to day situations especially 
those situations in which a clear structure exists, yet crumbling 
into psychotic disjointedness when structure is low, Stone and 
Dellis (1960) have postulated a "levels" theory as partially 
explanatory for this phenomenon. In assessing river 200 test proto-
cols of various types of schizophrenia, (including pseudoneurotic 
schizophrenia) using what the authors call "surface tests" like the 
WAIS, the Farer structured sentence completion Test and the TAT, as 
well as "depth" tests such as the Rorschach and Draw-a-Person Test 
.• 
.'• 
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(OAP), the authors concluded that for the pseudoneurotic 
schizophrenic patients there was always a surface-depth discrepancy, 
whereas with overtly psychotic patients, no discrepancy existed. 
Rather than postulating that the ''surface" tests measured conscious 
constituents of personality functioning, while "depth'' test measured 
unconscious constituents, as was popularly conceptualized at the 
time, Stone and Dellis envisaged a surface-depth continuum of 
functioning. They state: 
Dur general frame of reference is organized at 
different levels of impulse-control systems. 
We believe that these different levels of 
personality organization consist of a variety 
of impulse-control systems which exists on a 
continuum from those which are very primitive 
and undifferentiated to those which are highly 
organized and differentiated. (Stone and 
Dellis 1960, p.336~ 
Thus, in terms of their levels-hypothesis Stone and Dellis imply 
that the relatively unpathologized facade presented in structured 
situations even situations such as the question and answer clinical 
interview, is due to surface level interaction between the patient 
and the other. Somewhat more subtle and perhaps also more relevant 
is these authors' assertions that any one trait, for example 
aggression, has different manifestations at different levels of 
functioning. This would result perhaps in a disguised form of 
that trait manifesting as sarcasm for example, at the face to face 
clinical level, but at deeper more undifferentiated levels as 
revealed for instance by the Rorschach, the frank rage is far more 
blatant. They conclude: 
Our specific hypothesis in regard to psychological 
tests is that there is an inverse relationship be-
tween the degree of stimulus structure inherent in 
the test and the level of personality or impulse-
control system being 'tapped' by the test.(p. 336) 
·In other words, structured tests, like the WAIS, relate to higher 
level sophisticated impulse-control systems, while unstructured 
tests like the Rorschach, relate to deeper level relatively un-
·differentiated impulse-control systems. Thus according to their 
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"levels" hypothesis the following becomes axiomatic for 
psychological test performance: whenever thinking is bizarre 
on a "surface-level" test like the Wechsler, it is also bizarre 
on the "depth-level" Rorschach. But the obverse can also be 
true: the "depth-level" Rorschach may be bizarre, while the 
"surface-level" Wechsler is free of pathological thinking. 
McCully (1962), also concerned about the extent of discrepancy 
between clinical description and projective test responses, 
focuses his attention on the issue of latency, and asks this 
relevant question in relation to Rorschach responses, " •••• but 
are peculiar logic, bizarre expression, and other anomalies ( •.•• ) 
"latent'' anymore since they have occurred? (McCully 1962, p.404). 
He feels that the "latency" question in relation to projective 
testing is misleading and feels that what needs to be answered 
instead is what the nature of the stimulus is when this kind of 
data comes to the mind of the subject? And he notes that: 
"The nature of the stimulus is, of course, the crucial difference 
between what may be elicited clinically and what may be elicited 
in Rorschach" (McCully 1962, p.405). McCully takes the view, in 
agreement with Farer (1950) that with maturation and development 
individuals gradually internalize constancies of nature, of group 
practices etc., and develop as a result a system of internal cues. 
These cues are utilized when a low cue situation arises and hence 
the person, for appropriate functioning, invokes his internal cue 
system for guidance. McCully (1962) states: 
The soundness of the Rorschach subject's judgement 
hinges on his capacity to show appropriate 
behaviour despite minimal cues. (p.405) 
McCully, not wanting to be drawn into a "levels" debate, ignores 
~ Stone and Dellis' hypothesis but he however agrees with the notion 
of a continuum of functioning and with respect to borderline cases 
he feels that "if the range of stimulation is extended, some people 
produce psychotic features, while others do not" (p.404). He 
emphasizes that this does not necessarily mean that one is psychotic 
and the other not. He feels instead that: 
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There are people who are vulnerable to psychotic 
responses under certain conditions, and the 
difference between the presence or absence of 
such material lies in the nature of the psyche 
of the individual under consideration 
(McCully op. cit. p.405). 
This is an important point, for McCully points out that Rorschach 
data is as "clinical" as any other and asks: 
What then, of the matter of correct diagnosis, 
" •••• Our need to classify what may be by its 
very nature ambiguous into something without 
ambiguity may defeat its own ends." 
He warns in relation to our need for correct diagnosis: Let us 
not stumble over our own egos (op. cit., pp.405-406). He intro-
duces two concepts in support of his views which for the sake of 
completion are briefly reproduced here. The first is a theoretical 
frame against which he proposes we can judge spheres of movement of 
adaptivity or pathology, in the borderline schizophrenic. This can 
be schematized on two axes as follows: 
Withdrawal 
from the 
other 
Conscious awareness 
(the above) 
Unconscious 
(the below) 
Archaic 
Expansion 
toward the 
other 
(McCully 1962, p.406) 
He notes that the focus of interpretation in psychiatric examination 
tends to be along the horizontal plane, while in the Rorschach 
examination the focus is most often along the vertical. Naturally 
there are overlaps and exceptions, and the "movement in disturbance" 
may be anywhere along these axes. 
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His second concept is termed "process analysis". Essentially the 
focus is on trying to understand what the subject is doing with 
the stimuli at any one time; "It is as a result of asking, what 
process is going on in the patient at this point? (p.407). It is 
therefore an attempt to draw attention to the qualities of what 
the individual experiences as he goes through Rorschach material. 
The author then presents a Rorschach protocol of a young borderline 
subject and systematically locates individual responses on his two 
axis system as an overall backdrop, as well as attempting to eluci-
date the prodess of the patient's thought and affective procedures. 
Given the clear deviance from ordinary cognitive and affectual 
responses on Rorschach and other projective tests (e.g. DAP) that the 
borderline is prone to, it is not surprising as Singer (1977) noted, 
that writers from the psychological test perspective almost invariably 
include the term schizophrenic in association with the borderline. 
Writers from the clinical perspective have been far more reticent 
about adding the schizophrenic label for just the opposite reason, 
i.e. an absence of flamboyant schizophrenic behavioural styles 
during clinical interviews. 
It appears too that there is a degree of favouring referral of the 
more expansive, flamboyant borderline who has touches of loose 
reasoning at interview, for psychological testing, rather than the 
more inhibited laconic and withdrawn individual who is probably 
frequently labelled pre- or incipiently schizophrenic. If this is 
true, and it has not been empirically investigated, then some bias 
exists in the sample tested psychologically. 
- Wynn and Singer (1968) and Wynn et al (1977) set about·investigating 
in greater detail cognitive, emotional and communication traits of 
borderlines as well as their parents and siblings, using the Rorschach 
test. 
Prior to their study it has been found that a large proportion of 
non-remitting schizophrenics had parents diagnosed as borderline. 
In their study they divided a young adult population into five groups -
Normal, Neurotic, Borderline, Remitting schizophrenics and Non-
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remitting schizophrenics. They then compared the diagnoses, 
independently made, on the respective parents of these groups, 
as based on Rorschach protocols. Their results showed that 
~mong the non-remitting schizophrenics, 35% had one parent who 
had been diagnosed as borderline, and an additional 40% had both 
parents diagnosed as borderline or psychotic. Among the remitting 
schizophrenics, only 21% had one parent diagnosed as borderline. 
Of the borderline patient group, only 16% had one parent diagnosed 
as borderline or psychotic. While this situation has been well 
documented in clinical studies with the families of schizophrenics 
(Bateson 1956; Lidz 1957, 1958; Garmezy and Streitman 1975), the 
Rorschach as a tool on its own has not been used in this regard. 
Its usefulness as a time and money saving device is well illustrated 
in Wynne and Singer's study. 
The authors noted that certain features of the language and reason-
ing styles of the parents labelled as borderline or psychotic could 
be scored on a communication-deviance scale. They state in this 
regard that: 
The parents of normals and neurotics are vividly 
distinguished from the parents of both remitting 
and non-remitting schizophrenics. The border-
line young adults' parents form a group whose 
spread of scores overlaps those of the schizo-
phrenic and non-schizophrenics' scores. 
(Singer 1977, p.205) 
And more sp~cifically, they conclude: 
••• for this sample the normals and neurotics tend 
to have both parents with low-communication 
deviance scores while borderline young adults tend 
to have one parent with a high and one with a low 
communication-deviance score. With young adult 
schizophrenics, both parents tend to have high 
scores (Singer 1~77, p.206). 
With respect to affect, Callenbach (1973) studied the affective 
implications and elaborations of the Rorschach responses of these 
same groups. In summarizing his conclusions, three major dis-
tinguishing features were found. Firstly the parents of young 
borderline adults had more affectively laden .Rorschach responses 
~ .· 
. . . ·; . . . .. ·~ : . " 
' ,• 
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than any other group. Secondly, the borderline parent group 
had the largest amount of amorphous affect applied to their 
responses, i.e. in Singer's words: "This category is assigned 
when content is obviously affect-laden, but specific quality of 
feeling is not clear (Singer, ibiJ, µ.208) and thirdly, 
parents of the borderline showed the greatest increase in affective 
elaborations when exposed to a second viewing of the Rorschach cards. 
This is associated with drastic appending, editing and elaborating 
on stated responses. In conclusion Singer suggests that: 
The chaotic, difficult to classify behaviour 
and affective states of these borderline 
young persons thus seems to reflect in part 
the affective intensity of their families. 
Inspection of their clinical histories 
suggests they collapse into brief episodes 
of delapidation following periods of stormy 
turmoil in their lives. (ibid. p.208). 
With respect to articulation and integration of the borderline 
patients' percepts, a significant discrimination could be made 
between borderlines and remitting schizophrenics from chronic un-
remitting schizophrenics. The only criterion which proved of any 
value in attempting to discriminate borderlines from remitting 
schizophrenics was the fabulizing of responses of the borderline 
i.e. the joining of percepts because colours, or forms or ideas or 
statements occurred close.together in time or space. 
Luise Zucker (1952) writing at a time when the term latent schizo-
phrenia was popular, and from a perspective viewing that the latent 
would become manifest if untreated, espoused the values of the 
Rorschach in revealing the latency at an early stage. 
She summarizes with brief definitions, some of the major characteris-
tics of schizophrenic Rorschach responses, and this summary is 
reproduced here: 
1. Variations in form level (brilliantly and poorly 
perceived forms alternate within the record, and 
often within a single card 
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2. Position response (the association is determined 
•••• by the accidental position of a detail in the 
entire blot configuration. 
3. Contamination (two incongruous ideas are telescoped 
into one: concept). 
4. Confabulation (The whole card is interpreted on the 
basis of a small detail) 
5. Perseveration (the same response is given to several 
cards regardless of their actual structure). 
6. Verbal confusion (neologisms etc.) 
7. The associational content (either a dearth of content, 
e.g. focusing on a line, or on the symmetry, or con-
versely on a wealth of concepts, original but bizarre 
in quality; e.g. sexual preoccupations, religious 
symbolism, etc. (Zucker 1952, p.46) 
For Zucker these represent mainly schizophrenic-type responses, but 
as we have seen, often the borderline's response profile is more 
schizophrenic in style and content than is the overtly schizophrenic 
patient. In so far as this is true the above list holds for 
borderline profiles too. It may well be that one of the main 
reasons for this unexpected discrepancy is due to an extreme and 
typical defence of many schizophrenic patients; i.e. of active 
withdrawal especially perhaps, under conditions of fragmentary and 
wholly unstructured input. For, this author maintains, it is not 
true that subjects respond in a purely projective way to the Rorschach. 
In so far as there is a stimulus, albeit an obscure and unstructured 
one, and in so far as the subject is required to de~l with it by 
structuring it internally, there is a stimulus input barrage which 
the overtly psychotic patient may only be able to deal with by 
withdrawal with impoverished responses which may as a result appear 
less floridly psychotic. 
As Zucker notes, it may well be that just because there is a relative 
awareness of reality in the borderline, that he or she is able to 
muster the resources to attempt to deal with the blots, that gives 
the borderline's protocol its extremely psychotic form. 
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Zucker's paper consists mainly of the presentation of five 
Rorschach protocols, which she analyzes with the view of eliciting 
and highlighting what for her are spe.ci fically latent schizophrenic 
responses. She isolates 15 characteri~tics of which some will be 
presented so as to represent her results: 
1. Minimal loss of reality contact 
2. · Lack of conventionality (an inability to think along 
conventional lines. She gives the specific example of 
"edging", i.e. looking at the cards from unusual angles). 
3. Anxiety. The author feels that anxiety is present almost 
invariably in latent schizophrenia. It has a specific diffuse 
quality to it, which the author feels is particularly pathogo-
monic of underlying psychosis. 
4. Fantasy living. "Wish fulfilling, imaginative play tends to 
transform reality according to personal needs. The patient's 
fantasies are autistically imbued and often undistinguished 
from reality". (Zucker 1952, p.57). 
5. Estrangement from reality. This relates to actual content 
of responses but also in more subtle ways, e.g. "This is 
fascinating, it makes me forget I am in this room", or, "it 
is fun to watch myself perform"~ (op. cit. p.57). 
6. The tendency to attribute to reality to the cards. 
7. Ideas of reference. 
Religious themes and other schizoid traits are also prevalent. 
A brief summary of prognostically favourable signs is also added. 
Amongst these Zucker includes: 
1. In the intellectual sphere, at least average intellectual 
endowment; ability for reflective thinking and to be able to 
think along Universally accepted lines; manifestation of some 
imaginative ability. 
2. In the emotional sphere sympathetic relationship with others; 
some awareness of environmental demands. 
3. Generally speaking some anxiety or depressive phenomena, because 
this may point to some insight into their rather fragmented selves. 
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In his book Differential Diagnosis in Schizophrenia, Weiner (1966) 
distinguishes between two types of "non-overt" schizophrenia. 
These he terms pseudoneurotic schizophrenia and borderline schizo-
phrenia. The former is characterized by the utilization of a 
multitide of neurotic defence mechanisms, whereas the latter is 
characterized by the use of one neurotic defence, manifesting 
for example, as an obsessive-compulsive neurosis. He adds too, 
that it is to these neurotic symptoms that the.borderline or 
pseudo-neurotic patient usually ascribes his difficulties. 
Weiner concisely summarizes what is already contained in this 
review, but includes an important differential between overt, non-
overt and incipient schizophrenia, as based both on clinical and 
test data. He states: 
Summary 
Patients whose ego impairments pervade their 
WAIS as well as their projective test per-
formance are likely to be overtly rather than 
non-overtly schizophrenic; those whose 
superiority of WAIS to projective test per-
formance suggests non-overt disturbance but 
who exhibit awareness of and concern about 
the inadequacy of deviant responses typically 
are experiencing incipient rather than border-
line schizophrenia. (Weiner 1966, p.407). 
A selected review of the available literature related to borderline 
conditions and psychological test performance was presented. High-
lights of the review revolved around the agreement and consistency 
with which writers from the testing perspective diagnose the border-
line condition. It was also noted that this framework encourages 
a view of the borderline as being latently psychotic,.the latency 
becoming manifest under certain specified situations. Some 
examples of test responses were presented and briefly discussed, 
as were the results of research into the families of borderlines. 
It _became apparent too that psychological testing plays an often 
decisive role in making a diagnosis of borderline disorder. From 
the research cited, a seemingly new and important role for projective 
testing was introduced, offering a uniquely quick means of assessing 
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quite complex forms of human interaction. Overall, a valuable 
and often overlooked role for psychometric assessment emerged 
not only as a means of general intellectual or psychological 
assessment, but diagnostically and revealing of underlying 
personality structure. 
2.4 DEFINING THE "BORDERLINE" FOR THE PRESENT STUDY 
It is somewhat premature to "define" the borderline personality 
for the purpose of this study at this point, since the brunt of 
what is to follow is an attempt to systematically allow an under-
standing of a borderline personality structure to evolve. On 
the other hand, there are certain descriptions, definitions and 
symptom clusters, from what has gone before which is appropriate 
for this study, and will serve to narrow our focus and to place 
the theoretical derivation into some perspective. 
The first broad point to be made, is that it is the author's 
contention that the borderline personality refers to a specific 
and unique entity different from either the psychoses or the 
neuroses, even though it may share many of the outward characteris-
tics of both. Also, it is not seen as a temporary or transitional 
state, but is a stable state whose underlying structure is under-
standable from, for instance, a psychodynamic viewpoint • 
• The multitudinous and dfsperate symptoms, are seen as secondary· 
elaborations on a fundamentally pathological structure, and while 
these may be ascribed to as "the pathology" they merely represent 
the superficial layers of a deeper disturbance. 
It is also held that a signs and symptoms type psychiatric examina-
tion is not the optimal method of arriving at a borderline 
diagnosis. Rather an understanding of longitudinal patterns of 
social interaction will reveal more relevant and conclusive data 
for determining a borderline personality. 
It is, however, necessary to observe signs and symptoms of border-
line pathology, and to be able to discriminate with accuracy this 
condition from others. Towards this end the following personality -
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profile is presented drawing heavily on the descriptions which 
have gone before as well as on the author's own observations. 
Affect: A major feature of the affectual life is in terms of 
its quality. This is invariably superficial, though by no means 
latent or hidden. The actual range of displayed affect may be 
wide, but, with the exception of anger, is usually felt to be of 
an "as-if" or mimicry nature. This superficiality is manifested 
by the lability of any one affect, the range of affects which is 
observed during any one time-period, as well as the inappropriate-
ness of certain affects to any given situation. Ang~!s singled 
out as perhaps the only~r~~l-~rrrQ.tion_manif~~ted. 
-· 
Another major qualitative feature is the seeming intolerance to 
being in one mood state for any length of time. A mood state is 
frequently broken either by aggressive acting out, spontaneous 
agitation leading to extra-symptom formation, a compulsive need 
for socializing (i.e. seeking to be in a crowd to "forget" the feel-
ings), self-destructive features, or psychotic-like episodes. This 
applies even to feelings of relative well-being of which the patient 
becomes suspicious or begins to anticipate the return of symptoms. 
In this sense, anhedonia is a specific symptom characteristic of 
the borderlines. 
But the most distinguishing affectual characteristic of the border-
line is the frequent complaint of having no feelings at all. This 
is especially true and feared when the person is alone. Quite 
frequently experiences of depersonalization or derealization are 
concomitant with these periods of "absence'' (Lacan 1966) which are 
better characterized as a neither-nor state, a state of pure suspen-
sion of feeling. 
Anxiety, depression, feelings of closeness or love, are all short-
lived experiences, displaced by some other affect state, and all 
lack a sense of genuineness. 
. . 
50 
General appearance and behaviour: 
Appearance and dress is usually socially appropriate, but 
variable in the sense that it could change drastically, in accord 
with social contacts at any one time. Similarly, behaviour is 
superficially acceptable, but varies with social group contact, 
but closer scrutiny shows a low frustration tolerance with 
frequent acting out. 
A range of self-destructive behaviours are common, from moderate 
alcohol and drug intake, passive criminal involvement to acts of 
self-mutilation. Again however, the qualitative nature is 
characteristically mild, however, exceptions to this rule do occur 
and suicide for example does result. Longitudinally seen, 
behaviour may be extremely inconsistent with marked variability 
and unpredictability. 
Sexual Adjustment: 
Borderlines are invariably sexually maladjusted. Acts of poly-
morphous sexual perversity closely related to a fundamental gender 
identity confusion are common. Splitting of the body into masculine 
or feminine halves, parts or complexes has been fairly frequently 
observed by the author. The borderline person appears to fall 
victim to sexually tainted assaults with some frequency, the reasons 
for these unconfirmed observations may be varied. Generally 
speaking, sexual development is arrested at a very early stage, and 
sexual contact is inevitably tainted by much anxiety and fear. 
Psychosis: 
Micropsychotic episodes which are diffuse, amorphous and unsystemat-
ized are common. Hallucinatory experiences usually have stro~g 
hysterical overtones, whereas delusions which are more common are 
usually of a paranoid-persecutory nature or more rarely, the opposite, 
a mixed manic/paranoid-like grandiosity and omnipotence. Again 
however, these experiences are short-lived, the patient being easily 
distracted from them, and they are usually stress related. The 
'stress however, may be of an actual overt nature, or it may be an 
auto-induced agitated state. 
51 
The patient generally retains contact with reality and loosening 
of association in thought processes, when present, are transient 
and rare. The psychotic blunting of affect is generally not 
observed because of the specificity of the borderline's own 
affectual nature. 
Interpersonal Relations: 
In this sphere marked characteristics include: excessive dependency; 
inconsistency; superficiality. It has been the author's observa-
tion that a marked compulsive sociability exists, either in reality 
or in phantasy where an empty life is peopled by figures born in 
phantasy and imbued with many and varied emotions. It has been 
noted too that at times of forced aloneness, self-destructive acts 
are most likely to occur. Often this results in being rescued, 
or admitted to hospital or generally speaking, in gaining the 
company and attention so badly needed. 
What deserves special mention is the nature of the transference/ 
\ 
counter-transference situation in therapy or even as early as the 
initial interview, as a special form of interpersonal relationship. 
Here there is a remarkable vacillation, in just how the therapist 
is seen, resulting in an uncertain relationship even over a 
considerable period of time. There is a unique variability in 
the accessability or tangibility of the patient in the mind of the 
therapist, which is especially inconsistent if the situation is 
left unstructured by the therapist. 
Psychological Test Performance: 
Broadly speaking the common observation holds of an intact, often 
above average, structured test performance as compare9 with a 
decidedly psychotic-like performance on unstructured tests. However, 
it has also been the experience of the author that a baffled with-
drawal from the unstructured test situation exists, leaving the 
overall responses extremely impoverished. 
-.. 
~ ... ... :: 
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Finally, with respect to subgroups of borderline states, it is 
felt that while these groupings may well exist, their existence 
is explicable fiom within a general theoretical model. Thus, 
in what follows not one or another of a specific subgroup will 
be borne in mind, but rather a theoretical foundation necessary 
for each to develop upon. It is implicit in this stance that a 
continuum of borderline functioning exists, rather than specific 
and possibly unique entities. 
SUMMARY: 
A personality-profile of the borderline personality for the 
purposes of this study was presented, narrowing the reader's focus 
and rendering a perspective for the theoretical section which is 
to follow. Material was drawn largely from the literature reviews 
which preceded this presentation, as well as the observation of 
the author's own clinical experience. 
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL FORMULATIONS 
3.1 Introduction and Aim 
What has to be stressed throughout this Chapter is that an under-
standing as opposed to an explanation of the borderline is intended. 
The latter term conveys the impression of finality or of a laying 
bare of the actual nature of the borderline personality. What 
is a far more accurate view of what is to follow, is to see it as 
a means of structuring the various experiences and behaviours of 
the borderline personality, and making sense of them from a 
particular framework. Naturally enough, a framework such as 
Object-Relations Theory, rests on a far wider conceptual theory 
and in this case, would be psychoanalysis. The framework and 
underlying theory however, differ from each other in some important 
ways so much so that Object-Relations Theory as its name implies 
has a set of internally consistent laws and principles making it a 
theory in its own right. Yet, it is fair to say, that having 
such an embedded relationship with classical psychoanalysis it seems 
more of an elaborate theoretical extension and sophistication than 
a separate theory in itself. 
In Charles Rycroft's "A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis" 
(1972) he differentiates between Object-Relations Theory and 
classical psychoanalysis in the following way: 
Object-Relations Theory: Psychoanalytical theory in 
which the subject's need to relate to objects 
occupies the central position; in contrast to 
Instinct Theory which centres round the subject's 
need to reduce instinctual tension. (p.101) 
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This definition while bringing out the salient features between 
the two theories is, however, a little inadequate, but will 
serve, with modification for understanding the sense in which 
Object-Relations Theory will be used in this study. 
Rycroft seems to imply that the emphasis for Object-Relations 
Theory is to cathect objects and in such a way establish contact 
with the world. It would appear that what is more central to 
Object-Relations Theory is not the need to cathect but that cathexis 
of libidinal and aggressive impulses occur, and that the manner of 
this occurrence is all important. There is an implicit emphasis 
on a reciprocity of development between subject and object, and 
Object-Relations Theory would have us accept that there is a 
particular form which this reciprocal development takes. 
With specific reference to this study, it is the task of Object-
Relations Theory to form the basis f6r adequately understanding 
the nature of borderline existence. The task is an invidious one, 
as we are able to judge from the vast range of affectual and 
behavioural manifestations presented in the aforegoing descriptive 
literature review. 
The historical roots pertinent to this theoretical anderstanding 
will be traced from Freud onward, and if certain omissions occur, 
this is so because of the lir~ited scope of this particular study. 
Where necessary, however, sufficient references will be provided 
for far more comprehensive coverage of the numerous important 
contributions in this area. 
· ... •' :·.··:·: .. :· ... : ... · 
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3.2 Early Foundations: Freud and Karl Abraham 
Introductory Note 
It was Freud who contributed the notion that symptoms had a sense 
(1916). In his theory of the neuroses Freud conceptualised a 
neurotic symptom forming as a result of the failure of defence 
mechanism at maintaing the instinct-attached libido in an 
adequately repressed form. The symptom was seen to be a distorted 
compromise between the impulsions of the id, and the restraints of 
the ego. What is of importance for the present study is the 
specific relationship between the type of defence mechanism 
utilised (ibsessional, manic, etc.) and the nature of the symptoms 
which emerge from their failure. This is a central concept to 
Freudian libido theory and neurosis formation, in so far as specific 
defence mechanisms are indicative of the level of libidinal regression, 
and hence suggests certain fixation foci. There is, therefore, 
great importance in specifying symptoms so as to understand the 
major defences at work and hence to be able to locate fixation 
points. These relatively undeveloped foci would then give us an 
indication of the relative maturity of the person under discussion 
with regard to his specific conflicts( 1). 
The importance of thus locating the points of libidinal fixation 
firstly gives one a perspective on the degree of personality 
disorganisation in relation to a hierarchy of defences along a 
(1) See Introductory Lectures, Chapter 17. 
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primitive-mature axis. This allows one to relate affects, 
behavioural, and interpersonal phenomena to typical defence styles 
hierarchically organised and hence to construct a composite 
personality profile from this data. The importance of this 
facility as derived from psychoanalysis for the purposes of 
this study will become clearer as we explore the various theoretical 
formulations -0ffered for the borderline personality. 
Freud's contribution to the understanding of the differing nature 
of the psychoses and the neuroses can be seen to be the foundations 
of a developing Object-Relations Theory of borderline personality. 
Hence a summarised introduction to his contribution in this area 
will be an appropriate point to begin our discussion. 
In his conception of a three-stage development from an entirely 
inner auto-erotic focus to an intermediate narcissistic one and 
finally to an outer object related cathexis, Freud opened the way 
for understanding the ego as either relatively inner or outer 
located in terms of libido distribution, in relation to object 
cathexis. Libido, therefore, in so far as it can be located some-
where along the ego-other axis, can be seen to also provide a means 
of understanding transitional states of development~ a position 
central to understanding borderline phenomena. 
In his paper on Narcissism (1914), Freud makes the distinction that 
in the neuroses, libido is withdrawn from objects which are replaced 
in the fantasies of the neurotic, whereas in psychoses, the libido 
is withdrawn from outer objects without a similar intrap~ychic 
... '.···. 
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replacement process. However, the libido is cathected in 
psychosis, but onto a particular object - the ego, with the 
observable consequences. Freud states: 
The difference between pa~aphrenic( 1 )affections and 
the transference neurosesl2Jappears to me to lie in 
the circumstance that in the former, the libido that 
is liberated by frustration does not remain attached 
to objects in fantasy, but returns to the ego; the 
megalomaniaC3)then represents the mastery of this 
volume of libido and thus corresponds with the intro-
version on to the fantasy creations that is found in 
the transference neuroses. (1914, p.43) 
In this sense therefore the re-cathesix of the ego is equivalent 
to a secondary narcissism which characterises psychotic states with 
the consequent loss of contact with reality. 
This construction along with Abraham's (1908) paper on Hysteria 
and Dementia Praecox, was the first dynamic explanation for the 
psychoses. Abraham states that the histories of psychotic 
patients frequently contain references to their quietness, alone-
ness and their inclination to "brood". He ascribes this "autism" 
to their inability to form transferences, i.e. their incapacity to 
specifically externalise or to cathect their instinctual psychic 
energy. Abraham relates this incapacity to form true object 
(person) relationships with a child's incapacity to see beyond 
himself. He states: 
(1) Freud's term proposed in 1911 for the Dementia Praecox of 
Kraepelin and Schizophrenia of Bheuler. 
(2) Transference neuroses: obsessional and hysterical neuroses. 
(3) Megalomania refers to the totality of psychic energy being 
secondarily cathected onto the ego, and .as a result 
engenders feelings such as omniscience and omnipotence. 
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Thus we see that this illness involves a cessation 
of object-love and of sublimation. Only one other 
similar sexual conditon is known to us, namely, 
that of early childhood; we term it, with Freud, 
"auto-eroticism" (Abraham, 1908, p.73). 
He thus theorises that the psychoses represents a regression of 
the libido back to that stage of childhood where the dictates of 
hedonism were predominant, and in which reality was excluded as 
a realm for any real energy investment. 
But Abraham goes further than this, and notes that the withdrawal 
of all interest from the outside world is not without direct conse-
quences. He speaks of the isolation resulting from this process, 
and in the isolation, whatever misery the person may experience, 
is ascribed to forces beyond himself. In a footnote in the 
reference cited above, he states, "The turning away of the libido 
from the external world is the basis for the formation of delusions 
of persecution in general". (p.74) 
The importance for our purposes of this understanding of the 
psychoses, is, firstly, the implied split between inner and outer, 
and that in the massive return of object-cathected libido 
(decathexis) onto the ego, the ego employs a defence which we know 
as projection, as a means of locating threatening objects. But 
more is implied or potentially present. One could view the 
"inner" as good (containing maximal libido cathexis) while the 
"outer" in so far as it harbours threatening objects is bad. 
This extension of Freud's original conceptualisations can be seen 
to have laid the foundations for the later developments, which will 
be discussed in some depth: ·P?~hological splitting between good and 
bad, projection, and a special relationship between inner and 
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outer in borderline pathology. 
For Freud, in the normal course of events, the repression of the 
narcissistic ego-libido is adequately sublimated into an ego-ideal. 
This is to be distinguished, initially anyway, from his notion of 
the super-ego which he introduced in 1923. He at first ref erred 
to a "watching function".which served the purpose of ensuring the 
ego-ideal its due of libidinal energy and traced this faculty of 
conscience back to the influence of parental criticism. Relating 
the notion of the ego-ideal back to paranoid psychosis, Freud made 
the very poignant observation that parental criticism, i.e. the 
orgins of the super-ego, was originally transmitted by the medium 
of voice. It was this "watching function" together with its vocal 
transmission which for Freud, is the origin of the paranoid's 
auditory hallucinations, and general suspiciousness of the 
persecutory world. A point of great significance for this study 
is Freud's observation that "The lament of the parnoiac shows also 
that at bottom the self-criticism of conscience is idential with, 
and based upon, self-observation.'' (1914, p.53) The implication 
being that the original persecutor having been introjected as 
parental criticism, and due to the inability of adequately tolerat-
ing this inner persecutor, it is at a later stage projected again 
and seen to be identified with objects in the real world. 
It is appropriate to turn to an earlier paper by Freud at this 
point, for further elucidation of the mechanism of projection and 
its role. 
• 
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In his paper, On the Mechanism of Paranoia (1911), which was 
based on his famous analysis of Judge Schreber, Freud makes the 
important point that in the psychoses, the nature of the complexes 
(conflicts) themselves may be exactly the same as those in the 
neuroses. What is different is the mechanism by which these 
symptoms are formed, or by which the regression is brought about. 
Freud here assures us that the hunt for a particular psychotic 
complex devoid of our understanding is thus needless. He draws 
attention instead to the means of dealing with conflicts existent 
in everyone and opens a way for establishing rapport with the 
psychotic( 1). 
For Fre~d, paranoia was a defence against homosexual fantasies, 
a point we need not agree with, but his understanding of its 
formation is of decided importance and one fully worth exploring 
for the purpose of this study. 
He considers that love of a man by a man (or of a woman for a woman) 
occurs as a result of the sexualising of social instincts, which 
undoes the work of sublimation. This sexualisation occurs as a 
carry-over from persons who have not freed themselves from the stage 
of narcissism, which then develops into a fixation· point, the 
objects consequently being sought being identified with the subject 
as closely as possible. 
(1) At the same time it must be stressed that at the time of 
writing his 1911 and 1914 papers, despite his understanding 
of paranoia and of the psychoses, he felt that due to the 
total withdrawal of libido in the psychoses, the psychotic 
was inaccessible to the methods of psychoanalysis and hence 
unable to be effective as a treatment in psychotic states. 
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The unconscious thesis runs thus (for males):- I (a man) love 
him (a man) which meets with full violence of a primitive (intro-
jected) conscience. A reaction formation thus transforms the 
thesis into: I do not love him - I hate him, but this internal 
perception is unacceptable to the paranoic due to the intense 
anxiety created: 
The mechanism of symptom-formation in paranoia 
requires that internal perceptions, or feelings, 
shall be replaced by external perceptions. 
Consequently the proposition I hate him becomes 
transformed by projection into another one: He 
hates (persecutes) me, which will justify me in 
hating him. (Freud, 1911, p.449) 
Freud here again invokes projection as a primary defence mechanism 
in paranoia. This projection succeeds the original repression, 
but it represents a particular form which the eruption of the 
repressed material takes when this defence fails. The form of 
the symptom is related to the degree of libidinal regression -
and hence Freud, as early as 1911, questions the authority of 
diagnosis simply according to symptoms because of the large potential 
overlap between symptoms in different clinical conditions, but for 
very different reasons. He pleads instead for a psychodynamic 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms that give rise to the 
symptoms, rather than diagnosing at face value only. He states: 
What seems to me more essential is that paranoia should be 
maintained as an independent clinical type, however 
frequently the picture it presents may be complicated 
by the presence of schizophrenic features. For, from 
the standpoint of the libido theory, while it would 
resemble dementia praecox in so far as the repression 
proper would in both disorders have the same principle 
feature, detachment of the libido, together with its 
regression on to the ego, it would be distinguished from 
dementia praecox by having its dis¢ositional point of 
fixation differently located and by having a different 
mechanism for the return of the repressed. (Freud 1911, p.463) 
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In his paper Neurosis and Psychosis (1924), Freud further dis-
tinguishes between the neuroses and psychoses in the following 
manner. He regarded neurotic conflicts developing as a result of 
the ego in conflict with id impulses, while psychoses result from 
the conflict between the go and outer reality. Freud adds: 
The pathogenic effect depends on whether, in a 
conflictual tension of this kind, the ego re-
mains true to its dependence on the external 
world and attempts to silence the id, or 
whether it lets itself be overcome by the id 
and thus torn from reality. (Freud, 1914, p~151) 
He recognises the role that repression plays in the neuroses 
resulting, as we have seen, in the return of the repressed at 
the time of the failure of repression, in the compromise form of 
the symptom. In extreme forms of psychosi~ 1 1iowever, the dominance 
of the id's influence over the ego is such, that it automatically 
creates a new external world in accordance with the id's impulses. 
In the other psychoses too, Freud recognises the characteristic 
decathexis from the world and a return inward. The implication 
is that in delusions or sporadic hallucinatory experiences, the 
ego's creating capacity is at play as an attempt at a cure or a 
reconstruction of a prestated primal wish. In other words, the 
push of the impulse binds the ego to a compromise distortion of 
reality 
It is at the end of this paper that Freud first introduces the 
notion of the ego itself undergoing a pathological transformation 
(1) Freud's example is Meynert's amentia. (F. 1924, p.150) 
' 
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in dealing with the varied conflicts between its "various ruling 
agencies" (ibid. p.152). 
Suggesting possible outcomes for these extreme conflicts he states:-
••• it would be possible for the ego to avoid 
rupture in any direction by deforming itself, 
by submitting to encroachments on its own 
unity and even perhaps by effecting a cleavage 
or division of itself. (ibid. p.153) 
Freud takes up this issue again, i.e. of the ego deforming itself, 
as a defence mechanism in his 1927 paper on Fetishism. It was in 
this paper that he first extended his views regarding the disavowal 
of the anatomical differences that children implement when first 
faced by these differences, in relation to their parents and others 
and the consequences of this strategy for ego functioning. 
In the paper on Fetishism he extends this notion to apply to the 
Fetishist who under the influence of a strong castration anxiety has 
relocated the absent mother's penis, so as to preserve it from 
extinction and hence to allay his own castration anxiety, in some 
other object. This formulation of the Fetishist resulted in 
Freud's postulation that two psychical streams existe9 side by side 
in the fetishist; one in touch with reality external and internal, 
and the other disavowing reality altogether. 
He later extended his ego-split notion in his last completed work 
published before he died, the Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940). 
In this paper he writes: 
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It must not be thought that fetishism presents 
an exceptional case as regards a splitting of 
the ego; it is merely a particularly favour-
able subject for studying the question. (ibid. p.203) 
And again: 
Disavowals of this kind (disturbing reality dis-
avowed by child's ego) occur very often and not 
only with fetishists; and whenever we are in a 
position to study them they turn out to be half-
measures, incomplete attempts at deia.chment from 
reality. The disavowal is always supplemented 
by an acknowledgement; two contrary and independ-
ent attitudes always arise and result in the 
situation of there being a splitting of the ego. 
(ibid. p.204, author's words in brackets). 
In this paper therefore, Freud has laid the foundation for an 
intermediate mechanism of dealing with psychical conflicts -
intermediate that is, between psychotic decathexis, and neurotic 
repression. This too can be seen to be a shift towards a more 
ego-oriented development in his psychology, and hence opens the 
way for the interactional orientation of the ego-psychology as well 
as the object-relations theory which was to follow. 
Supplementing and expanding on the nature of the split ego ho~ever, 
were his ideas expressed in his paper entitled Negation, (1925) 
published years earlier than those mentioned above. - In this paper 
he introduced the notion of a splitting between the content of a 
repressed complex and its affective component. This lifting of 
the repression is made possible by the process of negation: "A 
negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for repression; 
its 'no' is the hallmark of repression". (1925, p.236) 
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In this paper too, Freud relates orality and judgement. The 
most primitive expression of judgement, for Freud, is the wanting 
to take in (introject) good or (the need to) keep out (externalise, 
expel) the bad. " ••• the original pleasure-ego wants to introject 
into itself everything that is good and to eject from itself every-
thing that is bad." (1925, p.237) 
Here again we find emphasis laid on the most primitive of all 
distinctions, i.e. the inside and the outside with respect to the 
subject's body. That there should be a return to a reinvocation 
of this primitive distinction as a defence in the employ of the 
psyche at times of stress, appears natural within the Freudian 
context, and as we shall see, in the defences of the borderline. 
To conclude this section, a summary of the essentially Freudian 
contribution wiil be presented in point form: 
: . .. •.· .. 
Introduction to the notion that symptoms have a sense, 
and that they relate to a failure of defences. 
That there is a specific relationship between defence 
mechanism employed and the symptom. 
Defences are indicative of the levels and foci of·libidinal 
regression or fixation. 
Freud's implicit contribution to an understanding of border-
line personality as contained in his theory of psychosis 
and paranoia. 
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Libido theory and the potential for recognition of 
transitional states. 
Psychoses and the decathexis onto the ego, idea of 
secondary narcissism. 
Abraham and redistribution of libido onto the ego in 
psychoses, as giving rise to megalomania. 
Abraham's construction of persecutory delusion as 
resulting from a withdrawal of libido from the external 
world. 
Introduction to "inner'' as "good" and "outer" as "bad" • 
The relationship between the ego-ideal, super-ego and 
, persecutory delusions in paranoia. 
Placing of psychosis-neurosis abnormality on a continuum 
from the dynamic viewpoint with emphasis on the same 
complexes existent, but manner of dealing with them the 
crucial difference. 
Diagnosis as based on symptoms alone inadequate - dynamic 
understanding more enlightening. 
Neuroses a function of id-ego conflict, while psychoses 
related to ego-reality conflict. 
Construction of a new reality in hallucinations. 
Eqo itself undergoing transformation. 
Relation of splitting of the ego with fetishism and later 
expanding this view. 
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The role and relationship of disavowal and splitting. 
Development of greater focus on the autonomy of the 
ego as a psychical agency. 
Splitting between the idea and the content of the 
repressed, and its relation to negation and judgement. 
Orality and judgement and the primacy of the inside (good)/ 
outside (bad) split. 
3.3 Core Borderline Theorists (I) 
Introduction 
This subsection will be dealt with under two further subdivisions. 
The material will be presented for the sake of clarity and contrast 
under the headings: 1) European-British Contribution and 
2) American Contribution. It is felt that sufficient distinction 
exists (as will become evident) in what appears to be traditional 
interpretations and expansions of object-relations theory, to 
justify this division, if only with respect to borderline personality 
structure. 
The synthesis which follows this chapter will thu~ represent an 
. 
attempt by the author to extract what he deems as crucial respective 
contributions to borderline psychology, and to piece them together 
where appropriate, with the belief that this whole will constitute 
an addition to the various parts. Finally, it must be understood 
that this final synthesis will represent a selective process, in 
the sense that this composite view will be that held by the author, 
and not an academic exercise aimed at merely unifying two traditional 
approaches as fully as possible. 
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3.4 European - British Contribution (I) 
Melanie Klein (1921-1963) is a name invariably referred to by 
·borderline theorists. While she herself never actively applied 
herself to the study of the borderline personality per se, her 
contribution in the area of object-relations theory has provided 
(perhaps arguably) the major conceptual tool for the theoretical 
developments in this area. It is appropriate therefore that an 
outline of her major contributions to her theory of mental.and 
emotional development is sketched here. 
Klein was essentially a child analyst, and it was from this perspect-
ive that she made a first-hand analysis of the psyche of the child. 
Winnicott, in a personal tribute to Klein, (Winnicott, 1962, 
pp. 171-178) relates how as a paediatrician he was continually faced 
with the fact that ''Babies could be emotionally ill" (ibid. p.172). 
·This caused him great frustration because at that time Freud's 
_Oedipus Complex was seen to lie at the core of neurotic conflict, 
leading only secondarily to a regression to pregenital fixations. 
Klein changed all this for him and for the rest of psychoanalytical 
psychology too. In a very real way she opened up the psyche of 
the baby from birth onwards, and drew attention to extremely primitive 
mental mechanisms operative from the outset of life. 
One of Klein's most controversial but rigidly stuck to principles 
was the operation of the Life and Death instincts. Her adherence 
to this principle caused severe ruptures within the. rest of psycho-
analysis at the time, but as Henri Rey (1980) has pointed out, in 
. · .. 
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in this regard, "people have quarrelled about words and have 
forgotten that analysis is rooted in observation" (p.22), and at 
the level of clinical observation, he feels that Klein (and later 
Freud) are fully vindicated. 
For Klein, the first introduction to extra-uterine life is 
necessarily a traumatic one. This is so because according to her 
theory, the activation of the death instinct arouses a primary 
anxiety, that of annihilation. This primary fear is s~pplemented 
by the renting of the blissful state of intra-uterine unity, i.e. 
the primary separation anxiety, and is subsequently added to by 
bodily states of hunger, pain, frustration, etc. However, this 
internal anxiety-laden situation is intolerable to what Klein per-
ceives as an unintegrated frail ego, and these various trauma are 
experienced as coming from without - i.e. external persecutors are 
experienced as responsible. She states: "The fear of the destruct-
/ 
ive impulse seems to attach itself to an object - or rather it is 
experienced as the fear of an uncontrollable overpowering object." 
( 1946' p .4) 
Implicit here is the assumption of the operation from birth, of a 
primitive defence mechanism invoked as a means of protecting the 
original frail ego. Moreoever, since the child's first object-
relationship is with the mother's breast, it is this object that 
must be endowed with the persecutory powers innate in the child. 
At the same time, however, the primary object also gratifies, stills 
hunger and pain, and the relation to this object is characterised by 
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love and goodness. Thus there develops an object-relationship 
based on gratification and pleasure (i.e. the original libidinal 
·cathexis of the breast) and an object-relationship initiated by 
the trauma of birth but very soon taken over by the frustrating, 
absent breast at times of hunger, frustration, etc. (i.e. the 
original aggressive cathexis of the breast). 
Klein maintains that the original state of these two relationships 
is a split one, i.e. that the good breast, its relationship to the 
ego, and the ego itself are split off from the oppositve unit of 
bad-breast - affect-ego. This is the major defence of earliest 
childhood, and termed by Klein the splitting defence. 
Since these relationships are established under the domination of 
oral drives, Klein establishes the difference between oral sadism 
as operative in the bad breast relationship, and oral-gratification 
or sucking as operant in the good-breast relationship. 
Under the dominance therefore of these specific modes of orality, 
the infant's aggressive impulses will be manifested by, for instance, 
fnatasies of sucking dry, and tearing at the breast, and the child 
feels, by the principle of reciprocity existent at this time, that 
the breast will attack in the same way. Later under the dominance 
of urethral and anal sadistic impulses, the child in his mind attacks 
the breast with poisonous urine and explosive faeces, and therefore 
expects to be poisoned and exploded by the breast too. We see here 
Klein's conception, further developed, of the early persecuting environ-
ment of the child, as well as the child's primitive defences against it. 
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On the other hand, however, under the influence of the sucking 
oral impulse, the child is receiving support and nourishment 
from the available good breast. For Klein this good object is 
introjected whole, and contributes strongly to the stability and 
growth of. the early ego. 
The gratification and love which the infant experiences in these 
situations all help to counteract persecutory anxiety, even the 
feelings of loss and persecution aroused by the experience of birth. 
It is appropriate at this point to elucidate the Kleinian notion of 
fantasy in its structural and functional manifestations. The major 
reference here is Susan Isaacs' paper entitled The Nature and Function 
of Phantasy (1952). 
The word £!:!.antasy as used here is to be distinguished from .f.antasy 
in so far as the former refers predominantly to unconscious phantasy 
with its concomitant attributes which will be presented below, while 
the latter is a colloquial term synonymous with conscious day-
dreaming. 
In emphasising the primacy and reality of phantasy, 1saacs defines 
it as follows: 
Phantasy is (in the first instance) the mental 
corollary, the psychic representative, of instinct. 
There is no impulse, no instinctual urge or re-
sponse which is not experienced as unconscious 
phantasy. (1952, p.83) 
. . . . ~ :' .· ... 
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The primary and perhaps dominant characteristics that phantasy 
has for the infant, is its omnipotence. While it holds sway, 
.psychic reality (phantasy) is all there is. Thus to question the 
validity of psychic reality in relation to external reality is to 
misunderstand the meaning of the term. 
Phantasy is also preverbal, and hence operates at a concrete level. 
Herein lies a great paradox, yet for Kleinians, a central fact of 
infantile mental life. Thus the examples referred to above, i.e. 
of attacking the bad breast, or of introjecting the good breast 
whole, are to be seen at the level of phantasy as concrete acts on 
the part of the child. 
Inasmuch as we have already spoken of the introjection of the good 
through sucking, and the bad through biting, etc., we are in a 
position to see that for the infant two sets of objects, and hence of 
object-relations exist: the sets of external and internal objects. 
With respect therefore to this dual object-relationship and to 
emphasise the point made in the previous paragraph, Isaacs states: 
The wish and the impulse, whether it be love 
or hate, libidinal or destructive, tends to 
be felt as actually fulfilling itself, 
whether with an external or an internal object. 
(ibid. p. 85) • 
The following examples taken from Rey (1980) are taken from the 
·experiences of a preschizophrenic patient. It is to be seen, that 
for Kleinians, schizoid states including schizophrenia, represent a 
regression to the world and mental life of the infant, hence these 
examples apply for infants too. "You don't understand If I speak 
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to you Ihit you, I poison you with the rotting and mouldy things 
which I am full of". (p .11), or "When you speak to me and ask me 
questions you bite me and tear out a piece of my flesh". (p .11) 
Henri Rey notes that with respect to schizophrenia, and this again 
is seen to be equally true for infancy, Kleinians would have us 
accept that thoughts, ideas, wishes, etc. are material objects 
contained somehwere, and expelled into something or someone. 
Phantasies have a particular function however, which needs some 
elaboration here. Freud suggested( 1)that whatever the infant 
desired was simply imagined in hallucinatory form and he equated 
this with normal dreaming. What is it that the infant hallucinates 
or phantasises about? Isaacs replies that since it is the oral 
impulse which dominates at the earliest stage of phantasy, the 
nipple, then the breast and later the whole mother is thus engendered 
for the purposes of gratification under the sway of the Pleasure 
Principle. 
She notes that phantasied gratification would probably work best 
under conditions of least tension. As tension builds up, phantasied 
satisfaction is likely to break down, giving rise to pangs of pain 
and of hunger. Isaacs suggests that with the increase of frustration, 
the infant has a wish to take the whole breast into him or herself 
and to keep it there as a continual source of gratification.· 
(1) Formulations Regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning, 
1911. 
· ... 
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She assumes that the incorporation of the breast is bound up with 
the earliest forms of phantasy-life·and refers to this phenomenon 
as primary introjection. 
However, when the hallucination of the internalised good satisfying 
breast breaks down under the influence of continued frustration 
and hunger, then rage and violently aggressive feelings are 
mobilised, giving rise to the oral-sadistic, or later at the time 
of teething, oral-cannibalistic impulses, tearing and annihilating 
the phantasised bad breast held responsible for this situation. 
Klein takes this notion regarding the interplay between libidinal 
and aggressive desires a step further with respect to gratification 
or frustration at the breast. She regards greed as a fundamental 
component resulting from continual frustration, either due to the 
absence of external satisfaction, or due to constitutional factors. 
It is the unsatisfied infant who longs to incorporate, i.e. envies 
an ideal breast and wants to take it into himself. At the same time 
however, it is as a result of extreme envy that oral-sadism is rife, 
and this upsets the rhythm of normal mental development which will 
be described below. 
Splitting of the good and bad in infancy is regarded by Klein as 
an essential and healthy developmental stage, not only in so far as 
it is a defence to keep the bad from spoiling the good, but also for 
more complex reasons. Klein suggests that the establishment of a 
good internalised object is fundamental for healthy ego development, 
because later when the integration between the two fundamental 
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aspects of the ego is to come about, the existence of an intact 
good object allows for this synthesis far more effectively. 
On the other hand, however, Klein states: 
·Excessive envy, an expression of destructive 
impulses, interferes with the primal split 
between the good and bad breast, and the 
building up of a good object cannot suffici-
ently be achieved. (1957, p.192) 
It is due to the indiscretion of the excessively envious ego that 
the idealised breast is ever unavailable. This leads to the 
development of excessive idealisation, far removed from the good 
primal object, and driven mainly by strong persecutory forces. 
To return to the splitting process as the primary defence, denial 
of the existence of the bad persecuting object and of the emotions 
attached to it, operate omnipotently in the phantasies of the infant 
when hallucinating the ideal breas: 
Denial in its most extreme form - as we find in 
hallucinatory gratification - amounts to an 
annihilation·of any frustrating object or situa-
tion, and is thus bound up with the strong feel-
ing of omnipotence which obtains in the early 
stage of life. The situation of being frustrated, 
the object which causes it, the bad feelings to 
which frustration gives rise (as well as split off 
parts of the ego), are felt to have gone out of 
existence, to have been annihilated and by these 
means gratification and relief from persecutory 
anxiety are obtained. (Klein, 1952, p.65) 
In summary up to this stage, we see that the infant's world up to 
3 or 4 months is essentially a torn one. On the one hand, a life-
giving good relationship is established with a good external and 
subsequently introjected breas under the dominance of the Life 
instincts, while on the other, impulses of aggression and hostility 
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are directed at that object imagined to be the cause of all pain 
and frustration under the dominance of the Death instinct. This 
.object is likewise taken in, but under the influence of oral-
sadistic and cannibalistic impulses, and again projected. This 
primary split is necessary for the maintenance of the integrity 
of the early ego, its development, as well as the synthesis which 
is still to be described. This projection, introjection, re-
projection and reintrojection of both good and bad, continuously 
occurs and is the hallmark of infantile ego development. 
Omnipotent denial of all aspects of the bad at a phantasy level, is 
seen as a necessary corollary to the splitting process. Envy and 
greed have, for Klein, their origins at this primitive level too, 
giving rise to the idealised object as a defence against an extremely 
persecutory world. This idealised object remains ever removed from 
the envious ego, however, being mobilised by the forces of persecution 
and therefore under the influence of aggressive phantasies. It was 
seen too, how the operation of excessive greed.; interferes with the 
healthy splitting of the good and bad for the purposes of ego develop-
ment, and leads to the contamination of the good by aggressive 
impulses, so forever removing satisfaction and gratification from 
the envying ego. 
The role and nature of phantasy in infantile life was outlined, and 
its relationship to the world of the schizophrenic was introduced. 
Klein's naming of this period in the developmental history of the 
infant as the paranoid-schizoid position can therefore be seen to be 
.... . . . ... most appropriate. 
· .. '.:··· .... Paranoid in that the world both inner and outer 
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is filled either with persecutors, or feelings of oceanic well-
being, and schizoid because of the manner of dealing with these forces. 
Before we leave discussion of the paranoid-schizoid position, and 
go on to describe the further development of the ego, a few further 
points need to be added and elaborated on. 
The objects referred to hitherto must be understood to be part-
objects, i.e. the breast as standing for the mother. Further 
subdivisions of this part-object may occur involving the splitting 
of the breast into nipple-breast, each part bearing a particular 
relationship with the split ego. It is this latter point that needs 
further elaboration. 
With every split part-object relationship, there is a split in the 
ego too. Thus initially Klein would conceptualise of a number of 
introjected and projected split-ego-object units: 
I believe that the ego is incapable of splitting 
the object-internal and external - without a 
corresponding splitting ·taking place within the 
ego. Therefore the phantasies and feelings 
about the state of the internal object vitally 
influence the structure of the ego. (1946, p.6). 
While this is a necessary form of early ego development, the frag-
mented dissociated aspects of the split ego-object unit with their 
associated affects must be fully appreciated, as this fragmentation 
forms the basis, if it continues in this form, of the fragmented 
personality of the borderlines. Klein recognised this fact naturally 
enough, while never relating it directly to the borderline personality. 
~ . .. . . . 
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She appears to have slipped into the viewing of mental-emotional 
development along a very either-or axis because her views regard-
' 
·ing fixation at the paranoid-schizoid position almost always 
involved for her schizophrenic manifestations of pathology. 
Finally a closer inspection of the actual nature of infantile 
projection and introjection is required. It will be recalled 
that the original projection of intolerable hostile inner impulses 
onto the primary object was primarily directed at the self. This 
projection of hated parts of the self outward, develops into a 
particular kind of identification with the object into which these 
affects are projected. 
In these various phantasies, the ego takes possession 
by projection of an external object - first of all 
the mother - and makes it into an extension of the 
self. The object becomes to some extent a representa-
tion of the ego, and these processes are in my view 
the basis for identification by projection or 
'projective identification'. (Klein, 1952, pp. 68-69) 
The same applies to the introjection of objects. There is thus a 
fusion of ego and object which has the result of weakening the ego 
itself, if it remains so vicariously identified. 
We are now in a position to further explore the developmental 
process of the infant, covering the ages roughly falling into the 
second quarter of the first year. 
We saw that the first quarter was marked by a drastic splitting of 
good and bad, both inner and outer. A marked change occurs in the 
second quarter in terms of both intellectual and emotional 
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development. Interests broaden, different relationships are 
established and a greater consciousness as a whole emerges. At 
the same time the infant's sexual organization is progressing and 
while the oral desires still dominate, increasing libidinal 
distribution onto urethral, anal and genital foci developes. 
Generally speaking there is a narrowing between libidinal and 
aggressive sources, bringing new anxiety situations, new phantasies 
to life and hence requiring a different defensive organization. 
Klein maintains that a natural development towards a synthesis of 
good and bad, of loved and persecuted occurs. This occurs with 
respect to both inner and outer objects themselves. A greater 
coherence of ego fragments thus emerges, narrowing the "distance" 
between opposing affect-laden identifications and consequently 
introducing a new form of anxiety termed depressive anxiety. 
At this developmental position diminution of destructive impulses 
occur. Klein is unclear as to the mechanism of this inhibition, 
but states that it occurs as a result of the fear of damaging the 
now coalescing loved object, out of the good and bad previous ones. 
She assumes too, a primitive "knowledge" on the part of the infant, 
that damage has already been done against the good ohject, and this 
recognition introduces a new emotion into infantile life - guilt. 
It is under the influence of guilt that a striving to repair is born, 
first at a concrete level, and later as the depressive position 
develops, mourning and later reparation evolve. 
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Initially, however, under the anguish of facing the full extent 
of depressive anxiety the primitive splitting defence is still 
employed. This depressive anxiety results from the realisation 
that since the good and bad are not as rigidly split as the infant 
had at first imagined and that in the vicious phantasied attacks 
against the bad object, the good had been damaged too. The fear 
of having possibly permanently damaged the good object, on the one 
hand, and having to stand alone on the other, result in the emergence 
of a depressive anxiety. At this stage however, the emergent whole-
object is split into an alive undamaged one, and a damaged or even 
dead other. Strong identification now occurs between the ego -
also more synthesized - and the damaged object, towards whom 
reparation is done in phantasy. Omnipotent reparation is accompanied 
by a new defence - the manic defence in which the ego and primitive 
super-ego( 1),( 2)are united as one, conflict-free. Klein maintains 
that the continued vascillation in infants from contented happiness 
to agitated discomfort and seeming terror, represent the outward 
manifestation of the to-and-fro rocking between mania from the 
manic-defences, and depression due to the terror associated with 
depressive anxiety. 
An important point easily overlooked when reading Klein, is the 
role that external reality plays during these turbulent develop-
mental positions. For example she states: 
(1) For Klein the super-ego develops from the very first introjects 
of both good (ego ideal) and bad (critical function). 
(2) See Chapter 8 in The Psycho Analysis of Children, 1932. 
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••• when the infant introjects a more reassuring 
external reality, his internal world improves, 
and this by projection in turn benefits his 
picture of the external world. Gradually, 
therefore, as the infant re-introjects again 
and again a more realistic and reassuring ex-
ternal world and also in some measure establishes 
within himself complete and uninjured objects, 
essential development in the super-ego organiza-
tion takes place. (1952, p.74) 
While Klein has frequently mentioned the importance of the nature 
of the external reality, her clinical examples and clinical inter-
pretations appear almost invariably to be aimed at intrapsychic 
reality and the activities of phantasy. But it is with the onset 
of the depressive position, when the nature of the infant's entire 
relationship faculty is changing, that this ego-other link appears 
to be of greater importance for Klein. 
It is due to this widening of object-relations, that the depressive 
position is eventually worked through. During the depressive 
position, while oral drives are still dominant, genital drives assume 
greater significanc~. Under the influence of genitality, frustrated 
oral desires are transferred to the father's penis. This represents 
for Klein the beginnings of the early Oedipal situation. Thus from 
the primary envy of the breast, jealousy now enters in the triadic 
Oedipal situation. This transfer from preoccupation with mother, 
to the incorporation of father, is the beginning of substitute object-
relationships, and a general widening of relationships potential. 
With reference to the working through of the depressive position and 
its relationship to the Oedipal situation, Klein states: 
.... ";' .. ; 
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In both sexes, the fear of the loss of the mother, 
the primary loved object - that is to say, 
depressive anxiety - contributes to the need for 
substitutes; and the infant first turns to the 
father, who at this stage is introjected as a 
whole person, to fulfil this need. (1952, p.79) 
Thus the early stages of the Oedipal situation bring relief to the 
anxieties of the child and help him to overcome the depressive 
position. 
With time genital trends increase in strength. With this increase, 
powerful forces are mobilised to enhance the overcoming of the 
depressive position, and to establish a new centre in the ego. 
Klein maintains that with the ascendancy of genitality the capacity 
for reparation increases, its range widens allowing for greater and 
more satisfactory sublimation of energy. This is due to the fact 
that with genitality in women, 'fertility as a function is awakened, 
i.e. the power to give life, thus the reparation to loss of the 
object is greatly enhanced. In men, the element of life-giving is 
reinforced with phantasies of fertilising and thus restoring or 
. . th . . d d d . th ( 1 ) reviving e inJure or amage primary mo er. 
The ascendancy of genital trends therefore implies a great advance 
in the integration of the ego, since these trends take over libidinal 
and reparative desires of a pregenital nature, allowing for a synthesis 
between pre-genital and genital reparative tendencies. The increase 
(1) For Klein it is not so much male and female as gender forms 
which are important, but rather that in the direct and inverted 
Oedipal situation the masculine and feminine positions are 
experienced by both genders. See Chapter VIII in The Psycho-
Analysis of Children (1932). 
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in reparative sublimations, is accompanied by a lessening in 
anxiety and guilt aroused by destructive tendencies, due to a good 
·relationship being established with inner objects and the develop-
ment of a stable relationship with outer reality. 
In concluding this outline, the vascillating nsture of the working 
through of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions must not 
be lost sight of. It is a gradual process, suffering setbacks 
resulting in regressions to earlier positions to a greater or lesser 
extent, as a function of either constitutional or environmental 
factors or both. For Klein, by the time that the latency period 
has dawned, the child in the normal course of events has established 
a secure inner world, and a relatively stable outer-object world. 
Before continuing with those theorists more directly involved with 
specific borderline issues, it is necessary to be reminded of the 
aims of this section. Freud, Abraham and Melanie Klein have been 
presented as foundational theorists, who provided major theoretical 
contributions for the theorists who follow to specifically build on. 
It is stressed that not every sign and symptom as presented in 
Chapter 2 will be attempted to be explained. What is intended is 
an understanding of that personality structure necessary for these 
multitudinous symptoms to manifest. The reader is therefore 
referred specifically to pages 48 to 52 for the symptomatological 
background, for the theoretical contributions which follow. 
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3.4 Core Contributions (II) 
Donald Winnicott is regarded by Andr~ Green (1977) as "the analyst 
.of the borderline" (p.24). He considers this so because of 
Winnicott's focus on the interplay of the external and the internal. 
Green endorsed Winnicott's notions regarding the importance of the 
nature of the early environment resulting in borderline developments, 
which we will now consider. 
Winnicott (1960) in addressing himself directly to the borderline 
state, regards the development of a "False-self" as central to border-
line personality. He regards the False-self as that state of being 
that lacks a sense of reality or continuity in time and space. In 
this sense he offers an explanation of the frequent complaints of 
an absence of feeling by borderline patients, as well as their mirror-
like or merely mimicked existence. 
He traces the origins of this False-self to the early infant-mother 
interaction, which he feels takes a definite form. This form is 
defined by the "not good-enough mothering" offered by the potential 
borderline's mother. The not good-enough mother is one who cannot 
adequately respond to the infant's spontaneous omnipotent gestures. 
Instead of meeting these gestures (expressions, in so far as they are 
spontaneous, of the True-self) and making repeated sense of them, 
the not good-enough mother is unable to engage the infant's omnipotence, 
and instead substitutes her own gesture which is to be given sense by 
the compliance of the infant. He maintains that this compliance of 
the infant, is the earliest stage of the False-self, and derives from 
the mother's inability to sense her infant's needs. 
: .... ::. ·· ....... :, ·. 
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Winnicott, in suggesting that the mother should meet the omni-
potent spontaneous gestures of the infant, is in a sense saying, 
that the mother adequately responds to her infant by allowing or 
encouraging a belief in the omnipotence of the infant's gestures, 
so that in this way the infant can gradually and at a later stage 
abrogate omnipotence. Winnicott feels that the infant can initially 
enjoy the illusion of omnipotent creation and control, and later can 
gradually come to see the existence of this illusory element because 
he will have developed the stability of a True-Self. What is central 
to Winnicott's theory, is that there is a gradual loosening with 
illusion through the transitional object into reality. We will have 
more to say regarding the transitional object a little later on. 
But in the case of a False-Self development, the mother's not good-
enough mothering leads the child to prematurely reacting to her 
gestures, and the infant gets "seduced into a false compliance" 
(Winnicott 1960, p.146). A compliant, reactive pattern is thus 
established in relation to environmental demands, and a seeming 
acceptance rif them results. It is from this primary False-Self 
that the infant builds a set of false relationships, based either on 
mimicry or a spectacular ability to pick up cues for taking on a 
particular role to suit the occasion. In comparin~ this False-Self 
development to actors he states: 
(In regard to actors), there are those who can be 
themselves and who also can act, whereas there are 
others who can only act, and who are completely at 
a loss when not in a role, and when not being 
:1pprecint.erJ or npph1uded ( acknm1ledged as existing). 
(_ibid. p.150). 
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In this sense, Winnicott's False-Self can be compared with Helen 
Deutsch's ''as-if" personality (1942), which as we saw earlier, 
(p.tO) she related to an ongoing unstable early environment not 
allowing for adequate identifications~ or insufficient stable 
objects for appropriate libidinal expression. 
Winnicott emphasises yet another aspect in his infant-mother 
interaction in this regard. He states that in between the infant 
and the mother is something, or some activity or sensation, which in 
so far as it performs a joining function (infant to mother) is the 
basis for symbol formation. Alternatively, inasmuch as this some-
thing may separate instead of join, a blocking of symbol formation 
develops. This second possibility is postulated to occur in the 
potential False-Self-Mother interaction, with the consequent empty 
symbol formation and hence false-object relationships. As a result, 
the infant remains isolated, because cathexis of external objects is 
not initiated. Symbol formation for Winnicott thus lies at the 
very root of communication forms of all types. 
The origins of good-enough mothering lies in the development of a 
close identification with the "foetus of the pregnant mother. It is 
at its height during confinement, and gradually weakens in the weeks 
that follow birth. Winnicott maintains that it is because of this 
identification with the infant that the mother knows how to "hold" 
her infant: 
•.• so that the infant starts by existing and not by 
reacting. Here is the origin of the True-Self which 
cannot become a reality without the mother's special-
ised relationship, one which might be described by a 
common word - devotion. (1960, p.148) 
.··· 
... ··:·-.. ·:.-
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In an elaboration on what could be regarded as the part-object 
representation of the facilitating environment, Winnicott in his 
book Playing and Reality (1971) makes the following point regarding 
the primary infant-breast (mother) relationship. 
Either the mother has a breast that is, so that 
the baby can also be when the baby and mother 
are not yet separated out in the infant's rudi-
mentary mind; or else the mother is incapable 
of making this contribution, in which case the 
baby has to develop without the capacity to be, 
or with a crippled capacity to be. (1971, p.82) 
He makes the subtle distinction between t~e active breast which "does" 
and the breast the baby needs w~ich "is". In the former the baby 
has to "do like", or to be done to (ibid. p.82) while the latter 
allows for the development of life-giving interactions. 
What Winnicott is emphasising here, is the subtlety at work at the 
earliest infant-mother interaction. The quality of this interaction 
is all important in the development of a true sense.of self. He 
implies that an original compliance at the breast leads, by a process 
of introjected identification, to a False-Self development, devoid of 
spontaneity, deficient in symbol formation, hence limiting real 
communication or relational functions to a mere facade. 
This character profile fits very neatly with the core group of "as-if" 
personalities of Grinker et al's study (1968)~ In his relating this 
way of being to the "actor who can only act", Winnicott introduces a 
way of understanding the compulsive sociability of the borderline, in 
so far as external acknowledgement grants a sense of existence. The 
borderline is therefore seen to exist through the establishment of a 
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temporary projective identification with the object. In the 
absence of objects, existence is therefore impossible. 
For Winnicott, no transitional object exists in the borderline life. 
Instead a "gap" or "void" exists (Winnicott 1965) and th,e False-
Self's uncathected libido strives to ensure the continued "existence" 
of the True-Self wherever or whatever that may be. For in the 
anguish of the borderline's plea for help out of incessant loneliness, 
some intuitive knowledge of a meaningful referant( 1)must ·exist. 
This is an important point in the aetiology of borderline personal-
ities for Winnicott. If no meaningful referant existed, no anguish 
is possible because the void would be all there is, and presumably 
psychosis is the result. But it is because there is anguish, even 
though of a primitive and momentary kind, that some form of primitive 
spontaneity must exist, i.e. a rudimentary sense of a True-Self. 
What is fundamentally absent for Winnicott is the transitional bridge 
for the borderline. The absence of an early facilitating environment, 
in the sense outlined earlier, leads the borderline to function merely 
by primitive and transient forms of identification, and fixated as 
a result at an early oral level. Instead of the transitional 
"potential space" utilised for the development of trans.i tional symbols, 
the borderline creates symptoms, that is to say, a pathological 
distribution of available libido. 
(1) A Lacanian (1966) term deemed appropriate .for inclusion here • 
.. . 
. :· . ... 
.... ··· .... · ... -
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This outline of Winnicott's theory regarding the complexities 
of the early infant-mother interplay, renders understandable the 
origins of some of our typically noted borderline patterns of 
behaviour. 
His notion of the False-Self, besides suggesting the need for compul-
sive sociability, as mentioned earlier, can be seen to be fertile soil 
for the sorts of psychotic-like depersonalisations and derealisations 
so characteristic of the borderline. This can particularly be seen 
to exist at times of stress, such as when structure is low, and cues 
are few, yet demands are made. The borderline, lacking the necessary 
primitive symbol formation - the basis for object cathexis - can be 
seen to necessarily collapse into non-existence, or turn all else 
magically into an unreal state. 
Strongly inferred from this theory too, is the typical interrelational 
pattern of the borderline, i.e. extreme dependency - dependency here 
better described as a projective identification, in the sense that 
"the other is the self". For Winnicott however, this would be of · 
a special type; not the projection of a fragment of the ego, but 
by projection, the enlivening of the ego itself. The threatened loss 
of a relationship therefore for the borderline according to this 
formulation, must mobilise either all the anaclitic dependency present, 
or the opposite, i.e. the annihilation of the most primitive.drives of 
destruction and annihilation - for the loss of protected True-Self 
is imminent. 
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Winnicott's aetiological understanding of the borderline, can 
thus be seen to be related to a particular quality of early infant-
mother relationship. In developing his notion of the absence of a 
meaningful transitional space, Winnicott establishes the inadequate 
development of communication. The form communication takes for the 
borderline is a superficial mimicked one, revealing the essential 
False-Self of the borderline. He highlights the transient ego 
existences through identification with the other, in whose absence, 
the ego also collapses. 
Green (1977) in paying tribute to Winnicott for his focus on the 
inter-play of mother and infant, extends his (Winnicott's) formulation 
regarding the need for adequately meeting the spontaneous gestures of 
the infant. Green feels that one basic function of the psyche is 
to strive for separation, in order to foster adaptation, individualisa-
tion and autonomy, which the primary gesture is the first expression of. 
But he states emphatically that this aim will not be met, "· •• unless 
the disjunctive process is accompanied by a conjunctive one, where 
the aim is to re-establish communication with the split-off elements 
to the extent possible." (ibid. p.31) This, he states, is the work 
of symbolisation or in Winnicott's terms "symbol formation", to which 
the adequately responding mother plays a central role. 
Green starts his exposition of the borderline with a consideration as 
to the basic function of the psyche. He suggests that this is a 
representational one in a very broad sense, i.e. representation of the · 
inner and outer world, in pluralistic modes (i.e. acts, affects, 
bodily states, etc.). He maintains that the "physical field" is 
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under the pressure of the instincts aimed at a "specific action" 
(Freud, 1950, Laplanche and Pontalis 1973) and the impact of the 
object satisfying the instinctual push through representation. 
Both these functions are fused initially in the mother's breast, 
where unity prevails. But through the impulse toward autonomy, 
inevitable frustrations and disappointments compel the infant to 
tolerate simultaneously with feelings of well-being, discontent 
and anger fixated in a primitive representational form. It is in 
his efforts to separate the "good" from the "bad" and the impulsion 
toward separation, which for Green engenders the pathological 
splitting in borderlines. 
It must be emphasised that splitting itself for Klein and Green is a 
beneficial process, for in Green's theory it can facilitate representa-
tion by damping and controlling psychic tension. It is radical 
splitting, that is held as partly but fundamentally responsible to 
borderline pathology, because it results in the fragmentation of 
the ego itself. The question is now put: under what conditions 
does pathological splitting come about? For Klein splitting is 
related to defences again~t early anxieties resulting from the operation 
of the death instinct, which is true for Freud too. For Green the 
actual nature and location of splitting itself is of vital significance 
and in considering its different f3cets. the conditions for its 
development Jlso emerges. 
Green considers that splitting in the borderline is a basic reaction 
to the mother's attitude which he contends can be of two types, 
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(1) a lack of infant-mother fusion, even at times of primary physical 
contact the infant meets with a "blank breast" (1975), and (2) an 
excess of fusion in which the mother is unable to give up the 
"paradisiacal bliss" regained through the experience of pregnancy, 
resulting in a stifling towards autonomy of the infant. Splitting 
therefore results in a "loss-intrusion" polarity - with respect to 
the infant-breast separation. What is meant here is that which is 
split off and projected is reintroduced with an intrusive, persecuting 
quality by way of projective identification. 
A major point regarding the nature of splitting, is that it may occur 
at levels other than inner or outer, and Green feels that the split 
·between psyche and soma, and consequently between bodily sensations 
and affects may even predominate. This may result in a disjunction 
between affect, representation and thought, or physical motor activity 
could be dissociated from the psychic world. 
As a result of this radical splitting process, psychosomatic symptoms 
as opposed to hysterical symptoms will be dominant in the psyche/soma 
split due to the blindness or lack of symbolic links between psyche 
and soma in psycho-somatic situations. And secondly, acting out a 
primitive and infantile reaction to stress, devoid of possible meaning 
for the patient, results from the inner/outer split, which is contrasted 
with the pregnancy of meaning in the parapraxes for example where the 
inner intention and outer expression though manifestly incongruous are 
related at a different level, very meaningfully. 
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Green then relates this state of radical splitness, to the essential 
differences between repression and splitting. In the former the 
links are intact and recombined in a new pattern, the "psychic 
energy remains bound" (1977, p.35), whereas in the latter the links 
are destroyed or at best badly damaged. Thus the experience of 
helpless ness, annihilation, etc. at the return of the split-off 
elements, as opposed to the signal anxiety operative with the return 
of the repressed. 
The specificity of the borderline splitting manifestation is due to 
these two particular modes of splitting. Firstly the inner/outer 
split is determined by the constitution of an ego container (Bion 1962). 
The peculiar nature of this particular container is such as to have 
clearly delineated limits, but which does not function as a protective 
shield, in so far as ego boundaries are largely elastic. The elasti-
city affects the nature of the separation (loss) anxiety and the 
intrusion (implosion) anxiety. As Green notes, this ego-object 
variability is not enriching of experience, but is experienced as loss 
of control. Second, the psyche/soma split results in the fragmenting 
into "noncommunicating nuclei'' (1977 p. 37), of the subject's ego. 
These fragmented ego-nuclei each establish a self-object relationship, 
but are totally lacking in a sense of cohesiveness or integration with 
each other. In Green's own words these disparate ego nuclei are well 
described as "ego archipelagos" (ibid. p. 37). 
~ .: 
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In my view, these islands of ego nuclei are less 
important than their surrounding space, which I 
have described as void. Futility, lack of 
awareness of presence, limited contact, are all 
expressions of the same basic emptiness that 
characterises the experience of the borderline 
person. (ibid. p.37) 
The net result is an absence of distinction between thoughts, 
representations and affects. Rational thought is impossible, because 
the individual thought elements are loaded with inappropriate quantities 
of affects, and the only mode of detaching these contradictory or 
merely inappropriate juxtapositions, is by further splitting. We are 
reminded here of Henri Rey's examples given earlier, regardin~the 
inappropriateness, the concreteness, and the massive affectual compo-
nents of the experience of the borderline. 
This concretization of words opens an interesting research area with 
regard to how words differentiate out, from primitive concrete 
symbolisations of a fantasied kind, through the intermediate forms 
of ususal symbolic language communication modes, to the various abstract 
systems of communication, for example, in music or mathematics. It 
appears that in borderline functioning, the transition from concretistic 
fantasied communication to more symbolic forms, fails to occur, and 
the word itself and the fantasy associated with that word assumes 
magical o~ omnipotent characteristics in a very concretely representa-
tional form. 
In conclusion, Green offers a final hypothesis regarding the reality 
judgement of the borderline. In Freud's paper on Negation (1925), he. 
relates the basis of the faculty of judgement to the psychical construct 
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of negation - i.e. "that object is bad and is to be kept out of me." 
The subject in a primitive oral form either affirms the presence of 
an object, or negates it. Winnicott, with the introduction of his 
transitional object, extended the range of possibilities to the 
object being regarded as existing (Yes) and not existing (No). Green 
wants to introduce the concept, that in borderline functioning a third 
possibility exists, that of Neither Yes nor No - a genuine active 
suspension of judgement surrounding the fact of his or the object's 
existence. Hence a profound question mark hangs over the most funda-
mental aspects of the subject's (or object's) being. The borderline 
is locked into an uncertainty for instance in which the "Presence-
absence" pair cannot be dissociated - i.e. the borderline cannot 
distinguish between absence and loss, and since in Green's terms the 
absence of the object is the basis for the development of creativeness 
or aliveness, to confuse this with a sense of loss is tantamount to 
psychical destruction. This is so, because as we have seen, in 
Green's terms the return of the split-off elements is characterised 
by annihilation or fatal helplessness. 
Green can thus be seen to extend Melanie Klein's central concept of 
splitting to refer to more psychical modes than just the inner/outer 
one. Indeed it is the fragmentation of the ego into disparate 
nuclei separated by void, that characterises the "blankness" (Green 
1975) of the borderline personality. Green's formulation offers an 
excellent vantage point for understanding the "as-i fness" of the 
borderline, especially in terms of the archipelago nature of the 
fragmented ego. 
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The characteristic anger noted by so many clinicians in this regard 
remains a little more obscure however. It is felt that this un-
directed.and often inappropriate affect state can be seen to derive 
from Green's notion regarding the meaningless acting out of the 
borderline, the opposite of "specific action" mentioned earlier. 
He assumes that this acting out is a desparate attempt to ward off 
or defend itself against psychical reality. We appear to face 
something of a theoretical contradiction here because of Green's 
conception of the archipelagos of egos - in other words, what is 
doing the warding off, if nothing tangible exists? 
A way out of this dilemma and yet remaining true to Green's theorising, 
is to start where he started, with Melanie Klein. In her theory she 
assumes the existence of some frail unintegrated ego at birth, that 
undergoes splitting. It later re-coalesces or it matures through 
the depressive position. But what is perhaps more important is that 
she maintains that splitting is never entirely successful, a quantity 
of energy is always left behind in the splitting ego. If this were 
not so, psychosis would result. Thus, in the face of manifest 
psychical reality, a regression can be seen to occur to that very 
primitive level of ego integration, where fear of annihilation 
(operation of the death instinct) dominated and momentarily coagulates 
inlo an outburst of rage, only to end redistributed again into the ego 
fragements. 
Green also includes centrally into his conception of the borderline, 
the importance of the containing function of the primary objects. 
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He respects the importance of the transitional potential space 
introduced by Winnicott, as the birthplace for creativity and alive-
. ness - for symbolisation. Failure at this intermediate level either 
due to excessive fusion or to blank contact results in defensive 
manoeuvres of splitting as we have seen. 
In concluding this all too brief introduction to Green's notions 
regarding the borderline a quotation from a paper presented to the 
International Psycho-Analytical Congress in London in 1975, in regard 
to theorising is appropriate: 
we cannot do without a mythical or1g1n, just as 
a small child must construct theories, even romances 
about his birth and infancy. Undoubtedly our role 
is not to imagine, but to explain and transform. How-
ever, Freud had the courage to· write 'Without meta-
psychological speculation and theorising( .•• ), we shall 
not get another step forward.' We cannot accept that 
our theories are fantasies. The best solution would 
be to accept that they are not the expression of 
scientific truth but an approximation of it, an analogue. 
Then there is no harm in constructing a myth of origins, 
provided we know that it can only be a myth. (1975, p.18) 
Dr. Henri Rey in a series of papers which were collated in Canada in 
1979, but never formally published, outlines the nature of the 
borderline personality along two fundamental dimensions; time and 
space. It is in the borderlines' unique "structuration" of space and 
"seriation" of time, that many of the bizarre clinical manifestations 
can be condensed down to. Intertwined between these two broad humano-
physical dimensions for Rey, lies the complexities of language, or 
more correctly, the mental representation of experience. The border-
line along the linguistic dimension lies somewhere between the 
primitive Piagetian action schema (i.e. concrete communication form) 
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and the symbolic processes (i.e. abstract communication forms). In 
Rey's thinking the complex interrelationship between these three 
Primary modes of how we can make sense of our existence, is revealed 
in certain overall structures, and it is the form that these 
structures take and the implications of living according to them, 
that differentiates relative normality from relative insanity 
The question of border line aetiology as such, is not focusse.d on in 
Rey's thesis. He is more inclined to the understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the structuration of the person's world, ,and 
hence to arrive at an understanding of the form of primary phenomena 
as it is experienced by the borderline, the elucidation of which is 
therapeutically significant. 
For Rey, a psychical structure exists as the result of the interaction 
between at least two substructural psychological elements. He speaks 
of two types of structure, pathological ones which he describes as 
aggregates which are unstable, and true structures. A structure in 
Rey's terms represents an interactional unit, involving the ego, as a 
part ego at a primitive level, and something to be repeated symbolically, 
with which a relation is established. With time and maturation 
primitive substructures coalesce in the whole structures with the 
increase in sophistication of their mode of representation. One of 
the fundamental lapses in borderline development, is just such a 
failure on the part of substructures, or primitive part-objects, to 
coalesce into maturer more stable full structures. Rey identifies 
splitting and fragmentation of the ego as " ••• the lines of cleavage 
or interfaces or frontiers where instead of transformation, aggregates 
were formed." (1979(a), p.5) 
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But structuration of the psyche is a paradoxical and indirect one. Rey 
maintains that the infant'bonstructs his objects" (ibid. p.6) and via 
projective identification, identifies with them. It is therefore import-
ant that the appropriate stages (Piaget) of object formation are develop-
ing, for appropriate transformations from part objects to whole objects. 
Rey maintains that should something interfere with these normal matura-
tional stages according to a Piagetian system then that person could find 
himself locked into a relatively primitive mode of identification - i.e. 
a split one. 
One.of the fundamental aspects of what Winnicott may have called the 
facilitating environment, is what Rey refers to as the relative bigness 
or smallness of the subject in relation to the object-world. Unless the 
external objects are facilitating in the sense that they do not become 
invidiously big in relation to the infant's capacities to deal meaning-
fully with them, the infant will be unable to reach the level required 
to work through the depressive position. 
Relative smallness or bigness to my mind pervades the whole 
of the schizoid mode of being and many of its reaction 
formations are related to that factor. It is most evident 
in the manic defence •••• (ibid. p.7) 
The manic defence represents the fusion between ego and super-ego, and 
for Rey identification with the omnipotence of the erect (big) penis. 
The counterpart of this excited power, is the anxious terror associated 
with castration. The implied bigness vs. smallness emerges clearly from 
this example. That is, the manic defence is invoked in the face of 
in~urmountable odds, as an omnipotent means of control, but actually 
marks a fundamental "littleness" and anxiety. 
What Rey is also describing here, is the concrete level at which schizoid 
thinking operates, especially. in fantasy. The appropriate representational 
.. t;ransit;i,on ha·~ ·not adeq~·ately been made from the action schema of the 
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infant to the symbolic processes of the adult. For the borderline person, 
tho~ghts are conceived as material things, contained somewhere and 
expelled into something or somewhere, and his fantasies operate similarly. 
Generally therefore the concreteness of the infant's world is retained 
in all its material capacities. 
It is this notion of needing to contain or be contained, that brings Dr. 
Rey to the conclusion that the schizophrenic patient is the truest 
claustra-agoraphobic person, and in so far as the schizoid hovers on 
psychosis, this applies here too. At the level of concrete representation 
the claustro-agoraphobic syndrome exists in the form that the idea is 
equivalent to the object and the "ides-objects" (ibid. p.12) are always 
contained or containing. It is in this sense that Rey refers' to the 
borderline as a prisoner in prison. Many of his defensive manoeuvres 
are directed at extricating himself from this interminable position. 
The ultimate vessel from which the borderline has never extricated him-
self is the all-embracing womb (mother) with whom he is still symbiotic-
ally related. 
As an example of the basic contained-containing nature of the border-
line, he employs a basic means of protection: projection, both of the 
good and the bad aspects of his inner world. Bad split-off aspects of 
the ego, with the associated impulses and anxieties are projected into 
objects. These objects are again introjected, but are not assimilated, 
and are again projected and the cycle continues. 
In relation to the good, the schizoid projects these aspects into 
some relatively safe object, whose own security or whereabouts becomes 
a constant source of concern for the borderline. In this sense too 
he is imprisoned, imprisoned by his own projections which contain parts 
· C:>f· his self. 
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A fundamental aspect of borderline functioning is the haunting 
fear of annihilation which can again be seen to have roots in 
Piagetian psychology. The fundamental inability to as~imilate 
good and bad introjections, and the need for the variety of defensive 
operations, to control them is characteristically borderline and leads 
the self to being so devastatingly scattered that actual concrete 
annihilation into parts is the great "nameless dread". (Bion, 1970). 
Unlike the psychotic who has difficulties at the accommodation level 
of object perception and conception, the borderline is able to contain 
thes~ objects, but always at a split primitive level resulting in the 
impossibility of adequate assimilation. For instance, split-off 
and projected part-objects which if "bad" become external persecutors 
by projective identification, are dealt with in a most concrete fashion. 
These objects are classified, according to Rey, along one axis, for 
instance "eatable or not eatable, hard or soft, bigger or smaller 
than the mouth, etc." (Rey, 1980). It stands to reason therefore, 
that if one's world is structured in terms of concrete object-
relations, assimilation, which requires the re-alignment and a new 
synthesis of previous parts, is virtually impossible, or at best 
results in different concrete aggregates. 
It follows therefore, that in line with Kleinian theory, adequate 
assimilation of part-objects into whole objects, because of the 
severe split of the borderline's world, leads to inadequate intro-
jective identification, central to the healthy development of the ego. 
The extensive use of projective identification hence underscores the 
borderline's lack of any real identity, including naturally enough, a 
gender identity. 
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It is clec.r from what I have just said that the 
question of his identity is a major problem for 
the schizoid. The enormous difficulty of 
acquiring a stable ego i~ the result of faulty 
introfjective identification made very difficult 
by persecutory feelings and a fear of the object 
created by the projection of destructive, violent ••• 
impulses. They are neither heterosexual or homo-
sexual, not even bisexual. This arises from the 
fact that their identifications depend both on an 
internal object which is not assimilated and on a 
containing external object in which they live, and 
hence this identity depends on the state of the 
object and varies with it •••• They have an 
external shell or carapace but no vertabra column; 
they live as parasites in the shell which they seem 
to have borrowed or stolen and this creates a feel-
i11g of insecurity. (Rey, 1979, p .15) 
In summary therefore, up to this point, Rey outlines certain necessary 
personality substructures for a number of the recognisable symptoms 
to be superimposed upon:- i) Acts of polymorphous perversity - due 
to a fundamental lack of gender identity, these acts can be seen to 
be either experimental, complementary or symbiotic; ii) the particular 
anaclitic dependency in their interpersonal relationships - without 
the presence of the other, the containing vessel of their own ego 
and hence the ego itself disintegrates; iii) compulsive sociability -
seen to have similar meanings as the previous point; iv) symptoms 
of depersonalisation or derealisation - at times of true isolation in 
which their own absence becomes manifest; v) acts of self-mutilation, 
or drugging, etc. - attempts at concretely proving their own reality 
("If I bleed I must be real"). This latter point also reflects and 
is an example of the presence of the primary body-ego in the border-
line. Drug abuse would again represent a concrete attempt at shift-
ing the absent reality, chemically. In a sense a regression from 
absent conceptions of the self for example leads to the engaging of 
chemical transformations to alter perceptions as a means of distraction 
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as well as an indirect and temporary means of providing a perceiving 
ego, or better an ego-forced-to-perceive • 
. Implicitly here too, because of the per.secutory nature of the 
schizoid's world, the central affect of anger can be seen to be the 
only real one present. Here Rey would follow Klein in her notion 
regarding the relationship of the operation of the death instinct, 
its deflection and projection, and the resultant oral and anal 
sadistic measures of dealing with these external persecutors. The 
lack of existence of all other affect states of any depth, relates 
directly to the type of world that has to exist, which inhibits the 
development of other affects. In other words, the dominance of· 
persecutory anxiety, and the continual battle to stave off annihila-
tion precludes the development of all other affect states to any 
significant extent. 
' In this regard Rey sees the schizoid as living in a pre-ambivalent 
world, i.e. his constructions have not yet been sufficiently developed 
to have two simultaneous affects toward one object. This notion owes 
its origin to Karl Abraham who locates it at a primitive early oral 
stage - he terms this the primary oral stage (Abraham 1924), before 
cannibalistic aggression develops. Rey uses this term (pre-ambivalent) 
somewhat differently, and relates it to the part-object world of the· 
schizoid. It is the radical [(part-ego)-affect (part-obj~ct)J splitting 
which renders the schizoid's world pre-ambivalent, i.e. the borderline's 
part egos are always related to part-objects under the dominance of 
one affect state at any one time, though the affect concerned can be 
rapidly interchanged for another. The criticism that surely the 
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opposite part-ego-affect-good-breast relationship is a loving one, 
leading to the question concerning the inability of tbe borderline 
to display true feelings of care, etc. may be understood in the 
following terms. The object-relationship as outlined here is not 
based on an ego-good-object differential at all, it is the anaclitic 
symbiotic unity which defines this relationship and not object love, 
it is total projective identification. The persecutory threat (i.e. 
the operation of the death instinct) is seen to disrupt this basic 
unity and hence mobilizes the concomitant rage. 
It is this basic schism in the schizoid's world, that accounts too for 
his intolerance of anxiety. Anxiety results from intrapsychic 
conflict, i.e. two sets of differing affect directed at the same 
object; classically, id impulses and ego restraints in neuroses, and 
the id-ego union and outer reality in the psychoses. This implicitly 
grants the co-existence of two different affect states at the same 
time and we have seen that the borderline for Rey, lives in a divided 
pre-ambivalent world. Thus the presence and tolerance of anxiety 
would admit the potential reality of actually losing the state of 
primal unity. The annihilation fears which would consequently 
emerge, would and to a greater or lesser extent do favour a shift to 
primary acting out behaviours, as concrete expressions of the primitive 
split world in which the borderline lives. In Kleinian terms, this 
primitive move towards a depressive reality is too powerful, and a 
schizoid mechanism of defence is employed as a means of survival of 
the symbiotically linked parasitic primitive ego. In Piagetian 
terms, which Rey extends into psychoanalytic understanding, there is 
a regression to the action-schema level of sensori-motor activity. 
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For Piaget action is the source of all manifestations of life, 
precedes thought, controls perception and sensation, and by processes 
of combinations of actions of the subject on the object, and the 
internalisation of these action-patterns (schemas), thought and 
symbolic representation is born. Thus the structural pattern of 
though is laid down secondarily to action-schemas and represents a 
progression in terms of effective communication patterns. It is 
just this progression which is absent in the case of the borderline. 
For Rey, the progressive representation of space in the growing 
inf~nt is central to proper development, and the manner in which it 
miscarries will direct the form of object relationships. The border-
line manifests a particular mode of constructing his space, giving 
it the specific characteristics of the "borderline-mode-of-being" 
(Rey , 1979) • 
To begin with, Rey asserts that a universal aspect of the infantile 
neurosis is the claustro-agoraphoric syndrome from which the infant 
emerges with growing autonomy. This primary claustro-agoraphobia 
develops, for Rey, into a sense of a personal space at a mature level 
and this sense operates at differing levels of abstraction depending 
on the variables concerned. Expressions such as an "intrusive 
person" or someone '!invading one's space" are examples of such a 
system in which the variables are negatively laden. Rey wants us to 
understand that the mode of structuring this personal-space and 
distinguishing it from the non-personal space, is a representational 
step not made by the borderline, presumably due to intrusions on the 
part of th~ mother.'· _·or. 0-0n$titut.io11al factors., ·or both. · A sense 
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therefore, of where a personal or other space begins or ends is 
not developed adequately in the borderline, resulting in inappropriate 
psychotic-like fears of being penetrated for example, by the mere 
presence of someone, or the sound of someone's voice. Alternatively 
this absence of a space may retreat inwards and encapsulate a part-
good object, and only at that level will the borderline feel that his 
space has been invaded. A second borderline mechanism of structuring 
his space can be seen from the infant wanting the bood object inside 
himself, i.e. in his primitive self-space, permanently. The frustra-
tion of not achieving this leads to his substituting temporarily a 
thum~, toys, etc. for the longed-for breast while waiting. However, 
continuing non-gratification may lead to "punishing the non-self space 
by putting frustrating objects, say faeces, into it" (1979, p.30). 
It is the persistence of such concrete "puttings into" or "taking out 
of" which lies at the root of projective and introjective identifica-
tions which account for many typical features of the way the borderline 
experiences his life. For instance, the experience of living in 
the object, and hence the importance of never leaving the object, 
or at the threatened loss, primary anxiety resulting giving rise to a 
primitive rage response. 
It is the primary experience of birth, i.e. the first separation 
anxiety which lies at the root of the absent personality of the 
borderline. The failure to develop an adequate self-space, and have 
this relate maturely to a non-self space, is for Rey the fundamental 
failure of the borderline. 
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A primitive state of birth experiences persist 
in the hierarchies of transformation and 
representation of that early experience. What 
is fixed in the mind is not necessarily the 
original experience of birth but on another of 
a primitive similar state belonging to the 
hierarchy of space constructions such as the 
marsupial space . • • When something comes out 
of the body such as shout, urine, faeces, semen, 
saliva, vomit, it fires the system "coming out 
of" and produces the attached affect ••• He thus 
experiences himself as coming out of his 
mother. (ibid. p.31) 
Rey cites a number of clinical examples to illustrate the points 
made and readers are referred to the text for clarification. 
The ~eriation of time operates at similar concrete levels. What 
Rey means by the seriation of time is essentially that the border-
line spatialises time. A watch set at a certain time, means that 
that is the time, if it is important for time not to pass. To the 
borderline, displacement or movement can lead to frustration, hence 
the rate of doing anything may become of vital importance. In 
relating the slowing of time in depression to the ultimate stopping 
of time in suicide, or the speeding up of time to limitless, boundless 
infinity in mania, Rey gives us a clue as to the significance time 
has at a concrete level for the borderline. At the concrete level of 
borderline seriating therefore, standing still may be equivalent to 
the stopping of time, or alternatively fantasied flying could be equal 
to great rapidity of the passing of time. 
Words and language are especially concretised in Rey's conception of 
the borderline. Again he emphasises the failure of the borderline 
to mature at the level of representation along the hierarchy from 
sensori-motor, through symbolic to abstract symbolisation. Rey feels 
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that language, along with self and object representation, is 
constructed. The constructional process involves the principles 
of analysis-synthesis,.and is related to the working through at a 
semantic level of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. 
According to Rey at an early age,sounds are treated as objects 
because of the perceptual quality of sound. Thus according to Rey's 
Object-Relations Theory, this sound can be structured, the first 
step being to enclose it with an inside and an outside, i.e. spatializ-
ing it. The content is filled out by a piece of experience associated 
with'that sound,which is projected into it. Since the original 
structuration of sounds and words occurs early in infancy, the form 
projection takes is thus of an identification type. Thus Rey 
postulates the existence of word-objects, being structured and given 
a content through projective identification, and through their content, 
some sense of meaning. This whole range of original wors and meanings 
is referred to by Rey as a personal lexicon. 
It is as a result of the person who fails to similarly imbue the 
"mother-tongue lexicon" with similar meanings and values, that a 
borderline language structure exists. The ability to subdivide to 
basic units, then to synthesise these units into a whole, the content 
of any given message, is primary to normal language development. 
This capacity to reconstitute the environment symbolically 
through language ••• rests on another ability to reify 
experience; an analysis into parts of the objects, 
properties and actions of life which, as concepts, can be 
manipulated as if they were objects. (Bellingi and 
Bronowski, cited in Rey 1980, p.14). 
109 
It is also at this level that the borderline fails. The reification 
of experience in language symbols is impossible because the experience 
is felt too concretely. Hence the persistence of bizarre associations 
being given to words in the borderline. One is reminded here of 
Green's (p.94) notion regarding the archipelago of unrelated egos 
each attached by some independent meaning to some idea or experience 
and the consequent impossibility of formal thought. Rey here implies 
that due to the failure of the personal infantile lexicon, to ascend 
the linguistic hierarchy and eventually develop into the mother tongue 
lexicon, lies at the root of the borderline's bizarre thought and 
language patterns. 
Rey holds that even in normal cognitive development which occurs 
through a vertical hierarchy consisting of sensori-motor, imitation, 
inactive, iconic, symbolic, abstract, - a concurrent horizontal process 
also occurs, namely, the working through of the paranoid-schizoid 
and depressive positions, in relation to the specific hierarchical 
level reached. Hence before a progression can take place from the 
sensori-motor level to the imitation level, the schizoid-paranoid 
mode of dealing with cognitive components of the former (sensori-
motor) level have to be worked through, the depressive position reached 
and worked through, before progression to the next level is possible, 
where the cycle repeats itself. 
In the borderline's cognitive development, premature leaps are made 
from one paranoid-schizoid organisation to another. 
Henri Rey thus presents us with a composite and rather complex view 
- · .. of the border line .. from three basic foundational developmental 
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structurations, viz. space, time, and language. As a result of 
lack of progress from the concrete to the symbolic in any of these 
areas, more particularly when structure is low, the borderline mode 
of life is manifested. 
3.5 American Contribution 
In this subsection the work of Otto Kernberg, J.F. Masterson, Donald 
Rinsley, and the developmental theory of Margaret Mahler, will be 
presented as representative of the American contribution to the 
understanding of the Borderline Personality in an Object-Relations 
framework. Since Mahler's developmental theory forms the foundation 
for the theoretical work of the others, her theory will be briefly 
outlined, and that aspect regarded as central to borderline develop-
ment will be more detailed. 
Mahler's theory is a nature-nurture interactional one, in which genetic-
ally laid down stages of biological expressions are moulded by the 
unique environment in which the child is located. It is also a 
hierarchically organised stage theory, in which certain functions 
emerge and form according to environmental influences. She places 
enormous ~mportance on the mother who "serves as a beacon of orienta-
tion and a living buffer for the infant, in reference to both external 
reality and his internal milieu". (1968, p.229). Hence the qualitative 
development of the child is strongly influenced by the primary environ-
ment. 
She regards and labels the first stage of development a "normal 
autistic" one, a presymbiotic state, of amorphous and totally 
···.·~ 
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ndifferentiated functioning. This spans the first month of life. 
This period naturally blends into the second stage, the symbiotic 
one, in so far as normal development is concerned. She speaks of 
this second stage as a "social-symbiosis" (ibid. p.34) which succeeds 
the intrauterine biological symbiosis. She states: 
The intrauterine, parasite-host relationship within 
the mother organism •••• must be replaced in the post-
natal period by the infant's being enveloped, as it 
were, in the extrauterine matrix of the mother's 
nursing care, a kind of social symbiosis ••• The 
mutual cueing between infant and mother is the 
most important requisite for normal symbiosis. 
(1bid. p.34). 
Continuing to stress the mother's role, Mahler states that it is the 
·specific unconscious need of the mother that activates out of 
innumerable potentialities those that particularly make the child 
"her child". In other words, Mahler would have us believe that the 
particular mutual cueing between mother and infant results in the 
mother providing a "mirroring frame of reference" to which the infant 
automatically adjusts. 
The absence of this preoccupation with her child for whatever reason, 
will result in the child developing without this frame of reference, 
against which he or she can check and monitor perceptions, expressions, 
and emotions, contributing to the laying down of the specific form of 
a primitive self-development. 
While stressing the role of the mother in the early development of 
the child, Mahler also highlights the innate ability of the child to 
extract selectively for itself from available human contact and hence 
·is not entirely passively dependent on the mother's needs. She cites 
:~· . ... : 
. .. . .. . . . . ~ 
·· .. ::: 
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examples of concentration camp children, as well as the work of 
Spitz (1945, 1956) who writes on the effect on children of the loss 
of mothers early in the first year of life and who never developed 
psychotic disturbances. In this way she develops a constitutional 
theory with regard to psychotic development, inasmuch as the total 
loss of the mother early in life does not seem to invariably or 
inevitably have devastating consequences. 
Thus together with the child's innate endowment and an adequately 
libidinally available mother a primitive self begins to develop. 
According to Mahler, it is in the nature of this developing self, 
that it should grow away from symbiosis to individuality. At this 
point, a new stage is reached, that marked by separation and individua-
tion. 
The separation-individuation stage roughly starting at about the second 
half of the first year, spans the next thirty months, taking the child 
into the third year. This stage is subdivided into four further sub-
phases, labelled respectively: 
i) differentiation (6-10 months) 
ii) practising (10-16 months) 
iii) rapprochement (16-25 months) 
iv) object constancy (25-36 months or 2-3 years). 
It is this relatively prolonged development period,which is regarded 
by the American ego-psychology school as central to the development of 
the borderline condition. We will thus explore the nature of develop-
- ment during this stage in some depth. 
.------------------------------------------
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As the first subphase's name implies, an awareness of differential 
between self and object emerges. It is at this stage that the typical 
"peek-a-boo" games be.come prominent. The rationale is that in gaining 
a sense of self-existence as distinct from object existence, the 
continual discovery and rediscovery of the object reinforces the 
novelty of this fact. Also, the mother's or other relevant person's 
involvement in the infant's omnipotent games - being struck down by 
"a blow", vanishing "on command" for example - again seems to reinforce 
a sense of mastery over the object, and hence an implied sense of 
awareness of the self. 
Mahler stresses the need for the adequate involvement, without 
emotionally flooding the infant at this crucial time. A balanced 
sense of distance and involvement is required. In the absence of 
this distancing, the differentiation of self and object, is disturbed 
at the conceptual level, and ego-other blurring occurs. 
The practising subphase, 10-16 months, normally includes the develop-
ment of upright locomotion, hence allowing for greater mobility. 
Mahler in emphasising the importance of primary walking states: 
In the course of the practising period, we were impressed 
by the tremendously exhilarating, truly dramatic effect 
that upright locomotion had on the hitherto also using 
busy quadruped infant's mood! I became aware of its 
importance for the achievement of 'psychological birth 
experience', the 'hatching' ••• It seemed to me that 
most toddlers had a 'love affair with the world 1 .(1) 
(1971, pp. 409-410). 
(1) cf. Greenacre 1957 'love affair' of the infant artist. 
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She combines this newly acquired locomotor skill with Piaget's 
representational intelligence occurring at the same period and 
regards these two great 'organisers' (ibid. p.410) as forming the 
'midwives of the psychological birth' (ibid. p.410). Consequent 
on this hatching process, Mahler regards the child as having reached 
the first level of identity, that is, of the infant as a separate 
individual entity. 
An ironic situation now emerges. During the two previous subphases, 
the infant has taken a delight at his separateness and his actively 
maximfsed his experience in this new capacity. But with the dawning 
of upright walking the effectiveness and potential of really being 
alone increases his fear of losing his primary attachment which leads 
to what Mahler has termed the rapprochement subphase. The infant 
again seeks a closeness with mother. 
It is stressed by Mahler that optimal emotional availability cannot be 
emphasised too strongly at this time, as well as the availability of 
the father. She stresses too at all times, the co-development of 
cognitive faculties, with general development trends, and notes a 
heightening of symbolic linguistic communications at this stage. 
A rapprochement crisis emerges. What is meant here is that the 
infant's gains in self-identity have to be delicately counter poised 
by the need to be contained. Mahler notes two characteristic patterns 
of behaviour at this stage; " ••• the shadowing· of mother and the 
darting away from her with the expectation of being chased and swept 
up into her arms" (ibid. p.411) 
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This represents the coexistence of a wish for reunion with the love 
object, and a fear of re-engulfment. She notes that the pattern of 
continually warding off by the infant who was no sooner picked up, is 
directed at a fear of the loss of this recently gained autonomy. 
However, the child still only emerging into the symbolic representation-
al level of communication, and still partly concretising his under-
standing and expression of communication also fears the loss of the 
loved object by the physical absence of it. Modification of this 
primary conflict exists in the growing child up to the third year of 
development. 
In so far as the rapprochement crisis serves to focus specifically on 
the quality and lastingness of a sense of personal identity, gradually 
acquiring importance in the preceding phases, it represents the final 
hurdle to adequate ego development for the path through the Oedipal 
situation and on to adolescence. Since the borderline characteristic-
ally displays at least a blurred sense of self as distinguished from 
other, the subphases of differentiation, practising and rapprochement 
serves for Mahler and those theorists resting on her developmental 
ideas, as central for borderline development. 
Mahler, in attempting to remain as classically Freudian as possible, 
views the fate of infantile narcissism as pre-eminently important in 
borderline development. Co-existent therefore, with her stage-
subphase theory, is a psychodynamic discussion relating narcissistic 
libido to her theory. Toward this end she rather mechanomorphically 
ascribes a narcissism "fuelling" function to the early infantile 
She writes: 
' 
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We recognized that an important source of 
marcissistic libido, the quantity and 
quality of libidinization of the body ego 
or body self, is dependent upon early 
narcissistic supplies. These supplies 
are contributed in the symbiotic phase as 
well as in the differentiation and early 
practising subphases by fuelling by the 
environment. (Mahler 1977, p.73) 
Whatever contradiction exists in a source of libido lying external 
to the subject, is not the focus for discussion here, but what needs 
discussion i~ how Mahler translates her observational material and 
theoretjcal constructs into psychodynamic formulations. 
With this end in view she observes that an important source of internal 
narcissistic enhancement, is contingent on the expression of autonomous 
achievements. This rises to an early peak during the practising 
subphases "fuelled" as it is by "self-love", primitive valuation of 
their accomplishments, and omnipotence"(ibid, p.73). It is during 
the rapprochement subphases, and subject to the adequate resolution 
of the rapprochement crisis, that Mahler maintains that narcissism is 
subphase-specifically vulnerable. 
Towards establishing this point she presents two diametrically opposite 
outcomes of narcissistic development in two case studies. Summarising 
the development of a borderline personality as based on one case 
essential features will be presented and briefly discussed. 
Mahler notes that throughout the duration of the separation-individuation 
stage (i.e. 6-25 months) the child's life was "a saga of daytime attempts 
to extricate himself from his mother's suffoca·ti.ng ·envelopment and 
. -· .. 
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intensiveness" (Mahler 1977, p.74). During the night he was seduced 
into behaving as the "child-lover at the breast" (ibid. p.74). The 
child strained away from mother at every opportunity, even at such 
times normally associated with a going toward her. As a consequence 
he showed stranger-preference rather than stranger-anxiety, at a time 
when the latter should have been dominant. The mother, however, 
continuously redirected the child towards her, forcing him to interact 
with her. 
At this point, up to the end of the normal practising subphase, the 
child had not had the opportunity for differentiating experiences, his 
symbiosis with his mother continuing into the rapprochement period. 
It was with the development of upright locomotion and in the absence of 
adequate experience of being an autonomous eog, that the child's 
rapprochement crisis was particularly severe, and significant for his 
later deviant personality development. 
The sudden onset of the rapprochement conflict, 
which syC1lexperienced without his ego having 
been prepared for functioning separately ( ••• ) 
was one of the roots of his deviational develop-
ment. (Mahler 1977, p.75) 
In this study, the child's demands on the mother were frequently 
ignored, and at the time of his suddenly refusing the breast (17 months) 
he developed a sleep disturbance. This was immediately interpreted 
as a result of his having given up the breast, and the child was 
(1) Name of child in the study • 
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reintroduced to the "dried breast (as) a giant pacifier" (ibid. p.75). 
At the time of weaning, his father, equal to the mother in degree of 
disturbance, "took him over body and soul" (ibid. p.76). In his 
father's company he was subjected to gross forms of disturbed contra-
dietary and unstable communication patterns. 
Sy was diagnosed as a borderline personality with the characteristic 
emotional; interpersonal, etc. disturbances. He was followed up into 
his school years, the parents refusing permission for his being taken 
into analysis. 
In developing a dynamic understanding of this case, Mahler points out 
that prolongation of the symbiosis stage into the child's twentieth 
month, laid the foundations for pathology. Narcissistically speaking 
he was never allowed to stimulate his "inner sources of narcissism" 
as outlined earlier, neither was he appropriately "fuelled" from the 
environment. 
For Mahler, Sy's development toward the Oedipal situation - "The core 
of neurosis ••• '' "The Oedipus complex represents the acme not only 
of infantile psychosexual development but also of object relations" 
(ibid. p.71), was hopelessly inadequate. He was precipitated into a 
premature frankly Oedipal situation with his mother, as the lover at 
the breast, and similarly, with his father's highly sexualised contact 
with him. This represents a specific condensation for Mahler, of pre-
genital and genital conflicts, resulting in an almost random distribu-
tion of narcissistic libido. 
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Along with the American ego-psychology concept, Mahler regards the 
introjection of object-relations units as crucial to ego development. 
What constitutes normal development depends on the adequacy of the 
external environment as well as on the assimilation of the introjects 
as whole objects. 
In the case outlined, radical splitting with the concomitant denial 
characterised the mode of defence of Sy. This resulted in the un-
assimilated identification of part images of the mother and father at 
the expense of transmuting and assimilating these images into a rounded 
whol~ around which the ego could healthily develop. 
It goes without saying that Mahler's final developmental subphase of 
childhood, i.e. object-constancy, relies on the perception of the world 
as adequately whole, and that this wholeness be reflected by the inner 
object world too. The split world characteristic of the borderline, 
hence precludes development of true object-constancy. 
Mahler's theory can thus be seen to be a genetic-environmental inter-
actional one, the various Freudian psycho-sexual stages determining the 
qualitative nature of laid down developmental trends. Her's is an 
object-relations theory, but a somewhat outer-located one in the sense 
that it stresses the nature of the observed interaction between mother 
and infant. She has clearly and unambiguously articulated specific 
developmental stages, and has intelligently related these to the infant's 
early environment. She stresses the operation of splitting in relation 
to borderline development, but does not direct herself to any great 
extent on intrapsychic representations of self-object interactions. 
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Mahler's developmental theory laid the groundwork for many American 
theorists in the area of borderline personality development. One of 
the most eminent American theorists is Otto Kernberg (1967- ) who, 
while developing his own ideas· related to borderline aetiology, strongly 
acknowledges and recognises the value of Mahler's contribution to his 
own work. (Kernberg 1977b). We turn now to a consideration of 
Kernberg's major contribution in this area. 
Kernberg's theoretical framework while originating in classical 
psychoanalysis has developed into a genetic-dynamic structuralist 
approach with the ego-oriented object-relations ideas of Jacobson (1964) 
playing a dominant role. But it is Kernberg's structural approach 
that makes his theory unique and it is at this point that we begin 
our discussion of his specific understanding of the borderline 
personality. 
Kernberg defines object-relations theory as the psychoanalytic 
approach to the internalisation of interpersonal relationships. 
(Kernberg as quoted in Masterson and Rinsley 1975). What is meant 
here, is that Kernberg acknowledges the overall influence of the 
various libidinal foci as broadly organising the mode of introjections 
of relationships being established between self and object. The 
classical id, ego, super-ego are viewed as overall organising structures 
which dynamically integrate substructures,such as the cognitive and 
defensive structures of the ego. Structures are thus relatively stable 
configurations of mental processes, the form being laid down by a 
predetermined libidinal and archaic mental organisation (id, ego, super-
ego), and the material for "imprinting" being that occurring··between 
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self and object. 
Three broad structural organisations corresponding to neurotic, 
borderline and psychotic organisation are postulated. The individual 
is seen to stabilise his psychological functioning in terms of this 
structure, which then becomes the underlying matrix from which 
behavioural symptoms develop. 
For Kernberg these three broad structural types are reflected in the 
person's overriding characteristics regarded as (i) identity inte-
gration versus identity diffusion and the related overall quality of 
internalised object-relations, (ii) a constellation of advanced versus 
primitive defence mechanisms, and (iii) the integrity of reality testing. 
What this implies for neurotic, borderline and psychotic function is 
this: neurotic personality organisation implies an integrated identity 
in contrast to borderline or psychotic structures. Neurotic personality 
organisation presents a defensive profile centering around repression, 
while borderline and psychotic defences center around splitting. In 
neurotic and borderline states, reality testing is maintained while in 
psychotic organisation this is not so. We will explore this structural 
hypothesis in greater detail a little further on. 
Kernberg (1972) has postulated a four-stage developmental theory, 
based on his notion regarding development as the progressive internalisa-
tion, under varying intrapsychic influences, of object-relations. The 
earliest stage of development, roughly spanning the first post-natal 
month precedes the establishment of the primary, undifferentiated self-
object constellation built up in the infant under the influence of 
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pleasurable, gratifying experiences in interaction with the mother. 
The second stage roughly occupying the first to third post-natal 
months, comprises the establishment and consolidation of an un-
differentiated self-object image or representation. Since Kernberg 
goes along with Freudian libidinal theory, these early undifferentiated 
self-object representations are established under the dominant libidinal 
mode of that period, i.e. orality. Following a purely Kleinian object-
relations model, Kernberg regards this as a part-object stage of object-
relations, and also sees the two basic polar opposite experiences at 
the breast, i.e. either gratification or frustration, as representatives 
of primary "good" and "bad'' object relationships. 
Thus two sets of opposite primitive self-object-affect complexes are 
built up and fixed by memory traces, i.e. internalised impressions, as 
basic polar opposite intrapsychic structures. 
The third stage is reached when the self-image and the object-image 
have become differentiated within the core "good" self-object 
representation, i.e. there has been a primitive differentiation at 
the level of good external and contented inner reality. 
Kernberg feels, however, that a similar differentiation does not occur 
simultaneously with respect to the self-object core "bad" representation. 
This is tied up with the primitive means of defence against strongly 
aggressive "bad" impulses in the infant, namely projective identification. 
This stage is said to occupy the period between the fourt post-natal 
month, and the end of the first year. The fourth stage has its 
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inception at some point between the end of the first year and the 
second half of the second year, and continues to evolve throughout 
the remainder of childhood. 
It is during this fourth stage that the child decathects his negative 
projections, and a coalescence between his good and bad aspects begins. 
What is central to Kernberg at this stage is a neutralisation of raw 
instinctual energies. Affects are toned down, and appropriate 
sublimations are formed. Similarly "good" and "bad" object images 
also coalesce, and the mother is seen in more integrated terms. 
It is interesting to note the intermediate position Kernberg takes 
between Melanie Klein's paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, 
and Margaret Mahler's developmental stages in terms of locating and 
timing the onset of whole object relations. This is felt to reflect 
Kernberg's own intermediary adoption of object-relations theory as 
derivative from dominant intrapsychic phenomena on the one hand, and 
the ego-psychology emphasis on the dominance of the ego and external 
reality on the other. 
It is fixation at the third developmental level, i.e. at that point 
when the (self-object affect) complex is split into "good" and "bad'', 
and this bad in turn projected outwards resulting in a diminution of 
ego strength due to the mechanism of projective identification, that 
represents the focus for borderline development for Kernberg. As a 
result,the toning down and neutralising of primitive instinctual 
energies fails to develop. However, Kernberg considers a two-stage 
analysis of the underlying borderline personality as being inclusive 
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for the purposes of understanding borderline functioning. The stages 
involved refer to a structural analysis referring to typical border-
line personality and symptom phenomena on the one hand, and a genetic-
dynamic analysis on the other. A close examination therefore of what 
is involved in such analyses will essentially represent Kernberg's 
conceptual understanding of borderline functioning. 
The structural analysis will be broken down into two further sub-
categoriss, namely into 
• 1. the ego itself as an overall structure which integrates 
and has synthetic functions, and the 
2. "structural derivatives of internalised object relation-
ships". (Kernberg 1975, p.22). 
1. The Borderline's Ego Structure 
Kernberg (1975) considers this topic under three main headings: 
(i) Nonspecific Manifestations of Ego Weakness 
(ii) Shift toward Primary-Process Thinking 
(iii) Specific Defensive Operations at the level of Borderline 
Personality Organization (or specific ego weaknesses). 
(i) Nonspecific Manifestations of Ego Weakness refers to a) lack of 
anxiety tolerance; b) lack of impulse control; c)lack of sublimatory 
channels. 
a) Lack of anxiety tolerance reveals one aspect of ego weakness in 
which any further stress resulting. in anxiety increase, leads to 
further symptom formation. 
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b) Lack of impulse control reflects for Kernberg a specific defensive 
operation tied to the ego's weakness. This is to be dissociated 
with that breakthrough of frustrated impulses usually associated with 
the infantile personality. Kernberg feels that in borderline 
functioning impulse breakthrough represents the mergence into conscious-
ness of a dissociated identification system (i.e. either introjective 
or projective identification). This form of impulse breakthrough 
has several specific manifestations; ego-impulse syntonicity during 
the time of expression; repetitive nature of the kind of lack impulse 
control involves; dissociation between expressive part of personality 
and the rest of the personality; and the blandness of the denial which 
follows the eruption. 
The lack of developed sublimatory channels underlines the ego's 
inadequate relationship with the world at large. It is this specific 
inadequacy which is often underlying the anhedonia experienced by the 
borderline, according to Kernberg. 
(ii) The shift toward primary-process thinking~ as particularly seen 
in the low structured projective tests, is the best manifestation of 
this characteristic. Kernberg considers that regression to primary-
process thinking may be the final outcome of several aspects of border-
line personality organisation: (a) the reactivation of pathological, 
early internalised object relationships connected with primitive drive 
derivatives of a pathological kind; (b) the reactivation of early 
defensive operations, especially splitting mechanisms; (c) the partial 
refusion of primitive self and object images affecting the stability of 
ego boundaries; and (d) regression toward primitive concrete cognitive 
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structures because of extreme ambivalence related to psychical 
ego-object relationships. 
iii) The specific defences employed by the borderline represent for 
Kernberg specific weaknesses in ego structures, and hence manifestations 
in ego structuring. These defence mechanisms center around splitting, 
and as we have seen skew the borderline in this regard to the psychotic 
end of the spectrum. In neurosis, repression and other advanced 
mechanisms of defences are predominant due to the relatively more 
inte§rated nature of the ego. Kernberg draws the distinction between 
these two defences very succinctly: 
Repression and related mechanisms such as reaction 
formation, intellectualisation ( ••• ) all protect 
the ego from intropsychic conflicts by means of the 
rejection of a drive derivative or its ideational 
representation, or both, from the conscious ego. 
In contrast, splitting ( ••• ) protect(s) the ego 
from conflicts by means of dissociating or actively 
keeping apart contradictory experiences of the self 
and significant others. When splitting and other 
related mechanisms predominate, contradictory ego 
states are alternatively activated, and as long as 
these contradictory ego states can be kept separate 
from each other, anxiety related to these conflicts 
is prevented or controlled. (1977, p.107). 
While protecting the borderline person from intropsychic conflict, 
splitting has the inevitable effect of further weakening an already 
fragmented ego, due to the associated projective identification of the 
split off ego-object affect relationships. The manifestation of the 
operation of splitting can be seen both at the object and ego level. 
Extreme contradictory and oscillatory conceptions, and feelings 
regarding any particular per~on occurs, with the associated denial of 
the switch. This occurs in relation to self-concepts too. Such a 
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situation is of course very detrimental to the integrative processes 
which would normally crystallise into a stable ego identity, and 
this underlies too the phenomenon of identity diffusion. 
The aetiology of pathological splitting can be traced to two essential 
tasks which the ego has to perform for the adequate internalisation of 
object relationships (and hence for ego growth). Kernberg lists: 
(i) the differentiation of self images from object images 
which form part of early introjections and identifications; 
(i~) the integration of self and object images built up 
under the influence of libidinal drive derivatives with 
their corresponding self and object images built up under 
· the influence of aggressive drive derivatives. (1975, p.27) 
These two processes fail to a significant extent in borderline personality 
organisation. Unlike the psychoses in which a regression to a primitive 
fusion state results, in borderline personalities an intensification of 
pathological splitting takes place, fixing the split-off self and other 
imagos. 
Excessive aggression either primarily linked to constitutional factors, 
or secondarily evoked by excessive frustration, is held to be the most 
important factors serving to maintain pathological splitting. A second 
dominant factor is a constitutionally based lack of anxiety tolerance, 
which interferes with the synthesising of introjections of opposite 
affects. Splitting occurs in com~ination with any one or several of 
the following secondary and associated defences, which will be listed 
but left undefined( 1): 
(1) Most of these terms have already been derived and defined in 
the section dealing with Melanie Klein. The reader is referred 
to Kernberg (1975, pp. 30-34) for further clarification. 
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i) primitive idealisation - of a fantasied object,· invoked 
as an omnipotent protector; 
ii) early forms of projection, and especially projective 
identification; 
iii) denial; 
iv) omnipotence and devaluation. 
2. Pathology at Internalised Object Relationships 
We have seen that Kernberg regards the dominance of splitting as the 
primaFY factor at play in determining the nature of borderline personality. 
It is the division between aggression and libidinal object cathexes and 
the failure at their integration which results into multiple inter-
personal and behavioural idiosyncracies. 
Since these two primitive affect states remain primitive and drive 
linked, i.e. dri.ve-derivatives, the objects for which they are cathected 
are similarly held in a drive-related derivative form. This complex, 
when activated, will give rise to the eruption of unneurtralised affects 
lying at their base. Kernberg states that since these early intro-
jects occur under the dominance of orality, the aggressive component 
will be largely of an oral aggressive, sadistic or cannibalistic type. 
Similarly, oral libidinal impulses will be expressed in an anaclitic 
encorporative manner, equally devastating for the object. 
Due to the fact that these primitive polar-opposite affect states remain 
"nonmetabolised" (Kernberg 1975, p.34) affect dispositions represented 
by the ego's capacity to experience depression, concern and guilt 
.. cannot .~e. ~e.iach-ed. Th~ ability .to mourn loss is equally absent,.· 
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because this would involve the loss of an identified part of the 
self, and hence would be devastating for the ego. It is clear that 
these borderline manifestations result from the split, part-object 
nature of early introjections, and hence the part object nature of 
the borderline ego as outlined. 
The presence of "all good" and "all bad" object images which cannot 
be integrated interferes seriously with superego integration. Instead 
the superego remains split into a primitive sadistic part object, 
projected outward, and an ever unreachable id~alised object, forming 
the ideal component. Finally, the realistic demands of the parent 
cannot be brought together with either the ideal self and object 
images and their related ego ideal, or with the threatening sadistic 
forerunners of the superego, because.both these primitive forms, split 
~nd affect laden as they are~ distort the perception of the parental 
images, preventing integration. 
In summary therefore, the borderline presents a typical profile, called 
by Kernberg the syndrome of identity diffusion. This is to be 
distinguished from psychotic refusion with the primary object mainly 
in so far as sufficient differentiation of self- from object representa-
tions obtains in the borderline permitting the maintenance of ego 
boundaries, and resulting in the maintenance of reality testing. 
Kernberg defines identity diffusion in the following way: 
Clinically, identity diffusion is represented by a poorly 
integrated concept of the self and of significant others. 
It is reflected in the subjective experience of chronic 
emptiness, contradictory behaviour that cannot be inte-
grated in an emotionally meaningful way. (1977, p.103). 
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Genetic-Dynamic Analysis 
What Kernberg attempts here, is to locate the central conflicts at 
the level of drives, operative in the borderline. He regards the 
pathological condensation of genital and pregenital instinctual 
strivings, with a predominance of pregenital aggression, as specifically 
.the borderline's central dynamic conflict. Quite clearly this is a 
broad orientation rather than a specific location of conflict sources. 
Kernberg lists five central drive derivative mechanisms by way of 
elucidation. 
First is an excessive aggressive involvement in the oedipal situation. 
Typically the image of the oedipal rival acquires terrifying over-
whelmingly dangerous and destructive characteristics (all "bad"). As 
a consequence the anxiety association with castration is excessively 
intense, and penis envy assumes completely overwhelming proportions. 
At the same time superego prohibitions are savage in intensity, 
resulting in the absence of guilt which replaced more concretely by 
severe masochistic tendencies or excessive paranoid projections, or both. 
Second, excessive idealisation of the heterosexual and homosexual love 
objects in the positive and negative (inverted-Klein) oedipal positions 
occur. This results in debilitating shifts from idealisation to 
devaluation of the s~me object, making this situation into yet another 
insolubly split one. 
On closer analysis, Kernberg maintains that a third anomaly arises. The 
existence of condensed father-mother images of a central kind emerges, 
reflecting the condensation of partial aspects of the re;L~t:ions with 
both parents~ This again results in rapid shifts ·of .l~b.;i.dinl:l.1 or 
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aggressive energies to either one or the other of the parents at 
any time. 
The borderline is pre-eminently fixated at the oral level, and the 
oedipal enervation can be seen to be a defensive precociousness. 
However, the dominance of oral erotogeneity serves only to confuse 
orality and genitality, and hence makes the possible working through 
. of the Oedipal situation even more remote. 
The penis for example, may acquire characteristics 
of the feeding, withholding, or attacking mother 
(basically the feeding function of the breast), 
and the vagina may acquire functions of the hungry, 
feeding, or aggressive mouth; ••• (Kernberg 1977, p.116) 
Finally, Kernberg, like Klein, describes the premature oedipalisation 
of oedipal conflicts as a defensive premature progression. This is 
due to: displacement of frustrated dependency needs from mother to 
father; excessive oral aggressive conflicts are displaced from the 
breast onto the penis; idealisation of the penis, as a defence against 
the persecution of the frustrating breast. 
In the light of this summary presentation of major aspects of Kernberg's 
theory, the broad base from which he works is clearly evident. In 
stressing the importance of constitutionally determined excessive 
aggression as pre-eminent for borderline aetiology, Kernberg has 
alienated himself from the main body of true ego-psychologists. 
Masterson and Rinsley, to whos~ approach we will shortly turn, criticise 
Kernberg in the .following manner: 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
\ 
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The presence of excessive oral aggression in 
the borderline leads Kernberg to favour a 
constitutional aetiology for the borderline 
syndrome. Although undue degrees of oral 
aggression do indeed characterise the border-
line individual, their presence does not per 
se justify a purely or predominantly constitu-
tional view of borderline psycho-pathology, and 
Kernberg adduces no other evidence in support 
of his view. (1975, p.165). 
It does appear unquestionably true that while Kernberg adequately 
addresses himself to the internalisation of object-relation units 
and their associated affects resulting in a particular structure 
of the borderline psyche, and that this introjection operates at 
the time of maximal orality, he does not adequately argue the case 
for his constitutional basis of borderline pathology. Perhaps it 
is due to his failure to sufficiently emphasise the function of 
fantasy as psychological representatives of underlying biological 
functions that leads to this dilemma. However, this chapter is 
intended to merely present the theory of specific workers and not to 
critically discuss them. 
Masterson and Rinsley (1975) present a synthesised condensation of 
their work predominantly with borderline adolescent patients (Masterson 
1971, Rinsley 1965) and it is with reference to this revised and 
extended summary (Rinsely 1977) that we now turn. 
In the summary \1977) mentioned Rinsley begins by confidently stating 
that: 
1. The diagnosis "border line syndrome" constitutes a 
theoretically, clinically, etiologically, and 
heuristically valid and specific nosologic category. 
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2. The clinical symptomatology, level of developmental 
fixation and therapeutic response of borderline 
patients allow their placement, as it were, along 
a spectrum of psychopathology between psycho-
neurotic and the psychotic. 
3. The etiology of the borderline syndrome, and the 
development arrest basic to it~ are known. 
4. The particular deficiency in object relations common 
to borderlines, which differentiates them from psycho-
neurotics and psychotics, is likewise known. 
5. Based upon these considerations, a rationale for 
the treatment of borderline patients may be developed. 
(pp. 48-49). 
It is the purpose of this final section to present their views as 
comprehensively as possible so as to fully comprehend the reason for 
their confident assertions. 
Their major focus is on the specific interaction between the potential 
borderline patient, and the mother regarded as also being borderline, 
in the primitive mother-infant relationship. Their major contention 
is that the determining cause of the fixation of the borderline 
individual, is to be found in the mother's withdrawal of her libidinal 
availability as the child makes efforts towards separation-individuation, 
during the rapprochement (Mahler 1968) subphase. The second major 
assertion made is that the reason that the fixation occurs at exactly 
that stage, is because the child's individuation constitutes a major 
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threat to the mother's defensive need to cling to her infant and, 
as a consequence, drives her toward removal of her libidinal 
availability. 
Thus it is the interpla~ between reward and withdrawal of this 
interaction which is introjected by the child as a blueprint 
for his psychical structure which emerges as pathologically split 
in self and object representations. 
Masterson and Rinsley make the point that the excessive oral aggression 
attributed by Kernberg (and Klein) to constitutional factors, may thus 
become entrenched as a consequence to the mother's withdrawal of 
libidinal supplies, in the wake of the child's efforts towards autonomy. 
Thus its original presence may be constitutionally located but its 
continued and virulent function is maintained by a conducive early 
environment. 
The authors claim that the borderline mother, herself suffering from a 
borderline syndrome, experiences significant gratification during her 
child's symbiotic phase. It is during the rapprochement subphase, 
when she is confronted by devastating ambivalence, curiosity and 
assertiveness by the toddler, that she fails to adequately respond 
and encourage growth toward autonomy. 
Thus the infant is confronted by two mothers. One who rewards clinging 
and generally regressive semi-symbiotic behaviour, and the other who 
withdraws if attempts are made to separate and individuate. What is 
more, the child needs the mother's supplies to grow, but if he grows 
135 
they are withdrawn from him. The mother is in fact two mothers as 
mentioned, because of the operation of splitting as the major defence 
at this stage. The images of these two mothers are powerfully intro-
jected as part-object representations together with their associated 
affects and self-representations. What emerges is what Masterson and 
Rinsley refer to as the split object relations unit. (1975, p.167). 
It is this internalised split (object-affect-self) complex that forms 
the important part of the intrapsychic structure of the borderline. 
Closer analysis of these two part units, i.e. a withdrawing part-unit, 
and a rewarding part-unit, reveals the following components: the 
withdrawing part-unit is cathected predominantly with aggressive energy, 
the rewarding part unit with libidinal energy. The withdrawing or 
aggressive part-object representation is seen as attacking, critical, 
hostile, withdrawing libidinal supplies in the face of moves toward 
autonomy. The part-self-representation is experienced as inadequate, 
helpless, guilty, etc., and the associated affect includes chronic 
anger, frustration, continual feelings of being thwarted, which cover 
over a severe "abandonment depression", which will be defined shortly. 
The rewarding part-unit on the other hand is experienced as approving, 
supportive and libidinally available for regressive clinging behaviour. 
The part-self representation is seen as good, passive and compliant and 
the accompanying affect consists of feelings of goodness, and gratifica-
tion of the wish for reunion. 
The state of the ego under these conditions is specifically remarked 
upon by the authors. They state that the ego is a split one, but the 
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nature of this split is all important. 
It should be emphasised that, in the case of the 
borderline, the concept of ego splitting implies, 
not that a previously formed structure had under-
gone regressive splitting, but rather that a co-
herently functioning ego, operating in accordance 
with the reality principle had failed to develop. 
Thus that part of the ego which Freud termed the 
pleasure ego could, in the case of the borderline 
individual, be termed the pathological ego, while 
the 'remainder' could be termed the reality or 
healthy ego. (Masterson and Rinsley 1977, p.169) 
We have already seen that the basis for the persistence of the 
pathological ego lies in the nurturance of symbiotic functioning by 
the mother~ The sudden cut off of libidinal availability, crucial 
for autonomous development, results in yet another powerful drive to 
reunion - fear of abandonment depression. 
Abandonment depression can be linked for the sake of clarity to two 
Kleinian concepts. First, primary separation anxiety, i.e. loss of 
the state of union, and secondly, depressive anxiety, i.e. the anxiety 
at the prospective loss of the good object. But more specifically 
abandonment depression refers to the core affect structurally linked 
to the part-self and part-object representations which together comprise 
the withdrawing part-unit. A core anxiety component tied to the sense 
of impending loss of the "maternal stimulus barrier'' (ibid. p.170) acting 
against an imminent stimulation barrage, and a second more derivative 
component, derived that is from the ego's anxiety over impending 
"abandonment" or a more paranoid fear related to sadistic assaults by 
the super-ego, in Kernberg's sense •• :~ ,L Faced with this 
dreadful fear and anxiety, the wish for reunion is strong, and can 
therefore be seen to be a defence againstabandonment depression. The 
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basic feelings common to the state of abandonment depression comprises 
a profound sense of emptiness and meaninglessness in the external world. 
The forced emergence into_adulthood therefore plunges the borderline 
' into the midst of the abandonment depression with the characteristic 
emptiness etc. previously described. 
What the authors term an alliance between the rewarding part-object 
representation and the pathological ego, serves the primary purpose of 
promoting feelings of "goodness" as well as a defence against abandonment 
depression. But this alliance also has important secondary functions, 
important too in the manifestations of borderline symptomatology. 
The authors state: 
The alliance has an important secondary function, 
the discharge of aggression, which is both 
associated with and directed toward the with-
drawing part-unit by means of symptoms, inhibitions, 
and various kinds of destructive acts. The aggression, 
which gains access to mobility through the agency of 
the pathological ego, remains unneutralised, hence 
available for further development of endopsychic 
structure (ibid. pp. 170-171). 
This is to say that this unneurtralised aggressio, can attach itself 
and become variously introjected and projected or generally activated 
by actual experiences of separation (or of loss). Hence the character-
istic acting out in relationships, especially those verging on dissolution. 
The reawakening of earlier libidinal withdrawals, makes this the 
inevitable manner of coping with losses by the borderline. 
In conclusion tha endless alternation of feelings of infantile megalo-
mania and of impotence and worthlessness, and a generalised inner 
absence, is given adequate understanding by this model. What is more 
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a means of conceptually understanding the existence of the characteristic 
borderline rage is also made explicit. 
Masterson and Rinsley's formulations, in the light of what has been 
presented, can be seen to be a truly ego-psychological one, embedded 
in a broad object-relations framework. 
SUMMARY 
Theoretical contributions to the understanding of the borderline 
personality were presented. This started with the early conceptuali-
sations of Freud and Abraham with particular reference to paranoia 
and melancholia. The work of Melanie Klein was then introduced and 
seen to be central to virtually all later elaborations, though not 
always fully acknowledge as such. Donald Winnicott's "transitional 
psychology" was introduced as well as his central notions regarding 
the role of "good-enough" and "not-good-enough" mothering in the 
aetiology of borderline states. Andre Green and Henri Rey were then 
introduced as contributors from the European School, stressing the 
centrality of an "archipelago of egos" and the peculiarity of border-
line time, space, and langauge respectively. 
The American contribution was represented by the developmental theory 
of Margaret Mahler and its particular acceptance into American 
theorising regarding the aetiology of the borderline from an object 
relations viewpoint. Otto Kernberg, as perhaps the most prolific and 
perhaps most elaborate of borderline theorists was introduced, with 
special emphasis given to his genetic-dynamic structuralist approach. 
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The Chapter concluded with a relatively brief, but representative 
contribution of Masterson and Rinsley, especially their notions 
regarding the centrality of the borderline mother, and the develop-
ment of the split object-relations unit, as a core borderline 
personality structure. 
/ 
CHAPTER 4 
SYNTHESIS: TOWARD A UNIFIED OBJECT-RELATIONS 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE BORDERLINE PERSONALITY 
4.1 Aim and General Introduction 
A synthesis of the various contributions presented will be made as 
outlined earlier. It is stressed that this is a selective process 
and hence represents the author's own understanding as derived 
predominantly from the literature presented as well as his own 
experience with borderline patients. The two cases which will be 
used for the purposes of illustration, while sharing typical border-
line characteristics, will be seen to lie at the two extremes of 
borderline functioning as outlined by Grinker et al (1968). 
Certain conceptual issues and clarifications regarding the author's own 
approach to object-relations theory as it relates to the borderline 
personality specifically and personality development generally, need 
to be stated from the outset. 
From the literature presented, three broad areas of focus emerge with 
respect·to understanding the borderline. There are those theorists 
who specifically state, without necessarily developing their arguments, 
that a constitutional foundation underlies the development of border-
line personality, (Klein, Kernberg). There are others who apparently 
do not focus on a fundamental aetiology at all, but are seemingly more 
concerned about the nature of the borderline's world, seen from the 
borderline's perspective, but viewed through an object-relations grid. 
(Green, Rey). And there are those, more environmentally located, who 
are actively involved and committed to the elucidation of the ehviron-
mentally based aetiology of the borderline~ specifically focusing on 
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early infant-mother interaction (Mahler, Masterson and Rinsley). 
For the author certain gross generalisations are made by these various 
orientations, raising important meta-theoretical issues deemed 
necessary for criticism and discussion. This is felt to be particu-
larly necessary to gain a proper understanding for the wider context 
in which the author's own contribution will fall. 
First, the .relating of certain fundamental "causes" for borderline 
personality development, for example excessive aggression or envy, 
to constitutional factors without further evidence or argument is 
viewed with some scepticism. The relating of genetic expression to 
psychological functioning is itself a complex and active area of meta-
theoretical debate. The problem of reductionism which this issue 
boils down to, is one which has stimulated and continues to stimulate 
enormous debate and argument within both philosophy and psychology 
and has done for many hundreds of years. (Marx and Goodson, 19/6). 
The issues involved philosophically relate to overall c~nceptual 
generalities, for instance the mind-body or inside-outside dualistic 
theory, let alone the specific interaction between gene and behaviour 
which the constitutionalists rather glibly accept. What is more, if 
this assumption is made, that is that representations at a psycho-
logical level are correlates of biological structures, this is by no 
means a neutral statement and reflects a very radical view regarding 
the nature of man. 
That there are aspects of our human functioning that can be related 
to our gen~tic endowment is not disputed, but the simple ascribing of 
... -· .·.,. 
.. , ...... , . 
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complex human issues to constitutional factors, without due 
consideration given to the subtle and complex involvement of our 
environments is seen to be a gross oversimplification. Thus this 
author wishes to dissociate himself from that school of thought 
viewing genetic predisposition as responsible for the initial 
impetus towards a borderline personality. This stand is especially 
made in the knowledge that no systematic scientific study has been 
directed at relating these two variables. 
It is, however, also the nature of the relevant environment, also 
very gJ.ibly referred to, which needs clarification. It appears 
common to assume that environment for the infant begins immediately 
post-natally. The nature of the foetal environment, especially in 
so far as neural cells and circuits are being laid down, is seemingly 
disregarded. Moreover the quality of life experienced by the preg-
nant mother, and her overall emotional state very directly reaches 
the growing foetus via the blood stream, through biochemical mediation. 
Therefore, since the mother does not live in isolation, neither does 
the foetus live without an "external environment". Whatever the 
interaction at this level may be, it will undoubtedly be a complex 
one, but one whose complexity should not encourage us to ignore it. 
The consequences in the face of this sort of argument for what 
constitutes dispositional factors at birth are naturally important. 
Furthermore, there appears to be the even more remarkable assumption, 
that the mother and infant live in dyadic isolation; that the 
relationship between infant and breast, undoubtedly important, is 
somehow outside of wider influences. While it is difficult to 
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that the clinicians ref erred to would be so short-sighted in their 
clinical approach to the problem, the literature seldom makes 
reference to the wider infant-world environment from the outset. 
The author feels some moral imperative to widen the focus hitherto 
directed purely onto the liberal breast, or fantisied variations 
of it. The breast, or the mother, it is felt, could equally include 
the entire populated world with whom the infant interacts intimately 
from the outset, without naturally losing sight of the very particular 
and close bond the mother has with her child, especially within our 
cultural and societal structure. But surely the "holding" (Winni-
cott, 1960) of the father can be seen to be at best ari important 
variable for the early security and development of the infant, 
especially in so far as nothing stops the father from feeding the 
infant. There appears to be a continual assumption made that it is 
the actual mother's breast, which is split, idealised etc., so 
focusing and pressurising into limitless roles of responsibility 
the actual mother, and her capabilities of mothering. Are we not 
here possibly confusing cultural mores and values for biological 
bonds? 
In summary therefore, the author wishes to draw attention to the 
entire nurturing early world in which the infant finds itself from 
birth onward. The breast therefore can be seen at a more meta-
phorical level, than purely "mother's breast", or as has been stated, 
specific fantasies related to it, while at the same time taking 
cognizance of its specific importance especially within given cultural 
constraints. The nature of the various issues involved ~re broad 
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enough to defy further consideration here. It was the purpose 
of these few brief paragraphs simply to orientate the reader to 
an approach to what is to follow, as well as to emphasise just a 
few of the more important generalisations and assumptions adopted 
by some of the theorists mentioned, which the author felt needed 
some criticism. 
It is in this broader perspective, and bearing some of these mis-
givings in mind, that what is to follow should be read. 
4.2 Synthesis and Presentation of Illustrative 
Material from Two Case Studies 
This section will be subdivided into certain specific categories of 
human expression, relating, experiencing, etc., to which the border-
line contributes in a unique fashion. It is quite impossible to 
be exhaustively inclusive about every aspect of functioning for 
which the borderline relates in his unique manner, thus, bearing 
this fact in mind, a few of the broader yet central areas, particularly 
conducive for the highlighting of borderline characteristics will be 
used. These are i) Interpersonal Relationships 
ii) Sexuality, Borderline Thought Processes 
and Language Usage 
iii) Psychosis, and the Nature and Consequences 
of the Borderline's Early Environment. 
i) Interpersonal Relationships 
Generally speaking these are marked by a number of qualitative aspects 
all hinging on a central failure, this being the failure by the border-
line to meaningfully experience himself as being real, consistently 
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through time, or in different situations (or spaces). We have 
seen that the primary reason offered for this observation and 
experience of the borderline is due to the inadequate introjection 
of a primary good object with the consequent failure of healthy ego 
development. Since no reality is experienced subjectively, a basic 
absence of the usual reciprocity of humanness, or shared meanings 
exists in the borderline. Thus these relationships are marked by 
an experienced shallowness, radically and vascillatingly interchanged 
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by an "invasion" by the borderline of the other's space. Examples 
from the histories and the transference of the two cases mentioned 
will be used to illustrate these points, and their wider ramifications. 
Some of Dudley's (See Appendix) major initial complaints were the 
following: 
(a) an inability to feel emotions 
(b) virtually without social contact 
(c) a pervading sense of aspontaneity about all activities 
including breathing, blinking, arm-swing about his sides while 
walking, even heart beat, etc. 
Dudley's only emotion which he later accepted as possibly being truly 
present was anger which displayed itself in aggression actively 
shown towards the child (9 years) of an elder sister. He used to 
"kick the child down the corridor in rage'', and feel no remorse after-
ward. The only "friendships" he had established occurred at school. 
On closer analysis these "friends" served to fuel his narcissism which 
he experienced vicariously through characters he used to create in 
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fantasy, by their (his "friends") admiring of his poetry and 
lyrics, etc. He would gather his friends around him who would 
hang on his every word. But the words were not his own. His 
fantasy life was his life. It appears that Dudley used to pro-
jectively identify with characters originally existing in songs 
or poems and via these characters would relate to others. 
It is significant too, that the only role Dudley ever felt he could 
fulfil in his life was to be an actor. It was with this end in view 
that he saw a.counselling psychologist with the expectation that he 
would be "told to be an actor". It was due to his inability to 
complete the required tests that led him to be ref erred in the first 
place. 
Much of the transference shared beb-Jeen he and the therapist, was 
based on the existence of these aforementioned phantoms of his mind. 
The therapist initially found it extremely difficult to know who was 
speaking, or who he was speaking to, due to the many cloaks Dudley wore. 
Dynamically one can view this process as the idealisation of a good 
object inadequately introjected, and projected into almost a perfect 
metaphorical object - the actor. What this enabled Dudley to be 
therefore was any role adequate to any particular situation as well 
as having the good object perfectly secure from external persecutors. 
Also it explains very adequately why Dudley feared the world - for 
as he said "they would swallow up my fantasies" and hence himself. 
This statement is interesting in two ways. He feared relating 
normally to the real world for fear that the characters with whom 
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he was identified and hence he himself would be annihilated -
a very clear-cut statement of an externally projected persecutory 
world. But the notion of being "swallowed up" seems to bear 
reference to the fear of projected oral sadism, indicative of the 
oral fixation point, generally viewed as the fixation focus in 
-----borderline conditions. 
This radical and uncontrollable vascillating between (part ego)-
(p~rt object) relating may be seen to reflect rather a psychotic 
transference situation and as a result the therapist later in the 
therapy, began to structure the sessions far more - which was at 
once threatening to Dudley, but also in a sense alluring. Threaten-
ing because it demanded that he be a consistent role, or that his 
rudimentary ego emerge and relate to the therapist; alluring because 
it was the safest place to experiment with the real world. 
A devastating event occurred which marked a major change in the 
therapy, as a result of the structuring of the sessions. The 
therapist expressed disillusionment in continuing with the therapy 
at merely "a word game level", which had the effect of invoking terror 
into Dudley. It seemed dynamically that these fantasied roles could 
only exist in relation to another, and in a uniquely borderline 
manner the therapist was seen as the "idealised mirror" for all these 
images. The confrontation it is felt injected the dread of 
annihilation, by the fading of the idealised mirror, and hence the 
annihilation of the virtual ego images too. 
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The outcome of this event was remarkable. Dudley began to show 
the typical symptoms of depression, and the monitoring out-patient 
psychiatrist summarily placed him on amitriptyline. Dynamically 
it was felt that this related in Kleinian terms to his moving from 
the paranoid-schizoid position in which the "idealised-mirror" 
dominated, to the depressive position, by being forced to tolerate 
the safe ("good") acceptance of the therapist and the therapy time, 
as well as the threatening ("bad") confrontation, coexisting side 
by side, which hence threatened the loss of the idealised object. 
From this point on therapy continued in a far more structured setting, 
Dudley's depression oscillating with his other symptoms, and the 
therapist experiencing the sessions in a far more real way. 
In summary therefore Dudley's transference relationship was marked by 
idealisation of the therapist as the great mirror or acknowledger of 
his fantasied existence in different roles. Generally his relation-
ships were vehicles for projective identifi~ation of a fragmented ego 
into fantasied images so as to find expression and validation. 
Penny (See Appendix) showed classic signs of the compulsive sociabi-
lity mentioned earlier (p.~/). Her need for company was vital to her 
existence. If she was out of the company of people for any length 
of time, she would either drink, take drugs, over-eat, or mutilate 
herself. Each of these activities had the effect of shifting her 
reflective frame of reference. Reflective in the sense, rather like 
Dudley, that she existed as a virtual image, reflected in the mirror-
ing personality of the other. 
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Drink would simply dull her either into oblivion, or excite her 
into a hypomanic disinhibition, termined by exhaustion and sleep. 
The drugs she took invariably excited her with the same hypomanic-
exhaustion-sleep pattern. Thus the end result was a desired state 
of consciousness, or lack of consciousness. Mutilation resulted 
in her getting in touch with "the real Penny" via the sight of her 
blood, again a consciousness shifting mechanism, but a somewhat 
more sophisticated one. 
Her own blood stood for, or was identified with, her first menstruation, 
which.occurred rather prematurely at the age of 11 or 12 years. This 
marked both the literal~~~d perpetual (potential) presence of child-
hood for her. End, in so far as it means she was a woman, which 
she dreaded, and perpetually a child because the world of her child-
hood came flooding back to her and she fully identified again with 
the child Penny, whenever she recalled her first menstruation, for 
which she was, incidentially, very poorly prepared. 
Penny's eating pattern, rather like any of her other basic functions, 
had a completely inappropriate affect state associated with it. As 
we shall see in the next sub-section. Penny had a very funda-
mental inside-outside split. The inside of her body represented the 
child Penny, and it was this inside that was being fed. At times of 
stress Penny would voraciously binge predominantly on sweet things, 
satisfying the inner child. But soon this stage would be transformed 
(usually the following morning) into intense anxiety and guilt. This 
radical reversal of affect state was associated with the fear that by 
feeding the inner Penny, she would grow into adult·Penny, and hence 
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culminate in the loss of an idealised state of childhood. Invariably 
Penny would wake the following morning, feeling gross, would not 
look at herself while dressing, and would set about in a frenzied 
state, looking for a doctor to put her on amphetamines to reduce 
weight. Her excessive guilt, it is hypothesised, is associated 
with the realisation that she may have destroyed the inner Penny by 
taking in the "bad.food", presumably under the influence of strong 
oral aggressive impulses. 
Therapy sessions were also likened to a good feed and with similar 
consequences. Penny used to emerge from sessions feeling better, 
satiated having taken everything in presumably whole. However, in 
so far as therapy was aimed at mobilising her autonomous functioning, 
she would soon start to experience similar anxiety and guilt-laden 
states, also resulting, unless a very clear contract had been made, 
in her visiting General Practitioners complaining of overweight and 
seeking slimming tablets. 
When in company Penny would lightly contribute to whatever conversa-
tion or activity was occurring. She existed happily as the mirror 
i~OY~~nd. Because of a degree of attractiveness 
which she flaunted and used, she would "catch" someone, usually a 
rather passive immature personality, with whom she could and would 
virtually symbiotically live. 
This symbiosis evoked her childhood experiences, during which years 
she never actually separated from her mother. This lack of separa-
tion was due to particular neurological difficulties she had as well 
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as a particular early family nexus resulting in her being totally 
overprotected and completely enmeshed with her mother, or any 
parental substitute onto whom she immediately latched. This 
aspect of Penny's history will shortly be entered into more fully. 
Her transference with the therapist was based on enormous idealisa-
tion and envy, and unlike Dudley, who reacted with depression to 
confrontation, Penny would visibly disintegrate in the face of 
negative interpretation or to whatever she regarded as confrontation. 
At these times, when hospitalised, she would commonly be thought of 
as being a borderline paranoid psychotic, with (virtual) auditory 
hallucinations which would in turn almost invariably be dealt with 
by invoking a manic defence, which, within the hospital context, 
would be heavily sedated, resulting in a chemical shift of her self-
. frame of reference, to some other more tolerable frame. 
If in her general interpersonal relationships she were to suffer any 
significant loss, as she did in the form of two suicides, one of her 
schizophrenic husband, and the other of a manic-depressive lover, 
she would react with more and bizarre symptoms. At the death of her 
first husband, who she still accepts as living on inside her, she 
disintegrated into a transient psychosis and was treated with dosages 
of phenothiazine appropriate for a florid psychosis. The sudden loss 
of a temporary vehicle for her "good parts'', could be interpreted as 
resulting in the actual fragmentation of her ego manifesting in 
these florid symptoms. However, in her "recovery" being inadequate 
to mourn the loss of this ideal object, she introjected it, and 
.hence this still "lives on inside" her as an anchor to which she turns 
under certain stressful conditions. The "all good" split nature of 
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this introjection has to be stressed. It may be added here that 
this may be the typical manner for schizoid or schizophrenic 
patients for mourning losses, i.e. the split introjection of them. 
The as-ifness of her personality is well illustrated by her mirror-
like relationship to others and her using their identities by which 
to identify herself. In the absence of people in whose presence 
she could have some sense of identity, she would concretely switch 
to some other self-reference frame, as illustrated. 
In summary therefore, Penny represents dynamically speakinci, someone 
whose ego or whose part ego exist only in relatiol)_j:g_the_active 
------------------
presen_s:~ _of_ _others •. 
~-
Her mirror-like personality being the screen 
behind which primitive projective identifications are her only means 
of survival. Ironically enough, it is considered by the therapist 
that other than by some accident, Penny is no real suicide risk 
because it is just this terror of death (= annihilation) against 
which she actively invokes her many symptoms as defences. 
ii) Sexuality, Borderline Thought Processes and Language Usage 
We have seen that invariably there is radical disorganisation in gender 
identity, sexual relationships and the area of sexuality generally in 
the borderline. We have noted the polymorphously perverse nature 
of borderline sexual expression and the extreme anxiety associated 
with sexuality. With respect to this observation and the many other 
factors suggested as pertaining to borderline functioning, the author 
feels that no pattern of sexual behaviour is characteristically border-
. line. Rather an absence of a particular pattern would probably be 
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closer to the truth yet there is a qualitative thread which runs 
through borderline relationships which is particularly well 
illustrated in the following clinical examples. 
Dudley was terrified at the possibility that he was either homo-
sexual or bi-sexual. This fear started (consciously) one day at a 
bus stop, when a woman passed by and said to him "It's cold today". 
He said that he "knew" she meant that they should go to bed together. 
In the bus the bed was associated with a young relative of his with 
whom.he used to play, a special game being the climbing into a very 
big.jersey together. An uncle who had a great influence on Dudley 
once remarked that the jersey was so big that it made him (Dudley) 
look pregnant. The recalling of that event in therapy suddenly 
explained why it was that he had smashed his guitar a short time 
earlier. 
His reasoning went along these lines. It was the same uncle who had 
suggested that he buy a· guitar because he thought Dudley had musical 
talent. Thus there was an association between pregnancy and the 
guitar due to the common source -- uncle. Dudley always washed his 
hands before playing the guitar and had always subconsciously 
ruminated that the water had represented semen, and that the tap was 
the penis. There was for Dudley an unconscious association between 
tap and guitar, and hence while playing the guitar he experienced 
himself as playing with his penis. Due to the involvement of the 
tap and semen therefore, which he washed onto his hands, and his 
influential uncle's remark that he looked pregnant, he believed that 
.. he had impregnated himself. The smashing of the guitar therefore, 
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represented the smashing of the penis, which while allaying his 
fears of bisexuality, only increased his fears, not so much of 
being homosexual, but of being a woman. 
This is an excellent example of the concretisation of words, and 
reflects well what Rey refers to as word-objects, i.e. by having 
had these thoughts the act of impregnation had occurred. Also, 
Dudley in this interaction has "seriated" time in the sequence: 
since guitar followed hand washing, and hand washing involved the 
tap-penis, therefore the guitar = tap and hence stood for penis. 
Time is hence bracketed and spatialised around these objects. 
Green's notion regarding the inappropriate juxtaposing of affects 
and objects and their relation to part egos, is also excellently 
represented in this example. For Green the part-ego which is highly 
sexualised is attached inappropriately to an object, the tap in this 
case. This ego-affect-object unit hence has meaning and connotations 
related only to the "personal lexicon" (Rey) of the borderline. Hence 
rational though processes are seen to be virtually impossible because 
of affects being attached to totally inappropriate objects or part-
object representatives which only have meaning in the personalised 
lexicon. 
However, the understanding of these events by the therapist, in this 
instance, and the ability of Dudley and the therapist to temporarily 
share a previously isolated lexicon, led to a totally unique and novel 
relationship for Dudley. He exclaimed, for example, after further 
"decoding" of his vocabulary, that he was "no longer entirely alone". 
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There was a significant deepening of rapport established at this 
point in therapy, and marked the, beginning of a more direct means 
of communication. 
It is felt that for those borderlines lying closer to the neurotic 
end of the spectrum (Grinker et al, 1968) that the personalised 
vocabulary whatever else it means, also represents an omnipotent 
defence against the outside threatening world. However, in the 
relatively safe territory of psychotherapy, were this personal lexicon 
to be shared with the therapist, a way for the borderline to communicate 
with the real world, is temporarily opened. In a sense the personal 
lexicon represents a paranoid-schizoid position in terms of language 
development, and is omnipotently idealised, etc. The real language, 
were it to be taken on, would mean the loss of this infantile omnipo-
tence (good-object representation) and would imply entry into the 
depressive position with respect to language development. As we 
have seen the particularly disintegrated borderline cannot tolerate 
this move, but in the case of Dudley, this was very definitely achieved. 
A second example of interpretation of a personalised paranoid-schizoid 
level of language functioning, which due to its early occurrence in 
therapy had no significant effect at the time, but which was reintro-
duced with greater impact later on, is the following. 
Towards the end of 1979. Dudley began experiencing his head as a 
vagina, (i.e. a split inappropriate part-object relationship). This 
occurred at about the time that he had obtained his first pair of 
spectacles. The first person he saw (whether "true" or not is 
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irrelevant) was either a homosexual or a bisexual. Shortly after 
this experience his eyes blurred over whenever he attempted to read, 
as well as his concentration becoming extremely poor,while reading. 
Reading and spectacles had always been regarded by him as masculine 
activity, and a mascule symbol respectively, due to the association 
with study, career, profession, father, etc. The interpretation 
that possibly his eyes blurred to prevent impregnation and hence 
revealing a feared bisexual nature was offered. The initial impact 
was to lessen some anxiety, but the real effect only occurred much 
later in the treatment, and opened a way for discussing the various 
bodily·splits he had made according to a masculine-feminine set of 
divisions, and according to very concrete criteria. For example 
his head had to be the vagina because it was round and had a crack 
(the mouth) in it. This allowed objects in, as did his eyes, which 
were under certain conditions sexualised into phalluses. 
A last example of the strong relationship between sexuality and words, 
in a sense the sexualising at a concrete level of words, is the 
following. 
He had been trying to recall the name of a girl for some reason or 
another. Try as he may he could not recall her name. Some while 
later a family member mentioned her name in passing; her name was 
Carol. At the sound of this a flash of anxiety ran through him for 
the following reason. Carol had phonetic similarities to the Afrikaans 
word k~rel (man) hece the forgetting of the name Carol, to him meant 
that he had forgotten that he was a k~rel, implying that he was homo-
sexual, or for him a woman. 
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In summary, a strong concretisation of words into object-images 
exists in the borderline, onto which inappropriate affects linked 
to part egos (ego-nuclei) become attached. This represents a 
personalised language, rendering a fully meaning-filled ordinary, 
mother-tongue-lexicon (Rey) unnecessary. Sharing of this personalised 
language with the outside world through the (good) person of the 
therapist, may lead to genuine cathexes of the real world's words. 
The fundamental level at which the borderline remains uncertain about 
his gender identity is well described here and also brings out the 
concretisation of part-object representations of not standing for, 
but being, the object. 
For Penny, the world of sexuality was an extension of her hunt for 
some identity. More than all else, however, she feared the loss of 
control associated with what she had heard of orgasm. Her fantasies 
relating to the meaning of orgasm, while never fully expounded, but 
revealed to some extent by her Rorschach response( 1)showed a particular· 
fear of falling apart, disintegrating as a result of the loss of 
control. She states: 
I therefore always choose men who are not going 
to threaten me -- I must always be in control. 
Homosexuals are the best, because they don't 
look at other women firstly, and secondly be-
cause I always am in control. (Extract from a 
therapy session). 
The therapist felt that Rey's suggestion relating to the claustro/ 
agoraphobia of the borderline may pertain in this instance. Rey 
relates the fear of the "shout, the semen, the urine, etc." 
to a fear of things·coming out of the subject, and by a process of 
(1) See Appendix I. 
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projective primary association, with these part-objects which 
switches the circuit coming out of the separation anxiety. This 
is a near psychotic association and is manifested in Penny because 
of her lying close to the psychotic end of the borderline spectrum 
in Grinker's (1968) terms. Loss of control symbolising the loss 
of the primary containing womb, and hence her frail terrified 
emergence into the world. 
Penny also presented a very typical borderline splitting manifestation, 
in relation to her body. She had split her inside as good (the 
young Penny that bleeds) and the outsid~ as bad (the older woman Penny 
who has adult responsibilities, who will age and eventually die, i.e. 
disintegrate). Penetration to her inside, was thus completely 
desexualised, because for her it represented the fertilising of her 
youthful self and hence was a keenly'sought after activity. However, 
the build up involving petting, and the associated "romance", was 
absolutely dreadful, because it meant acknowledging herself to the 
other and to herself as a mature woman, and hence this implied 
the associations listed above. Thus Penny used drink to anaesthetize 
herself as far as the petting was concerned, insisted that sexual 
intercourse could only take place in an entirely dark room so as not 
to see or experience the mature act (splitting of affect from content), 
and then experienced the flourishing again of her youth. 
Penny's body was further split into minute areas of "goodness" and 
"badness", representing clearly her identification at the body ego 
level of development. Into these split-off part-objects of herself 
she had projectively identified many o.f· the sp.lit .. affect-laden aspects 
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of her own ego. All sexually associated areas, since they were 
associated with maturity, were bad. All "neutral" aspects of her 
body, the central area of her back; the skin between her fingers 
and toes, and the skin of her soles were examples of neutral hence 
good areas. In other words these areas were neutral from an age 
and a gender viewpoint, and therefore carried libidinal cathexes 
due to their association with a timelessness, i.e. a not ageing. 
Summarising Penny's relationship to sexuality, we see an extensive 
. . 
use made of multiple splitting of body areas, in accordance either 
with libidinal or aggessive cathexes. A very clear, but fragmented 
identification existed with those body parts labelled neutral, or good, 
while a dissociated identification, i.e. the not-Penny, existed in 
relation to the bad. Control was seen to be a central issue in 
relating to the fear of annihilation, and a possible relationship to 
the claustro-agarophobic syndrome was suggested. Lastly an inside-
outside split, again broadly relating good and bad was made, having a 
strong influence over her overall sexual functioning. Moreover, 
what was sexual was split-off as bad, and sexuality was inappropriately 
associated with a different experience altogether, while neutral, 
i.e. non-ageing aspects of her body were libidinally cathected. 
iii) Psychosis, and the Nature and Consequences 
of the Borderline's Early Environment 
It has been noted that psychotic episodes in the borderline are usually 
i) stress related, ii) of short duration, iii) are usually resolved 
spontaneously, and iv) are experienced as ego-alien. The dominant 
form of the psychosis is an unsystematised paranoid system, and 
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feelings of depersonalisation are common. 
This clinical picture is well presented by Penny, and it is true 
to say that she literally hovers on a psychotic episode daily. We 
I 
saw that her compulsive sociability was related to having to be 
contained somewhere, i.e. in someone so as to experience herself 
as temporarily real. This would undoubtedly be recognised as a 
most schizoid existence. The sudden loss of the container, would 
(.,... _ .,, ---. 
therefore lead to the sudden loss of herself, and the experience of 
which engenders primary annihilation anxiety. In Penny's case her 
main defence against a full psychotic breakdown was through omnipotent 
denial at these times of intense stress, by the resurrecting of the 
~·--.,__,__·-~~~-~ -.-~-- --·~------- ·- o:· ·--
idealised imago of the lost object inside he~E)e_l f, (her husband). 
Along with this omnipotent denial, went the omnipotently creative 
potential of the manic defence, doing infinite reparation to the lost 
good object. 
It was during the transition period, i.e. that period intermediate 
between the perception of the stress and the erecting of her defences, 
that Penny would be most paranoid, actually becoming (for her) inappro-
priately aggressive in confronting people about "talking about her in 
a nasty way", and not being able to escape a generally paranoid state. 
Dynamically she can be seen to be suffering the consequences of the 
loss of a good object, either projectively or introjectively identified 
with, thus having to bear the full brunt of the persecutors all around 
with the support of a temporary good object. At this point her anxiety 
and paranoia would reach a maximum, until some good object had either 
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been manically resurrected or some idealised object could again 
contain her by projective identification, or she would induce some 
shift of consciousness focus 
The reason why this paranoid episode in her ca~e, and perhaps 
generally, is experienced as ego-alien, is due to the nature of the 
projection. of the bad - i.e., it is seen as coming from without, some-
one or something is seen as doing something to her which she is unable 
to do anything about. In the face of this helplessness, the manic 
defence is employed hurriedly because of the inability for a fragmented 
ego to tolerate this excess of anxiety, i.e. there is an identification 
between the remaining strongly activated part-egos and the super-ego, 
which is seen in the borderline as savage due to the splitting off of 
strong oral aggressive drives. In this union therefore the savage 
persecution is dispelled omnipotently, but temporarily. 
It would be instructive to consider the effects of Penny's general 
early environment at this point, to try to gain some understanding 
from an environmental perspective of her weak ego development. 
Penny's actual early environment was a particularly suffocating one 
for a number of reasons, which would strongly confirm Masterson and 
Rinsley's suspicion, that suppression of autonomy strivings, and 
rewarding of dependency regressions are at play to some significant 
extent. 
At the time of Penny's birth, there were serioui undercurrents of 
disintegration of the marriage, which was actively and massively 
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denied by both parents. Penny's arrival heralded a new focus for 
much of this unspoken about tension. It was in the interests of 
both parents to prolong Penny's infant status as long as possible 
so as to keep up the denial of the rift between the two of them. 
At the same time Penny's own "disposition" fed into this particular 
set-up. She was a collicky and fairly sickly child, and from an 
early age was extremely clinging and anxious. The emotional and 
mental state of the pregnant mother possibly cont~ibuting to this 
state would be interesting to know, but unfortunately not available. 
With the onset of school, a learning disability in the arithmetical 
area, as well as a spatio-temporal 81?>1'\0Sia which was left undetected 
for many years, seriously affected Penny's school performance which 
was grossly retarded. · This prompted her to being seen as needing 
more care and attention, etc., i.e. more dependency was fostered. An 
extremely poor self image, generalising into almost any autonous 
activity she was required to do, was thus developed. 
Moreover, her father appeared to playfully seduce her in front of 
mother, an activity which could be seen to be actively and excessively 
precipitating the oedipalisation of her already considerable conflicts 
(Kernberg, 1975). Penny, enjoying this role of child lover to father 
and mother's little dependant,then suffered an enormous blow. The 
sudden and unexpected loss of her father, after she had discovered 
and shown her mother a picture of father and another woman partying 
together. This precipitated the enormous underlying parental conflicts 
into the open and led to father's immediate withdrawal from home. 
Mother, no longer needing to pamper to all Penny's whims, summarily 
dropped her, and shortly afterwards sent her to boarding school, where 
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she expectedly never adapted and actively and obviously regressed 
to being excessively childish, and in due course came home. 
----
Dynamically this double blow appeared to regress her immediately to 
an almost symbiotic position with mother. This regression is made 
all the more likely due to her never having meaningfully worked 
through the practicing (Mahler) subphase of autonomy-development, 
and she certainly had not emerged from the separation-individuation 
stage of development. 
She appears to have remained strongly regressed to a primitive, 
dependent and split position manifesting in the numerous borderline 
symptoms she displays. Any move towards autonomy is immediately 
associated with fear and helplessness, and the person or situation 
associated with the situation is condemned to be bad and avoided, and 
to be the victim of paranoid projections. 
What needs stressing here is the respective responsibilities of both 
parents for Penny's particular early environment. Mother played 
the role of being an all-enveloping womb, and this as a result of the 
particular interaction with her husband. She was not a borderline 
personality as is stated as necessarily being so by Masterson and 
Rinsley, but behaved in a pathological way as a result of a particular 
set of circumstances perfectly logical and in a sense adaptive. We 
saw that when these circumstances changed, she did too, and perhaps 
with displaced and frustrated anger immediately excluded Penny • 
.... .. . ,..: 
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Moreover, as has been suggested earlier, the emotional and mental 
state of Penny's mother while pregnant with her, would be an 
interesting detail to know. It seemed that right from her birth, 
the relationship between her parents had been poor, and it is 
reasonable to assume that this tension antedated Penny's birth. 
What possible effect the mother's own experiences had on her foetus 
can only be speculated at, but this is an important point requiring 
more research and one that should not be lightly fobbed off. It may 
be that the. rather enigmatic qualities of learning disabilities, in 
terms of their exact aetiology which has escaped final discovery, may 
in some way be related to neural laydown, which in turn may be a part 
function of the mother's overall biological and emotional state during 
pregnancy. 
Dudley's "psychotic periods" were far l.ess obvious, and unless we 
regard his manner of thought as outlined earlier as being a psychotic 
way of thinking, psychosis cannot properly be attached to his overall 
functioning. Only under one condition did a psychotic-like ego 
structure emerge, and that was in his Rorschach responses, a few 
examples of which are reproduced below. A very experienced clinician 
supervising the Rorschach assessment immediately diagnosed schizo-
phrenia on the basis of the Rorschach protocol. (1) 
His response on Card II was the following: 
(1) See Appendix I. Rorschach Protocol - Dudley.· 
165 
Two men fighting, they're headless and 
they're filled with blood and there's 
blood on the ground. Seems that it 
is something evil creeping into them -
inside them, like spirits - that's what 
is fighting inside them and causing 
them to fight. 
Of significance here is the projecting into the two common large D's, 
i.e. "the men" being filled with blood, due to the association of 
the colours above and below the card. He clearly distinguishes 
this red from that which is projected inside them. 
On Card IV: 
Looks like a walking carpet, like a creature 
with his head bowed down, looking like he's 
scaring somebody -- I also do that walk with 
my head down and pretend to be the monster 
looks like a giant also, looking down at 
something. 
A clear example of a blurring occurring between himself and the card, 
· is displayed by the slip of the tongue, " and pretend to be the 
monster -" is significant in this sense. The start of the response 
"like a walking carpet", besides its highly unusual nature also reveals 
a rather concrete association, i.e. the texture response "carpet" 
concretely associated with the form stimulus to form - walking carpet. 
However, he later abstracts the idea into the monster, so adding to 
the improved overall quality of the response. 
A final example is Card IV: 
Looks like a symbol of an Indian tribe. Two 
creatures standing keeping it up from either 
side. They are dancing around the thing. I 
can almost feel the centre portion. 
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Again, a highly unusual response for this card, introducing 
dissociations of parts, where the card tends to lend itself to a 
more integrated response. He however, again saves the situation 
by relating the dissociated portions. However, the most pathological 
aspect again involves his concrete involvement in the action, i.e. 
blurring of ego-other boundaries in his "almost being able to feel" 
the centre portion. 
With respect to this card, an interpretation was made at a later stage, 
that the centre portion may be viewed as a phallus and may have 
something to do with his latent homosexuality, had a devastating effect 
on him, leading immediately to his wanting nothing more to do with the 
cards. In this reaction too, one can almost sense a paranoid 
suspicion of the cards, as threatening him. 
Trying to understand Dudley's pathological personality makeup partly 
in terms of a correspondence between symptom and early environment is 
a difficult task, not because of the obscurity of the association, but 
because of its excessiveness. Yet one interpretation related to his 
need to control the external environment proved to be of some value 
in understanding just one of the basic conflicts Dudley experienced, 
and this can be traced back to a unique early environment. 
Using Rey's concept of the borderline's level of representation of 
thought being at a very primitive action-schema level, an important 
break-through occurred in gaining entry in Dudley's need to control 
the external world. We saw one means was his metaphorical existence 
projected into numerous roles. A second related to his need to make 
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things "smaller" than himself. This concrete fear, whether it 
related to his being able to incorporate big things orally, anally, 
or whatever, was never established, but he himself was physically 
very small and quite frail. The following sequence of interchanges 
offers us a view into Dudley's big-small battle. 
He had been seen talking to someone quite freely the day before a 
therapy session by the therapist who said: 
Th. You seemed to be speaking very freely to the person 
yesterday. 
D. Yes. 
Th. Quite a lot of emotion was being expressed -- for you. 
D. Yes -- that's because he's a cripple. I don't have to 
do it (control) to them or homosexuals. 
Th. How come? 
D. Don't know, they just don't match me. 
Th. Match you? In a sense you are bigger than they are? 
D. That's right (with vehemence) -- that's what I mean by 
control -- control and survive -- if they're smaller 
than you then you must be bigger than them. 
Th. That theme has sort of occupied a lot of your life 
it seems. 
D. 
Th. The world as a whole appears quite big to you? • 
D. And me too small • 
It was found that this big-small "analogy" for the therapist was the 
experienced reality of Dudley. He recounted a remarkable episode 
while at High School, expanding on the concrete big-small reality 
and conflict of the borderline. He was made captain of a rugby team. 
. . . . . . . . ~ . . .. 
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To ensure that he remained "captain", he chose the rest of the team 
based on one criteria alone, their size, they had to be smaller than 
himself to qualify for his team. Thus tiny Dudley and the others 
all smaller and probably a lot younger than himself, lined up against 
a set of formidable opponents. 
than the others. 
To be "captain" meant being bigger 
Relating this defence mechanism to possible environmental origins, 
a little of his history is reported here. He was the ninth child 
out of ten sibs, and the only son. What is more he had a brother, 
a twln along with his seventh sister, who died after a few months. 
His mother he described as a very concerned person, very "over-
protective", whose'whole life revolves around her children, especially 
me because I was the only son." 
From the history it emerged that Dudley was breast fed at least up 
to 18 months, and possibly even later. Of greater significance 
however, is the fact that whenever he was stressed, he would run to 
his mother, who would calm him at her breast, in a mock feeding 
situation. All his sisters used to take turns in "holding him" when 
he got into trouble, as protectors, and his head would affectionately 
be placed at their respective bosoms. 
Dudley certainly never had a chance to "practice" his autonomy. Some-
one would always pick him up and hold him. 
Similarly there would be a great rush to wash him. He was bathed 
by someone everyday for about ten years. He recalls these times as 
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though he were "in paradise". In a sense he literally was - the 
paradisical fusion with an environmental mother. His father who 
had many years earlier withdrawn from the mainstream of family 
activiti, was in no position, even if he had wanted to, to compete 
for his son's company. As a result Dudley's contact, right up to 
the present, with his father, has been extremely scanty. 
Dynamically it appears that Dudley never had a real opportunity of 
escaping or psychologically emerging from the symbiotic stage of 
development. If this is so then it contradicts Mahler, Masterson · 
and Rinsley's ideas realting the borderline personality, solely to 
the rapprochement subphase of separation. At the same time it is 
agreed that this area of development is inadequately worked through, 
and the borderline certainly does not reach a point of truly autono-
mous functioning. It would appear that a tempting way out of this 
dilemma would be to assume that Dudley was constitutionally equipped 
to not remain fixated at a pre-rapprochement point, and only later 
to have these strengths finally crumble. This, however, as has 
been pointed out, is far too glib, and answers nothing at all. 
Similarly, it is the author's contention that while the suggestion 
that a clearcut and specified form and time-dependent mother-infant 
interaction lies at the bottom of borderline development, is an 
alluring and interesting prospect, it appears not to do justice to 
the full complexity of not only borderline development, but development 
as a whole. These two arguments are thus in themselves seen to be 
rather inadequate. 
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It is held that this focussing on purely or predominantly environ-
mental interaction between mother and child, or constitutional factors 
and to some attempt relate this interactionally to broad psycho-
sexual foci, does not do full justice to the function and role of 
the infant's fantasy life from the beginning. It is significant 
that both Klein and Kernberg, locate fixation points far earlier than 
do Mahler and others. The reasons suggested for this earlier location 
is felt to be due to the greater stress placed on the nature, power 
and onset of fantasy in the infant. At no stage does Mahler appear 
to interest herself with what or how the child is experiencing the 
world or more specifically his or her world. What the environmental-
ists are doing is to interpret what is going on from the. perspective 
of the adult, and inferring the processes operative in the child. 
Klein, while similarly applying an adult theoretical grid onto the 
productions of the child, can be seen to be remaining truer to the 
actual nature of the child's world, and especially, has become extremely 
appreciative of the extent, range and reality of fantasy in infancy. 
She however, appears to fall into the opposite trap of ascribing 
constitutionally based factors as dominant urges to borderline function-
ing. Following this line of argument therefore, it appears truer to 
say, that a complex quantitative, qualitative, and time dependent 
interaction of emotional, intellectual, experiential, etc. human 
components exists in the growing infant. That certain specific be-
havioural and emotional stages are reached and worked through, etc. is 
not disputed, but it must be stressed that the nature of the intra-
psychic reality of the child in relation to its particular understand-
ing and experiencing of its inner world, may significantly alter what 
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is seen and is interpreted by exgernally viewing adults. This 
author's contention therefore is this: A laid down developmental 
pattern of behavioural, intellectual, and emotional growth is evident, 
but the particular manner of experiencing and dealing with the crises 
particular to any one stage, is a unique function of the child's 
intrapsychic life. What determines the nature of intrapsychic 
functioning can only be speculated at, but that some understanding 
of these intrapsychic processes is possible, and hence makes the 
borderline's world accessible, is of far greater importance. 
As we' have seen, Dudley's world was continually threatened by a big 
and terrifying world of reality. Given some of the history outlined, 
it can be argued that inasmuch as he was never permitted to experience 
the outside world autonomously but was continually swept up and 
encouraged to be inextricably dependent with an environmental breast, 
his representational capacity of the outside world as a result remained 
at a primitive concrete, paranoid-schizoid level. His later years 
were preoccupied, especially when out of a relatively structured school 
environment, of needing to control an outside world which he feared 
would engulf and annihilate him. His defences as we have seen, can 
be seen to be relatively developed variations of a very primitive 
paranoid and schizoid split, his later experiences only serving to 
modify the quality of these mechanisms. In terms therefore of the 
nature-nurture debate no particular stance is taken for one or the 
other as dominant. What is held is that a third component born out 
of these two fundamentals, i.e. the structuring of the world by the 
infant's fantasy life is an equally fundamental factor. The form which 
this structured inner world takes is only very loosely bound by 
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generalised Jaws, and certainly to locate these limitations as 
mainly or purely external or internal is to over-simplify the 
complexity of the infant's psyche. 
Summary 
A brief criticism against what was regarded as glib in those theorists 
leaning toward either a constitutional or environmental basis for 
borderline personality development was made. The role of fantasy 
and the inner psychical mechanisms at work in structuring the infant's 
early world was introduced as a third fundamental factor in shaping 
development, arising out of and extending the scope of the nature 
and/or nurture viewpoint. This view endorsed the theories of those 
workers concerned with possible psychical mechanisms at play in main-
taining psychical reality as opposed to those attempting to establish 
aetiological paths, for borderline pathology, though aetiological 
actors were implicitly present but understood in a complex inter-
actional sense. This view represented in its final form the view of 
this author, and the major original contributors, Klein, Andre Green 
and Henri Rey, are acknowledged. This triadic interactional view 
defocussed from attempting to determine, finally, the aetiology of 
the borderline personality. Instead what was suggested was an under-
standing, from the perspective of the child's and later the border-
line's psychical reality, what some of the fundamental structuring 
processes underlying seeming bizarre symptoms and experiences may be. 
With respect to two clinical studies conducted by the author, a number 
of interpretations were made as to some of the possible underlying 
mechanisms of borderline pathology. There was essential agree'ment on 
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the dominance of splitting as a major defensive manoeuvre, but 
the vast ramifications of this defence were ~pecifically explored. 
Perhaps more importantly, the reader was taken into the split world 
of the borderline, to see as closely as possible some of the concrete 
modes of experiences which characterise this state. 
The inability to progress up a communicational-representational 
hierarchy due to the consequences of fundamental splitting process, 
was emphasised and the concreteness of borderline language structure 
was focussed on at some length. The reader was left with as close 
an experience of the borderline state, from the borderline perspective 
as possible, and as a result felt the uncanny accessibility of what 
appeared initially to be a most ephemeral and ever enigmatic state. 
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APPENDIX I 
CASE HISTORIES 
1. DUDLEY : 19 years 
Reason for Referral 
Dudley was referred in May 1980 from the Out-patients Department 
of a local Mental Hospital, showing the following symptoms: 
(a) Complaints of an inability to feel emotions, and was 
reported to have had a blunt affect. 
(b) He was virtually asocial, and very non-communicative. 
(c) He had suffered a suspected auditory hallucination. 
(d) He had had experiences of derealisation. 
(e) He could not read due to extremely poor concentration. 
(f) He had a morbid fear of being homosexual. 
(g) Certain obsessional features were evident. 
He had been treated on anti-psychotic medication (phenothiazines) 
without results for some while, and was referred for psychotherapy 
subsequent to this. He was suspected of being pre-schizophrenic. 
Family History 
Father: William, 63 years. Retired clerk after 25 years of service. 
Described as withdrawn and a loner. The patient describes their 
relationship as virtually non-existent, ''like a block between us". 
Dudley used to communicate to father via mother. Described as a 
man's man. Had been a heavy drinker up to time of Dudley's puberty. 
Arthritis sufferer. 
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Mother: Rhoda, 55 years. Housewife. "A born mother ••• her whole 
life revolves around her children." Very over-protective and over-
involved, but not really sensitive to specific needs. Patient feels 
that he had a better,but not a good relationship with his mother. 
Siblings: Nine siblings, eight, daughters and Dudley. 
Sandra - aged 30:) Looked after children and regarded by sibs as 
) 
Alithea " 28:) virtual mothers. 
Joan " 26: Diagnosed as schizophrenic; on medication. 
Wilma 
Ursula 
Wendy 
Zelda 
Dudley 
Janet 
II 25: Very concerned, and protective towards patient. 
Closest family member to him. Used to wash 
him for many years. 
" 24: Bad relationship with patient, frequent clashes. 
" 22: and twin who died after about three to four months. 
" 21: Reasonable relationship. 
" 19: Index patient. 
11 17: Poor relationship with patient. 
Family atmosphere 
The mar~tal relationship has been marked by frequent quarrels and 
arguments, often precipitated by father's drinking problem. Parents 
tend to ignore each other. Mother and daughters more or less form a 
unit. Dudley recalls being extremely embarrassed when his sisters 
would suggest possible girl friends for him • He could "never have 
brought a girl friend home." 
He shared a bedroom with three sisters for most of his life. Up to 
puberty he slept head-to-toe with one of them. 
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Personal History: Date of birth: 3. 3. 1961 
Pregnancy, birth, milestones - N.A.D. 
Health: Asthmatic as infant and still present, emerges after 
excessive exercises. 
Feeding: Breast or bottle fed up to at least two years, but possibly 
to 3% years. Always used to have his meals on his mother's 
lap, even at school going age, he would eat from his mother's 
or one of his sister's laps. 
Neurotic Symptoms: . Cannot recall original potty-training period, 
but was both secondarily enuretic and encopretic at nine years. 
Schooling: Went to co-educational school. Always average to above 
average. Regarded as lazy by teachers. Many acquaintenances, 
no good friends. Always a'~eader and rebel at school", i.e. 
trouble maker. Used to hate being caned in front of women 
in the class "used to fantasy killing the teacher". Good 
at orals. 
Work History: Left Std. 10 and wanted to be an actor. Wrote off to 
many drama schools in the U.K. Modelled himself on Marlon 
Brando, and James Dean. Went to educational psychologist 
with the expectation of having acting suggested as a career, 
but couldn't complete the tests, and had "a breakdown" and 
fled the rooms. 
He had never worked up to the time of therapy. 
He is currently employed in the building trad~. 
"'"-··· 
Sexual History: Started masturbating with excessive guilt at 12 years -
Masturbatory fantasies used often to be of a same sequence 
involving a girl friend and her mother, ending in his having 
sexual intercourse with the girl. 
He had never had sexual relations with anyone. 
(See History of Presenting Problem) 
Premorbid Personality: Major enjoyment music - Bob Dylan~ Don MeClean. 
Used to write reams of poetry and lyrics for music. Obsessed 
with the theatre and cinema and loved looking through books on 
these topics. Always a loner. Enjoyed his tapes, etc. in his 
own room. 
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History of Presenting Problem 
He states that his problems began in March 1979 while in Std. 10, 
while considering what he should do after school. Only career that 
came to mind was acting .. He reckoned that an actor needs to be able 
to observe both himself and the things about him astutely. He 
decided to start then. He said that he became extremely aware of his 
body and of all his movements, voluntary and involuntary. He felt that 
as a result of his super-awareness, he could never be spontaneous 
again, another prerequisite for acting. At this time he lost all his 
ability to concentrate and passed his exams on memory only. 
During his matric year he had been involved with an acting studio. 
A professional actor had invited him around to discuss acting as a 
career. (Dudley had just acted the role of a madman in an exercise). 
They met three or four times and on the last occasion the actor made 
a homosexual pass at Dudley. He froze and was unable to react. He 
was taken to the station, where he bolted from the car and took an 
entirely wrong train in a state of panic. 
28 April 1979. 
This occurred on the 
That same day, he claims that he had received his first set of 
spectacles, and the first person he saw ''through new eyes" was a 
homosexual friend. This event he feels sensitized him to the events 
which occurred later. 
A month or so after this event, he experienced all emotion draining 
from him, only being left with anger. 
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1979: After matric exams, saw an educational psychologist with view 
of becoming an actor. Due to "the nature of the tests and the general 
situation" that his intention was not going to be met, he was unable 
to do the tests, his concentration being minima~ and he left. 
He then consulted a private clinical psychologist for about three 
months. He left because he felt the psychologist to be homosexual. 
After a further one month, his obsessional symptoms and a feeling of 
being unreal increased, so much so that he saw a G.P. He was referred 
to Groote Schuur Hospital and subsequently to Valkenberg Hospital, 
where he was admitted. He stayed one week on the ward, on Stelazin~ 
and then left. He attended the O.P.D. till May 1980, when he was 
referred to the Psychology Department for management. 
Mental State Examination 
General Behaviour and Appearance: 
Neatly dressed, attractive, short adolescent. 
his 18 years. 
Talk 
Looked younger than 
Aspontaneous, but answered questions clearly. No formal thought 
disorder. Sometimes spoke by analogy however, but this was able to 
be followed and understood. 
Mood 
Flat, but not blunted. Not many facial expressions. Examiner did 
not feel as though real contact had been established. 
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Misinterpretation and Delusions 
Hypnogogic auditory hallucination elicited. No delusions or 
frank psychotic-like experiences elicited, with exception of de-
realisation experiences. 
He stated that he was frightened of the ~gross realities", which 
led him to "freeze and to feelings of excessive self-consciousness". 
Compulsive Phenomena 
Very aware of voluntary and involuntary movements. Had to walk 
around street poles and other objects, in a particular way, i.e. 
had to be "balanced". 
Cognition 
Adequate and intelligence judged to be average. 
Insight and judgement 
Aware that something odd about himself, defended about making judge-
ments about his future. 
appropriate. 
Generally speaking therefore, rather 
Overall Statement regarding the Course in Therapy 
Dudley was seen since May 1980, until May 1981, on a weekly and 
sometimes a twice-weekly basis. He would always be punctual at his · 
appointments. 
The overall time spent with Dudley could be divided into three 
distinct stages, named by the therapist the~omantic"; "End-of-
Romance" and "Past Romantic Realism" stages. These will be briefly 
outlined below. 
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(1) Romantic Stage 
This stage was dominated by Dudley reporting feelings of well-being, 
with symptoms dramatically reduced. He brought reams of material 
(dreams, poetry and lyrics) for discussion.,· The therapist was 
intrigued and unusually interested in the material brought for discussion. 
This period lasted roughly three months. 
(2) End-of-Romance Stage 
This period was marked by an increasing awareness and frustration on 
the part of the therapist, that the sessions were being used to 
essentially serve Dudley's narcissism. A distinct power struggle 
developed, with Dudley becoming increasingly abstract, and difficult 
to follow. The therapist's insecurities and anxieties were rife too, 
because he felt that no real attachment, or tranference, had been 
established. He made statements such as the following revealing a 
very aggressive element which was beginning to dominate the sessions. 
"Why is it that all psychologists and psychiatrists in this town can go 
just that far and no further?" He compared psychoanalysts of whom he 
had read with psychotherapists in this manner: Therapistswere like 
painters, while analysts were like sculptors, a far superior art." 
At this time the therapist confronted Dudley about the "word-game" 
level of the sessions. At this point he stated "ls this the end of 
the analysis?" and sounded and looked quite desperate. 
(3) Post-Romantic Realism Stage 
Many symptoms returned at this point. But the most important change 
occurred with return of emotions, and an emergence of a clinical. 
depression. Therapy proper began at this point, and the therapist 
for the first time felt that what had been a flighty ephemeral will-
of-the-wisp type of transference relationship, gelled into something 
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more concrete and real. This situation pertained for the following 
seven to eight months, until Dudley terminated due to "an inflexible 
work schedule". 
Psychometric Material 
S.A. Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. 
Information 12 
Comprehension 12 
Arithmetic 11 
Digits Combined 11 
Similarities 13 
59 
Verbal IQ = 118 
Performance = 118 
Full Scale IQ = 118 
Rorschach 
Picture Completion 
Object Assembly 
Bloc~ Design 
Digit Symbol 
Picture Arrangement 
14 
11 
12 
10 
11 
-
59 
I. (10") Thought of two men fighting over a woman. The woman 
is in a panic state. One man is naked. (Panic?) Yes, 
because of her hands - so small, like crab's hands. (Naked man?) 
, 
Yes - that's his buttock there. 
II. (15") Two men fighting. They're headless, and they're filled 
with blood, and there's blood on the ground. Seems that it is 
something evil inside the men - like spirits - which are 
fighting inside themselves, or it's causing them to fight. 
(What makes it seem like this?) Just something - the position, 
there's blood (i.e. at bottom) and two spirits above. 
(2 D's red portions). 
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III. (14") Two women fighting over a pot of food. Can be men too, 
women because there are breasts, men becauwe there's a penis 
too. 
IV. (14") Looks like a walking carpet - looks like the creature -
his head is bowed down, eyes up - don't know what he's doing, 
looks like he's scaring somebody. (I also walk with my head 
down - scaring people, - laughs). Looks like a giant also -
looking down at something. 
V. (3") Looks like two human beings abducting a third person. 
They are flying. The third person is a woman, she has plaits 
and her hair is standing up like this. 
attacking her too. 
Maybe two waves 
VI. (3") Looks like a symbol of an Indian tribe. Two creatures 
standing keeping it up from either side. They are dancing 
around the thing - I can almost feel the centre portion. 
VII. (1") Two females dancing with stylish hairdo's. Looks like 
a Black tribal woman - sort of uncivilized. Hair is tied 
together and they're standing with their backs against each 
other, and they're singing also. 
VIII. (3 11 ) Two chameleons and two flags also. There's a mountain 
with a stream. There's a butterfly. (How do you see them?) 
Individually. 
IX. (6") Two chickens in conflict. They're standing near to 
each other. (Chickens?) Ja, the shape. 
Also looks like two females because of the breasts. 
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x. (3") Seems like an alley leading through a throne. There 
are all sorts of creatures beside it. And there's a couple 
walking towards the throne, with their heads down, and they're 
holding hands. 
Looks like a battle field because they're covered in blood. 
2. PENNY: 32 years 
Reason for Referral 
Penny had been referred from Groote Schuur Hospital's Casualty 
Department having taken an overdose of Mogodon sleeping tablets. They 
diagnosed her as being in an agitated hypomanic state at the time, and 
assumed an underlying depression. This had been her second admission 
under similar circumstances in 1981; the first in January, and this 
second admission in March. 
Family History 
Father: 65 years. Accountant in Johannesburg. Shy, withdrawn,rather 
aloof person, but very severe. Never wanted children, but Penny became 
his favourite. Divorced when Penny 10 years old, now remarried. 
Became very depressed after divorce and admitted to hospital for short 
period. 
Mother: 56 years. Secretarial work. Warm, loving, accepting person, 
"a wonderful mother". Unable to really deal with Penny's father. 
Remarried two years after divorce. 
Step-father: 60 years. Kind, but not accepted by Penny. Has two children 
from a previous marriage. A "slogger". 
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Sibling: Christopher, 34 years. Very withdrawn. Lives in New York -
owns a clothing factory. Always had a rather distant relationship 
with Penny. 
Maternal Uncle had a leucotomy and a prolonged hospitalisation in U.K. 
Details unknown. 
Family Atmosphere: Parents always pretending to get on well. Made a 
great fuss of Penny. Sense of insecurity about marriage. Brother, 
went his own way from an early age. No harsh words spoken, but much 
undercurrent tension. Penny lavished with much affection, especially 
by mother at this time. 
After divorce, upheaval. Mother sent Penny to boarding school - because 
she couldn't "cope". She returned shortly afterwards. 
Personal History: 
Unplanned child. Pregnancy, birth, physical health N.A.D. 
Feeding - breast fed, no difficulties. 
Milestones Delayed speech milestones, spoke in sentences about 
2~ - 3 years. 
Neurotic Symptoms - Temper tantrums, banged head against floor; 
nightmares. Described as a "pale and nervous child". 
Schooling - Early schooling average, but from Stds. 1 and 2 onward 
either bottom of class or failed. Went to boarding school, aged 10 years 
Changed school frequently. Went to 5 High Schools and never passed. 
Assessment in hospital in 1974 revealed a below average Mill-Hill, and 
a defective Ravens Progressive Matrices. 
Discovered to suffer from dyscalculia, and finger agnosia. Spatio-
temporal ag~~sia evident too. 
185 
Work History - Left school aged 17 years and went to U.K. Attempted 
one year typing course. Unsuccessful. Series of menial jobs, unable 
to last longer than a few weeks at any of them. Very panicky and 
clumsy when under any sort of stress. Longest job as maid about 9 months. 
Sexual History - Normal menarche, heavy periods. 
Marital History - Married at 19 years very impulsively against family's 
wishes. Husband a labourer. Separated after four months. Married 
again in 1975. Met husband in hospital in U.K. - a homosexual schizo-
phrenic. Married for 5 years and'then husband committed suicide. 
Since the end of her first marriage she only relates physically to homo-
sexual men. 
Premorbid Personality. Reasonably sociable, but diffident and shy 
with strangers. Prone to anxiety and self-conscious. Labile mood, 
elated at times and depressed at others. Untidy but pre-occupied 
with bodily cleanliness. 
History of Presenting Problem 
After divorce with first husband in 1974, she suffered her first "break-
down", in the U.K., and was admitted to St. Mary's Hospital in London. 
Here she was diagnosed as a "Borderline Psychotic Personality Disorder". 
She manifested numerous symptoms, but mixed depression, anxiety, hypo-
mania and paranoia dominated. She also complained of persistent 
obsessional thoughts since 10 years of age. She was admitted for the 
first time on the 5 June 1974 and discharged on 17 January 1975, and 
readmitted 15 May 1975 and discharged 6 June 1975. 
After this date she attended the Outpatients Department regularly, and 
was readmitted for short spells from time to time. 
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With the suicide of her second husband she came back to South Africa. 
Shortly after arrival she was admitted to a casualty departmen4 having 
taken a small overdose of sleeping tablets. 
She was referred to Valkenberg Hospital and admitted. At that time 
her symptoms included: 
1. paranoid ideation 
2. manic-depressive mood swings 
3. eating and body image disturbance - anorexia 
4. self-mutilation 
5. alcohol and drug abuse. 
An EEG revealed a temporal lobe dysrhthmia. 
She stayed on the ward for some months, met up with a fellow patient 
and moved in with him on discharge. After he had taken an overdose 
in a depressed period, she did too, and was readmitted in February 1981. 
At this time her symptom picture was similar to that above. She was 
discharged after four months of admission. 
Course in Psycotherapy 
Penny was taken on for weekly sessions of supportive psychotherapy. 
These sessions were marked by an immediate lessening in her anxiety 
levels. She used to describe the sessions as similar to "having a good 
meal". The entire transference was dominated by an enormous oral 
dependency on the part of Penny. Any interpretation which suggested 
anything negative in terms of the therapist's regard for her, led to 
floods of tears. 
Equally, if she, on rare occasions expressed aggression or frustration, 
this was immediately countered by strong and crippling guilt feelings. 
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After discharge, Penny continued to see the therapist on a weekly 
basis but proved to be most unreliable, frequently missing appoint-
ments. Therapy was terminated after 5 months of contact. 
Psychometric Material 
Mill Hill 25th Percentile, below average. 
Ravens, defective. 
Rorschach 
Card I. ( 12") I don't know; looks like some bat. That's all. 
Card II. (14") Ah •.• another ••. That's blood isn't it ••• I don't know. -
Sex, it's terrible. 
Card II I. ( 4") They all look alike • • can't see anything here •. 
can't say. 
Card IV. (10") Another bat? Can't do it~ 
Card 
Card 
v. ( 2") 
VI. (14") 
That's a bat - it's flying. 
Doesn't look like an~thing. Don't know. 
I'm so bad. 
Card VII. (16") Nothing ••• again 
Sorry 
Card VIII. (17") Looks funny, but doesn't look like anything at all. 
Test discontinued at this point . 
.. . . " . ~ ....... . 
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